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effective means of disrupting commerce and damaging critical infrastructure.  In an 
attempt to develop a system of systems architecture to defeat mines and Maritime IEDs 
(MIED), the project team developed several system alternatives, or Adaptive Force 
Packages, that incorporate both existing systems and emerging technologies.  Overall 
performance was assessed using a US Joint Forces Command sponsored wargame 
simulating an MIED attack on ports based on the geography of Seattle and Tacoma.  A 
critical analysis of the alternatives based on performance, suitability, cost, and risk were 
carried out.  The study results showed that increases in performance are attainable with 
mixed results in cost and risk, and highlighted necessary actions and considerations that 
must be taken by military and civilian leaders in order to adequately prepare for and 
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 Insight gained from terrorist attacks, training excercises, and intelligence 
intercepts over the past few years has shown a renewed interest in the use of mining as an 
effective means of disrupting commerce and damaging critical infrastructure.  Although 
the risk of an MIED attack could be considered a low probability event, the importance 
ports and waterways play in domestic and global commerce demands timely and effective 
mitigation of the extremely high consequences associated with restrictions to port access 
should we face MIEDs in our MTS.  The students comprising Systems Engineering 
Analysis Cohort 14 were tasked to address this national concern as the focus of their 
capstone research project.  Their initial research led to the following problem statement: 
 
Design a system of systems that rapidly and efficiently mitigates the effects of a 
Maritime IED or Maritime IED threat to the Maritime Transportation System while 
protecting critical infrastructure and key port assets.  
 
 Following a procedural-based approach known as the Systems Engineering 
Design Process (SEDP), the project team developed a series of high level functions a 
system of systems would need to perform in order to fulfill the problem statement.  The 
high level system functions are Search, Detect, Classify, Identify, and Neutralize. The 
project team used these functions to engage a broad range of stakeholders involved in this 
problem, ranging from the Coast Guard and other Department of Homeland Defense 
entities, several US Navy commands, and business and industry leaders such as Northrop 
Grumman Corporation and Lloyd’s of London insurance market.  With stakeholder 
inputs, the project team translated the high level system functions into objective 
statements, measure of performance, and weighting criteria. 
 In order to address the immediate response needed to defeat this threat, a series of 
system alternatives were developed incorporating existing systems and technologies, 
emerging systems, and concepts under development that can be incorporated in the long 
term.  These concepts were combined into a series of alternatives, which we called 
Adaptive Force Packages (AFP), that address the varying effects of port environments on 
sensors and neutralization assets.  These force packages were analyzed for performance, 
 xxiv
suitability, cost, and risk using a variety of decision tools including wargames, modeling 
and simulation, cost-performance analysis, and suitability prediction. 
 A baseline system, termed AFP 0, modeled current capabilities and served as the 
baseline reference for performance modeling and analysis.  This AFP consists of REMUS 
unmanned vehicle platoons and explosive ordnace disposal (EOD) personnel.  While 
acknowledging that the US Navy has traditional mine countermeasure (MCM) assets that 
could be used in certain port scenarios, the long stationing times of MCM ships and the 
limited availability of MCM aircraft limit the use of these assets, and were therefore not 
modeled in this system. 
 AFPs 1 and 2 incorporate systems that are to be delivered to the government in 
the near future.  The timeframe these systems will become available ranges from 2009-
2015.  AFP 1 uses assets from the baseline AFP 0 and adds components of the Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS) Mine Warfare Mission Modules.  This package includes the 
AN/WLD-1 Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV), the AN/AQS-20 mine hunting 
sensor, and the Mission Package Computing Environment (MPCE) needed to operate the 
equipment pier-side without services of the LCS ship.  These additional components 
improve search performance but offer no additional neutralization capability. 
 AFP 2 incorporates emerging improvements to airborne MCM capabilities in 
addition to baseline components.  Incorporated here are the AN/AQS-20, deployed via 
HH-60 helicopters, and the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) for 
improvements in search and detection.  For improved neutralization, the system adds the 
Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS) and the Airborne Mine 
Neutralization System (AMNS), also deployed aboard HH-60 aircraft. 
 AFPs 3 and 4 are based on concepts that are more developmental and therefore 
scoped for implementation beyond 2015.  AFP 3 is based on the concept of the “Silver 
Bullet”, a single tool that can accomplish all mission functions.  This AFP incorporates 
modifications to the Talisman M being developed by BAE Systems.  This UUV carries in 
a single body sensors required for search, detection, and classification; two Archerfish 
Expendable Mine Neutralization System (EMNS) UUVs to identify and explosively 
neutralize contacts; and two conceptual SeaArcher chemical neutralizers that can 
neutralize underwater explosives without detonating them. 
 xxv
 Lastly, AFP 4 uses search and neutralization components from previous 
alternatives, namely REMUS and Talisman M UUVs, and adds the capability for them to 
communicate underwater and ashore using an acoustic modem network.  This network 
allows command and control (C2) commands and sensor data to be passed amongst the 
employed bodies and a shore based C2 center. 
 These force packages were analyzed for performance, suitability, cost, and risk 
using a variety of decision tools including wargames, modeling and simulation, cost-
performance analysis, and suitability prediction.  The results of this analysis are 
represented below: 
 









0             0 (Baseline) High High $43.9M Low 
1 0.39 High High $72.8M Medium 
2 0.64 Low Medium $84.3M Medium 
3 0.64 Medium Low $15.6M High 
4 0.70 Low Low $22.2M High 
 
 Based on the data that SEA 14 obtained from war gaming, modeling, and critical 
analysis, developmental concepts based on unmanned vehicles, advanced underwater 
communications, computer aided detection and classification, and non-explosive 
neutralization offer great potential for a timely, efficient, and effective approach to 
defeating MIEDs in homeland security scenarios.  These concepts ensure personnel 
safety, improved performance, reduced operation time, and low life cycle costs. For these 
capabilities to be attained, existing and new-start research and development efforts would 
need to be structured and funded at appropriate levels to ensure systems can be 
integrated, tested, and deployed in the near future. 
 SEA 14 learned other important lessons outside the initial project scope, and these 
lessons offer valuable insight into the MIED problem. One important lesson is that 
defeating MIEDs in any Homeland Security scenario involves more than just the 
significant tasks of determining appropriate systems and developing needed interagency 
cooperation.  Possibly, the most important cornerstone of reducing the effects of an 
MIED attack to the Maritime Transportation System is a standardized, national structure 
 xxvi
that can conduct baseline bottom surveys of ports and harbors, process and retain the 
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I. INTRODUCTION TO MARITIME IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES 
AND THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING DESIGN PROCESS (SEDP) 
 




SEA Cohort 14 (SEA 14) is composed of eleven students of the Systems 
Engineering Analysis (SEA) curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California. The SEA curriculum is a unique blend of systems engineering, operations 
analysis/research, and combat systems integration combined with joint professional 
military education. This unique course-load provides unrestricted line officers and 
defense civilians with a skill-set exceptionally adept at decomposing high-level problems, 
modeling the relationships of the realm in which the problem resides, creating technical 
solutions, and assessing the potential or demonstrated capabilities the designed solution 
presents. 
  SEA 14 is comprised of ten surface-warfare qualified officers and a 
Singaporean Ministry of Defense civilian. While the naval personnel bring a range of 
shipboard experience (including two with Fleet mine-warfare experience), the MOD 
civilian brings a wealth of knowledge from the contracting and program management 
fields. 
  The team used a modified matrix organization to capture the various fields 
of expertise brought to bear by team members, encapsulate the wide-variety of research 
areas and technical aspects of the problem, and distribute work evenly. The basic 
organizational structure of the team is shown in Figure 1. 
In addition to the traditional project manager and deputy project manager 
positions, three integrated project teams were established to conduct initial research, 
functional decomposition, and metrics evaluation. Additional positions of systems 
integration lead and wargame designer were established to ensure proper use of SEDP 
principles and provide early focus on wargame, modeling, and simulation efforts. 
Members were also assigned to specific areas of the project for advanced 
research. Such areas include unmanned vehicles, sensors, established programs of record, 




Figure 1 – Basic Organizational Chart 
 
  Project team members were also assigned to other ad hoc project teams for 
smaller objective teams charged with drafting SEDP products, wargame, modeling and 
simulation support, and research into emerging topics relevant to the study. 
 
 1.2. Tasking 
 
  Appendix 1 is the original tasking, as written, for the SEA Capstone 
Thesis Project.  This tasking is developed by the Systems Engineering Analysis 
Committee, an interdepartmental committee of the Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems 
Engineering that, along with inputs from OPNAV sponsors, and assigns the thesis level 
project to SEA cohorts. 
  According to the original tasking letter, SEA 14 was to “employ the 
systems engineering and analytical methodology” in order to “establish homeland 
specific needs to counter a domestic mining threat in naval and civilian ports.”  
Additionally, the team would “define program interdependencies in the Organic Mine 
Countermeasure System”, essentially determining how the systems and methodologies 
analyzed for Maritime Homeland Defense could be applied in the emerging naval 
concept of Organic Mine Countermeasures, where assets have an inherent MCM 
capability and are not reliant on dedicated MCM assets. 
  This tasking served as the initial guidance in scoping and bounding the 
problem and lead to the research that would enable the project team to understand the 
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current situation, historical references, and key stakeholders.  After reviewing the initial 
guidance, the team set out to understand the need for the stated objective. 
 
2. POTENTIAL FOR DISASTER 
 World trade is highly dependent on worldwide maritime transportation systems 
responsible for sustaining the expeditious and efficient flow of commerce on the sea. 
More than 80% of the world’s trade travels via these oceanic routes and must transit a 
handful of international straits and chokepoints1.+ With 50% of the world’s daily oil 
consumption traveling through these chokepoints, the potential for disaster is great2 In 
2003, the Organization for Economic and Cooperation Development (OECD) conducted 
a study and concluded that a coordinated attack on the national MTS would be measured 
in the tens of billions of dollars, yet trade through MTS continues to grow annually3.  
 Table 1, derived from a study conducted by the American Association of Port 
Authorities (AAPA) from the Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics, shows that 
world seaborne trade increased 34% (averaging 4.9% growth per year) between 1990 and 
20064.  
 









2006 1,814 517 711 755 262 3,128 7,187 5.0% 
2005 1,784 495 652 710 251 2,954 6,846 4.6% 
2004 1,800 465 590 650 250 2,787 6,542 6.7% 
2003 1,673 440 524 619 240 2,637 6,133 9.6% 
2002 1,588 414 484 570 245 2,294 5,595 1.5% 
2001 1,592 425 452 565 234 2,245 5,513 1.5% 
2000 1,608 419 454 523 230 2,200 5,434 5.3% 
1999  1,548 410 411 482 220 2,090 5,161 2.0% 
1998 1,524 402 417 473 196 2,050 5,062 -0.6% 
1997 1,519 410 430 460 203 2,070 5,092 4.8% 
1996 1,466 404 391 435 193 1,970 4,859 3.7% 
1995 1,415 381 402 423 196 1,870 4,687 4.0% 
                                                     
1 National Strategy for Maritime Security, White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/maritime-
security.html. 
2 World Oil Transit Chokepoints, www.doe.gov/cabs/world_oil_transit_chokepoint/full.html. 
3 Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact. Maritime Transport Committee. July 
2003. OECD. 
4 World Seaborne Trade 1975, 1980-2006. http: //aapa.files.cms-plus.com/statistics/world 
%5fseaborne%5ftrade.xls 
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1994 1,403 368 383 383 184 1,785 4,506 3.8% 
1993 1,356 358 354 367 194 1,710 4,339 2.8% 
1992 1,313 335 334 371 208 1,660 4,221 2.7% 
1991 1,247 326 358 369 200 1,610 4,110 3.3% 
1990 1,190 336 347 342 192 1,570 3,977 3.0% 
 
Table 1 – World Seaborne Trade 1990-2006 (Millions of Metric Tons) 
 
The United States is directly linked to the global economy and, thus, the global 
MTS. According to the AAPA, in 2006 there were eight US ports that ranked in the top 
fifty ports in the world for total cargo by volume and six based on total container traffic. 
Table 2 shows these US ports and their world ranking as of 20065. 
 
Trade Volume Rankings Container Traffic Rankings 
Rank Port Rank Port 
12 South Louisiana 10 Los Angeles, CA 
14 Houston, TX 12 Long Beach, CA 
20 New York/ New Jersey 18 
New York/ 
New Jersey 
42 Long Beach, CA 39 Oakland, CA 
46 Beaumont, TX 46 Savannah, GA 
48 Corpus Christi, TX 50 Tacoma , WA 
49 Huntington – Tristate - - 
50 New Orleans, LA - - 
 
Table 2 – US Port Rankings Based on Volume and Container Traffic 
 
 Tables 1 and 2 show how the US is strategically tied to the global economy 
through the MTS. Not included in these figures, however, is the critical bi-national St. 
Lawrence Seaway System.  
For nearly 50 years, the St. Lawrence Seaway has served as a vital transportation 
corridor for the international movement of bulk and general cargoes such as steel, iron 
ore, grain, and coal, serving a North American region that makes up one-quarter of the 
U.S. population and nearly half of the Canadian population.  Maritime commerce on the 
Seaway System annually sustains more than 150,000 U.S. jobs, $4.3 billion in personal 
                                                     
5 World Port Ranking-2006. http: //aapa.files.cms-plus.com/statistics/worldportrankings%5f2006.xls 
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income, $3.4 billion in transportation-related business revenue, and $1.3 billion in 
Federal, State, and local taxes6.  
 The St. Lawrence Seaway System is representative of how crucial sea transport is 
to the US economy and similar statistics could be drawn from any of the major US ports. 
Should a terrorist organization want to cripple the US economy, attacking—or even 
feigning an attack on—a major port could prove to be disastrous particularly because of 
the way the economy is organized.  
“Large U.S. firms held an average of 1.36 months of inventory in 2001, down 
from 1.57 months in the early 1990s.”7 David Closs of Michigan State University 
estimates this will increase to 1.43 months or more in the coming years. Just in Time 
economy (JIT) forces suppliers to rely on a constant stream of arriving goods to meet 
consumer demands. In this economic organization, if the stream is interrupted, the 
consumer demands will heavily outweigh the supply in a matter of weeks resulting in 
shortages, higher consumer costs, and staggering losses to the economy.  
Figure 2 shows the average domestic ground transport over trucking routes. 
Clearly, the major hubs for all domestic shipping are major ports such as Seattle, Los 
Angeles, Chicago, Houston, and New York. If any of these hubs were compromised and 
the supply stream interrupted, the downrange effects would be felt all along routes 
stemming from the ports. 
 A supply stream interruption is not unprecedented. In a 2002 strike, the LA/Long 
Beach Longshoremen demonstrated just such an interruption. The strike, only a draw 
down, not full work stoppage—and anticipated ahead of time—resulted in a $1.9B per 
day loss to the national economy8. Should a full stoppage result as the effect of an MIED 
attack on a port, the expected economic loss would be even higher.  
The idea of an international terrorist organization carrying out an attack on a US 
port or a global MTS chokepoint is not without merit. In April 2008, Osama Bin Laden  
                                                     
6 National Strategy for the Maritime Transportation System: A Framework for Action, presented by the 
Committee on the MTS, July 2008 
7 Carafano, J. and A. Kochems. 2005. Making the Sea Safer: A National Agenda fro Maritime Security and 
Counter-terrorism. The Heritage Foundation. 





Figure 2 – Average Domestic Ground Transport over Trucking Routes 
 
called for “Chokepoint Terrorism”9 and it is not unreasonable to assume an attack on 
either the US port system or the global MTS is in the near future. 
 
3. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
 Mines and MIEDs are the ideal asymmetric naval weapons used for more than 
two centuries by weak powers against the strong. Since the American Civil War, naval 
forces have been battling the threat of sea mines and the devastating effects they can have 
on shipping. In that war, both the Union and the Confederacy experienced losses from 
this asymmetric threat. The first vessel sunk by such a device was the USS CAIRO in 
186210. 
 The first mine deployed in combat was the Bushnell Keg developed by David  
                                                     
9 “Al Qaeda Affiliated e-journal: ‘The Sea is the Next Strategic Step Towards Controlling the World and 
Restoring the Islamic Caliphat’“ The Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor, 
http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/blog_personal.htm  
10 Nation Master. Encyclopedia>USS Cairo (1861). http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/uss-cairo-
(1861). 
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Bushnell during the American Revolution11. It was simple in design: a watertight wooden  
keg, filled with gun powder and tethered to the bottom by rope.  Bushnell laid several of 
these under the orders of General Washington in an attempt to destroy a fleet of British 
warships anchored near Philadelphia. Though unsuccessful in sinking a single ship, the 
potential for mining was seen and their place in the naval arsenal as both an offensive and 




Figure 3 – Bushnell Keg 
 
 3.1 Historical Examples     
  In the 19th century, mines were called torpedoes—a name probably 
conferred by Dennis Fletcher after the torpedo fish which gives powerful electric shocks. 
A Spar Torpedo was a mine attached to a long pole and detonated when the ship carrying 
it rammed another one. The CSS H. L. Hunley (Figure 4) used one to sink the USS 
Housatonic on 17 February 1864. Another early mine, the Harvey Torpedo, was a 





Figure 4 – Artists Rendition of CSS H.L.Hunley with a Spar Torpedo  
                                                     




  Since World War II, mines have damaged or sunk fourteen US Navy 
ships. The Korean War saw continued use of mine-laying by North Korean forces which 
damaged eleven US vessels, and as recently as the Iran-Iraq War, the USS Samuel B. 
Roberts (FFG-58) (Figure 5) struck an Iranian M-08/39 mine in the central Persian Gulf, 
wounding ten sailors. The USS Princeton (CG 59) and the USS Tripoli (LPH 10) were 




Figure 5 – USS Samuel B. Roberts Damaged Port Side 
 
  Simplistic design, effective results, and unknown locale will continue to 
enable these devices to exceed their design capabilities. Mines and MIEDs are perhaps 
the cheapest and most destructive weapon of choice of any potential adversary in the 
maritime domain.  
 
3.2 Terrorist Mining 
 In 1980, the US temporarily lifted a grain embargo on the Soviet Union 
prompting an act of domestic terrorism. An unknown caller identifying himself as the 
“Patriotic SCUBA Diver” was ideologically opposed to the shipment of grain to the 
USSR and arranged a hoax mine threat against the port of Sacramento. After four days of 
                                                     
12 Robert S Strauss Center. Mines. http://hormuz.robertstrausscenter.org/mines 
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searching and hundreds of thousands of dollars in lost ship lay days, the port was 
declared safe and reopened13. 
 In the summer of 1984, 19 commercial vessels reported damage from 
underwater explosions in the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez, which generated a massive 
multinational MCM response, Operation INTENSE LOOK. Egypt, Great Britain, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and the United States provided support to 
clearing the waterway.  Later it was determined that Libyan naval personnel used a 
commercial ferry to roll off the mines as it meandered throughout the waterway, 
completely unchallenged, for more than two weeks14. 
 On 21 April 2004, a tugboat operator on Lake Ponchartrain, Louisiana, 
spotted a suspicious floating bag and called the U.S. Coast Guard. The Coast Guard 
contacted the Jefferson Parish bomb squad, which fished the bag out of the water. It 
proved to be an IED with a few pounds of explosive in plastic pipes and a timer wrapped 
in trash bags to keep it afloat. One possible target was presidential hopeful Senator John 
Kerry, who had been scheduled for a campaign stop on the lake15. 
Even popular culture has demonstrated the potential hazards posed by 
MIEDs.  In Season 4: Episode 2 of CSI: New York, the high-tech crime-fighters discover 
an attempt to assassinate a foreign official by detonating an MIED under a helipad over 
the East River.  Fortunately, the Crime Scene Investigators are able to thwart the villains 
and prevent the MIED from exploding, but a real case of life-imitating-art-imitating-life 
could be disastrous. 
 
4. DEFINING THE PROBLEM  
 Initially, the project team was tasked with creating a System of Systems (SoS) to 
mitigate the effects of an MIED placed in a United States port. The initial tasking proved 
far too broad so the project team narrowed the scope of the problem to employ the 
Systems Engineering Design Process (SEDP) and develop a solution. 
                                                     
13 Truver, Scott. “Mines and Underwater IEDs in U.S. Ports and Waterways: Context, Threats, Challenges 
and Solutions”. Naval War College Review, Winter 2008, Volume 61, No. 1, pp-106-127. 
14 Truver, Scott, “The Mines of August: An International ‘WhoDunit’”,  U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 
(May 1985). 
15 Truver, Scott. “Mines and Underwater IEDs in U.S. Ports and Waterways: Context, Threats, Challenges 
and Solutions”. Naval War College Review, Winter 2008, Volume 61, No. 1 
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4.1 Narrowing the Scope 
SEA projects are assigned by the Systems Engineering Analysis 
Curriculum Committee with inputs from project sponsors such as OPNAV N85 or N71.  
The project assignment for SEA 14 can be found in Appendix 1.  After receipt of tasking, 
the project team first scoped the issue to include and understand the full spectrum of 
complicated, political, technical, and administrative issues.  Figure 6 displays a rich 




Figure 6 - MIED Rich Diagram 
 
  Once the problem had been scoped, the project team then used a series of 
design tools to bound the problem to a point where an achievable solution could be 





4.2 Problem Definition 
One method used to scope and bound the problem was to develop a 
problem statement the solution would be designed to address.  This problem statement 
was established early to guide initial project work, but was repeatedly iterated throughout 
the project schedule.   
  After receiving the initial project tasking, enclosed in Appendix 1, the 
project team formulated the following initial problem statement: 
 
Develop a system of systems to prepare and defend commercial ports, 
commercial transit space, and the associated inland waterways from the 
threat of maritime improvised explosive devices.  If defense fails, the 
system of systems will enable port recovery via the effective and timely 
search of above-stated waterways, conduct of command and control 
activities, and the mitigation of commercial impact to the port, regional, 
and national economies.  
 
  A series of statements to further scope the problem were also developed.  
They were: 
 a. Geographic space includes transit lanes and adjacent waters 
that impact the flow of commerce or the local economy of a domestic port, 
b. Solution shall be available to be implemented in US 
strategic ports by 2015, 
c. Focus on domestic ports, but assess solutions applicable to 
international implementation and 
d. Focus on the Underwater, Floating, and Infrastructure 
Borne subsets of maritime improvised explosive devices 
  As research, exercise analysis, and interviews were conducted, it became 
evident that the problem could be categorized as having an extremely high impact on the 
economy with reaching political concerns but was of such low probability that funding 
and dedication to prevention, preparation, and process ownership might negate effective 
response in these areas. Under advisement from port security and Coast Guard 
stakeholders, the project team decided to create a product that would operate in an 
environment with very little battle space preparation, could work within existing port 
security measures, and would provide a cost effective means of mitigating lost commerce 
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should a threat response be necessary. A revised problem statement was finalized to 
reflect this change in project scope: 
 
Design a system of systems that rapidly and efficiently mitigates the effects 
of a Maritime IED or Maritime IED threat to the Maritime Transportation 
System while protecting critical infrastructure and key port assets. 
 
  Within the revised problem statement, the phrase “system of systems” 
(SoS) references the SEDP process the project team used (described in Chapter I, Section 
5) and implies the system’s ability to interoperate with other components of the SoS and 
within existing port security measures. “Rapidly and efficiently” refers to both the 
timeliness and effectiveness of the system along with an importance on system suitability 
factors. The MTS is defined in the Maritime Transportation System Security 
Recommendations, one of the eight documents supporting the National Strategy for 
Maritime Security.  Critical infrastructure and key assets are also defined in the National 
Strategy for Maritime Security and its supporting documents. 
  The four scope supplements (a.– d. above) were maintained and a fifth 
was added.  Due to budgeting and acquisition processes, a 2015 solution would not be 
able to incorporate emerging technologies or developmental systems and would not be 
available in the near term to combat threats that could occur at any time. Therefore, a 
two-stage approach was adopted.  First, a system comprised of existing technologies and 
methodologies would be developed to combat a near-term threat as soon as 2009.  The 
second step would develop a true SoS an incorporate acquisition timeline concerns and 
be fielded by 2015. 
 
4.3 MIED Definitions 
An Improvised Explosive Device (IED) can be made of any type of 
material and/or initiator and is designed to inflict damage to an unsuspecting victim.  
These devices are traditionally homemade devices and are designed to cause death or 
injury by using explosives alone or in combination with toxic chemicals, biological 
toxins, or radiological material. IEDs can be produced in varying sizes, functioning 
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methods, containers, and delivery methods and can utilize commercial or military 
explosive components. 
  The project team defined MIEDs as improvised explosive devices 
employed in the maritime domain and can be found in four varieties: Floating, Watercraft 
Borne, Maritime Infrastructure Borne, and Underwater.  
 
  4.3.1. Floating MIED  
   A non-tethered explosive device placed or fabricated in an 
improvised manner, which is visible on the surface and/or free-floating in the water 
column.  Floating MIEDs may be difficult to detect and neutralize because they are free-
floating—following the currents—and may be found above the swath width of the 
detection devices employed for convention mine hunting operations.  
 
  4.3.2. Watercraft Borne MIED 
  An explosive device attached to watercraft. The project team 
defined this device as “any vessel or craft designed specifically and only for movement 
on the surface of the water”. These craft may be unmanned, manned, or remotely 
controlled and may motor driven vessels, sailboats, or submersible/semi-submersibles.  
This MIED may be targeted against the water borne craft itself or used in combination 
against external target. 
 
  4.3.3. Infrastructure Borne MIED 
   An explosive device placed—or fabricated—in an improvised 
manner and attached to any maritime infrastructure embodiment (e.g., piers, buoys, 
markers, bridges, etc) with the intent of disrupting the maritime domain.  
 
  4.3.4. Underwater MIED 
   An explosive device placed and detonated in the water column 
with no protrusions above the surface of the water from either itself or propulsing 




5. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING DESIGN PROCESS   
 In order to facilitate and monitor the progress of the design for the proposed SoS 
to counter the threat of mines or MIEDs, the SEDP was adopted. The process is 
comprised of four sections: initial research, problem formulation, analysis of alternatives 
and implementation. The project schedule is then tied in with the SEDP with the project 
end date fixed. Figure 7 shows the mapping of SEDP with the board project schedule. 
 
5.1. Initial Research 
  With the problem and task outlined, initial research was conducted 
covering the wide-variety of MIED topics and their relation to the SEDP.  Such research 
areas include the conduct of mission analysis, the development of threat scenarios 
 
 
Figure 7 – Systems Engineering Design Process 
 
to test our alternative solutions, the development of a Concept of Operations (CONOPs) 
and determining of customers and stakeholders.  At the same time, the project team 
conducted research into current solutions, systems, methodologies, and technologies that 
have been used or are in use to counter the threat of mines and MIEDs.  
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 5.2. Problem Formulation 
  After the initial research on the problem, the project team then conducted 
problem formulation. In this phase, the project team worked to establish a problem 
definition and scope it within the timeline and boundary of the project. This process 
involved the conduct of stakeholder analysis to gain insight into the desires of project 
teams and entities involved in the problem, constant feedback and revision to the problem 
statement and scope as we became more aware of pertinent issues, performance of 
functional analysis to understand what the system must accomplish, and the development 
of a functional architecture that outlines the sequence and structure of the tasks identified 
during functional analysis. 
 
  5.2.1. Stakeholder Analysis 
   In the stakeholder analysis, the interested project teams and entities 
of the system were identified and project teamed according to their influences on the 
system. This phase resulted in a weighted scale that allowed the stakeholders that were 
most closely-related to the problem have precedence in the decision-making process 
while still being able to evaluate the concerns and desires of project teams and entities 
with lesser involvement. 
   The views of the stakeholders were gathered through survey and 
interview. These inputs were then translated into requirements/needs and were rated 
according to their importance. To quantify the desires of stakeholders for use in later 
analysis, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was used to compare the relative 
importance of the various requirements/needs.  
 
  5.2.2. Refine Problem Statement 
   With the inputs from the stakeholders gathered and the initial 
research on the problem completed, the initial problem statement was refined to focus on 
the areas of concern and perceived gaps in the status quo while simultaneously bounding 
the problem to an attainable scope within the project timeframe. 
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5.2.3. Perform Functional Analysis 
   Functional analysis is a critical step in implementing SEDP. 
Functional terms were used to define the systems needs and basic requirements from top-
level down.  The objective of functional analysis is to specify the “whats”, not the 
“hows”, that need to be accomplished. It is intended to translate the system 
tasks/requirements into “functional” terms. A convenient mechanism for communicating 
this information is the functional hierarchy. Figure 8 shows the final functional hierarchy 
developed by the project team.  This functional hierarchy was used to model the actions 
required to effectively prevent, counter, and recover from an MIED placement.  As 
discussed later, this functional hierarchy changed as the project team narrowed the scope 
of the project.  
 
5.3 Analysis of Alternatives 
 
Upon completion of the problem formulation—which also draws out the 
functional architecture of the proposed system—the project team then developed the 
Figure 8 –Functional Hierarchy 
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physical architectures and generated various system alternatives. At the same time, the 
metrics to measure these alternatives and methodologies used to evaluate the 
performance of the alternatives were generated.   
 
  5.3.1. Developing Alternatives 
   Morphological charts were used to assist the project team in the 
development of alternatives. This structured brainstorm methodology helped to generate 
multiple potential solutions to the problem.  Figure 9 depicts and example of a 
morphological chart. 
 
5.3.2. Generate Metrics to Measure Effectiveness/Performance 
Metrics and system architecture were generated during this stage. 
The objective of metrics is to provide a quantitative evaluation of the effectiveness and 
performance of the various alternatives. Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures 
of performance (MOPs) were developed to provide a snapshot of the system as a whole 
and at the sub-system level. 
 
Search Detect Classify
ID Search Method Deploy Control  Assets Exe Search Method Locate Mark Obtain Char. Process Char.
DoD Decision Maker Air Deploy (Helo, Fixed wing, self)
Autonomous (UUV/AUV/ 
Marine Mammal) DoD Search Team DoD Detect Team Electronic DoD Classify Team DoD Classify Team
Civilian Decision Maker Ground (Train, Truck, 
etc)
Remote-Controlled Civilian Search Team Civi lian Detect Team Physical Civilian Classify Team Civilian Classify Team
ICS Unified Commander Sea (Ship, Barge, self) Manned USCG Classify Team USCG Classify Team
Site Launch (Crane, 
Ramp, Drop, Disembark) Pre-programmed  
 
Figure 9 – Example of Morphological Chart 
 
  5.3.3. Modeling and Simulation 
   At this stage, various modeling and simulation techniques were 
developed and conducted to obtain the data necessary to calculate the MOEs and MOPs 
for the various alternatives. War gaming, computer modeling, and spreadsheet simulation 






The final phase of SEDP is the implementation phase. The goal for this 
phase is to carry out the decision analysis of the alternatives with reference to the MOEs 
and MOPs obtained from the modeling and simulation exercise. It involved cost analysis, 
risk analysis, sensitivity analysis, trade-off study and finally the recommendation of 
preferred alternatives. 
 
  5.4.1. Decision Analysis 
   Decision analysis is the procedure and methodology for identifying 
and assessing the important aspects of a decision by applying the maximum expected 
utility action to a well-informed representation of the decision. Cost analysis, risk 
analysis, sensitivity analysis and trade-off study were conducted for the study.  
 
  5.4.2. Cost Analysis 
   The goal for cost analysis is to estimate the total cost of the various 
identified alternative systems. Total cost of ownership (TCO) is used to estimate the cost 
of the identified alternative systems. TCO is the life cycle cost (LCC) of the system plus 
the sum of the indirect cost components—such as costs associated with research, 
development, procurement, operation, logistical support and disposal of an individual 
system including the total supporting infrastructure that plans, manages and executes that 
system program over its full life. 
 
  5.4.3. Risk Analysis 
   Risk analysis was conducted to identify and manage the risk 
associated with the proposed alternatives. The goal is to identify cost, schedule, and 
technical risk so that they can be controlled, and that the consequences of courses of 
action can be determined early in the process. Risk consists of mainly two parts, i.e. the 
probability (likelihood) of failing to achieve a particular outcome and the consequences 
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Figure 10 – Example of Risk Matrix Plot 
 
  5.4.4. Sensitivity Analysis    
   Sensitivity analysis was conducted to investigate the robustness of 
the study by varying the different weights used for decision-making criteria. In general, 
sensitivity analysis tried to identify what sources of uncertainty affected the study's 
conclusions most. 
 
  5.4.5. Trade-off Study    
   A trade-off study is the activity of finding the solution to a problem 
that simultaneously satisfies a series of measures or cost functions. These measures 
describe the desirable characteristics of a given solution. Multiple Criteria Decision 
Making (MCDM) methodology such as min-max methods, min-max regret methods, 
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II.  PROBLEM FORMULATION 
 
1. STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION 
 The following entities were identified as potential stakeholders: 
a. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) – 
Federal agency focused on the condition of the oceans and the atmosphere.  
b. Program Executive Officer Littoral & Mine Warfare (PEO LMW) 
– Responsible for development and acquisition of Littoral & Mine Warfare Naval 
Systems.  
c. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) – Senior 
military officer in the Navy, responsible to the Secretary of the Navy for command, 
utilization of resources, and operating efficiency of the operating forces of the Navy and 
of the Navy shore activities assigned by the Secretary.  
d. U. S. Coast Guard Headquarters (USCG HQ) - Its core roles are to 
protect the public, the environment, and U.S. economic and security interests in any 
maritime region in which those interests may be at risk, including international waters 
and America's coasts, ports, and inland waterways.  
e. U.S. Coast Guard Sector Charleston and District 13 & 14. 
f. Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City (NSWC PC) – 
Division of Naval Sea Systems Command focused on research, development, test and 
evaluation, in-service support of mine warfare systems, mines, naval special warfare 
systems, diving and life support systems, amphibious/expeditionary maneuver warfare 
systems, other missions that occur primarily in coastal (littoral) regions.  
g. Commander Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command 
(CNMOC) – Operational arm of the Naval Oceanography Program, focused on providing 
critical environmental to warfare disciplines of Anti-Submarine Warfare, Naval Special 
Warfare, Mine Warfare, etc.  
h. Naval Oceanography Mine Warfare Center (NOMWC) – Provides 
ongoing support for the Navy’s mine warfare forces to neutralize threats and to allow for 
assured access of maritime assets.   
 22
i.  Naval Mine & Anti-Submarine Warfare Command (NMAWC) – 
Assure access for Joint, Coalition, and Maritime Homeland Security operations by 
providing able and quick reaction combat capability across the full spectrum of Mine 
Warfare.  
j. Explosive Ordnance Mobile Unit One (EODMU1) 
k. Mine Warfare Training Center (MINEWARTRACEN) 
l. U.S. THIRD Fleet (C3F) – Delivers combat-ready naval forces, 
executes fleet operations, and defines future fleet requirements in order to deter 
aggression, preserve freedom of the seas, and promote peace and security.  
m. U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) – Anticipates and 
conducts Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations within the assigned area of 
responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests.   
 In addition to the above listed Department of Defense (or DoD affiliated) 
stakeholders, there also included numerous secondary stakeholders. These include: 
a.  Klein Associates – Manufacturer of Unmanned Underwater 
Vehicles and other technologies. 
b.  Northrop Grumman - Manufacturer of Unmanned Underwater 
Vehicles and other technologies. 
c.  Lockheed Martin - Manufacturer of Unmanned Underwater 
Vehicles and other technologies. 
d.  Lloyd’s of London – UK based, worldwide insurance underwriter 
serving many of the world’s largest maritime transportation companies. 
e.  Orca Maritime – Employs today’s technology, executed by 
experienced operators, to provide solutions for today’s undersea security challenges.  
f.  Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) San Francisco. 
g.  The following Ports: Port of Portsmouth, Port of Charleston, Port 
of Savannah, Port of Honolulu, Port of Oakland, Ports of Seattle/Tacoma. 
 
2. NEEDS ANALYSIS 
 Having identified potential stakeholders, the project team conducted phone 
interviews, email correspondence, and site visits to gain an understanding of the problem 
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as viewed by the various stakeholders, and encapsulate the differing needs of each.  It 
was understood that with the wide variety of stakeholders in the problem, ranging from 
insurance companies, military commands, Coast Guard activities, and industry 
representatives, that some priorities would not be consistent across the stakeholder 
spectrum.  Therefore, after understanding the needs, the project team reconciled 
conflicting priorities by assigning general weights to stakeholders depending on their 
involvement in the end-use of the product and by the level at which our system solution 
would benefit them.  From this analysis, the functions the system would need to perform 
and their relative importance to mission completion would be determined, weighted, and 
used in decision analysis.  
  
 2.1. Stakeholder Analysis  
 The Stakeholders in the MIED system development process are persons 
with a vested interest in the system being promoted.  These stakeholders are grouped into 
the following categories: Primary, Secondary, and External.  The fundamental goal of the 
stakeholder analysis was to identify person(s) with a vested interest to either support or 
encourage reform or propose systems and alternatives. 
 Stakeholders were interviewed initially to determine weaknesses with the 
current process and their desires for improvement.  Each stakeholder has a different 
paradigm that is relative to their function in the maritime trade process and their 
“closeness” to the problem of an MIED.  Key stakeholders are identified in the above 
table as “Primary”. That is, those who are responsible to keep a port open and respond to 
an MIED threat.  Secondary Stakeholders have a large stake in the system, are high 
profile, and are affected either directly or indirectly by a port closure. External 
Stakeholders are those who are affected by an MIED or a system to assist in its recovery, 
but have very little if any direct input or involvement in the solution. 
The Relative Priority of Interest is defined as the following: 
1 – The stakeholder cannot make decisions regarding the use of the 
resources. 
2 – The stakeholder is one of several persons that can make 
decisions regarding the resources. 
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3 – The stakeholder can make decisions regarding the use of the 
resources in their particular organization or area. 
4 – The stakeholder is ultimately accountable for the process 
 
2.1.1.  Primary Stakeholders: 
 a. Commercial Port Security Departments - The Port Security 
Department incorporates security as a priority into their business strategies to ensure the 
uninterrupted flow of goods from ships to the rest of the country. With goals to reinforce 
safety and security at all port assets, they collaborate with other organizations and 
governments for an integrated security approach, and participate in national and global 
security efforts to facilitate the smooth flow of international commerce. 
 b.  Coast Guard - The Coast Guard is ultimately accountable 
for the safety of ports and harbors. As such, the Captain of the Port as the likely Incident 
Command System (ICS) Incident Commander is the primary end user of any counter-
MIED system. 
 c.    Local Authorities - The local police, fire departments and 
medical services may be involved during any response or recovery effort resulting from 
an MIED. Therefore, they are deemed as a primary stakeholder who will benefit 
immediately and directly from any system that may keep them out of harm’s way and 
expedite a cohesive response. 
 d.  Department of Defense -  The U.S. Navy is currently 
the recognized expert in the field of mine warfare, and the best executer for an MIED 
response due to their equipment and training. The Navy is also funding and training 
personnel in efforts to combat mines and MIEDs. 
 
  2.1.2.  Secondary Stakeholders 
a.  Department of Commerce - By definition, the Department 
of Commerce has the historic mission "to foster, promote, and develop the foreign and 
domestic commerce" of the United States. This has evolved, as a result of legislative and 
administrative additions, to encompass broadly the responsibility to foster, serve, and 
promote the Nation's economic development and technological advancement. A 
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disruption in trade via the ports would trickle down through all inter-modal means and 
spread throughout the country.  
 b.  Federal Bureau of Investigation - The FBI is tasked with 
protecting communities and businesses from the most dangerous threats and responsible 
for the criminal investigation of a maritime terrorist act.  The closure of a port would 
affect the port itself and the trading partner nation, but additionally the rail and trucking 
industry, small business who receive trade the received goods and industry and 
consumers that use the goods.  The effects of a port closure due to an MIED are far 
reaching, and therefore shall easily fall into the FBI’s area of concern. 
 
  2.1.3. External Stakeholders 
 a.  Lloyds of London - As a major insurer of cargo and cruise 
vessels, they have a substantial monetary concern that cold result from the damage to a 
ship or its cargo. 
 b.  Wholesalers/Retailers - Wholesalers and retailers rely on 
the flow of goods in a timely manner to their businesses so they may trade or consume 
the products for industrial needs.  The loss of a single port, if even for a short period, 
would be felt by commerce nation-wide. 
   c.     Environmentalists - The explosion of an MIED can cause 
fuel leaks, contamination, kill wildlife, etc. Therefore, the safe identification and disposal 
of such a device is the environmentalist’s best interest. Environmentalist groups may also 
be concerned about the counter-MIED system itself, as the technology it employs may 
have an impact on the environment or wildlife. 
 
 2.2. Needs and Constraints Analysis 
A needs and constraints analysis was carried out to study the present needs 
and constraints faced by the various stakeholders in dealing with the stated problem. At 
the same time, the analysis was conducted to help to outline the general direction and 





2.2.1 Needs Assessment 
In order to assess the needs of the stakeholders for the problem, the 
project team uses the following tools to help to identify the key issues/needs and 
prioritize them: Functional flow diagram and Stakeholder survey. 
a.  Functional flow diagram - A functional flow diagram 
shows the functions that the system must perform to satisfy the system needs statement or 
system goal in accordance with the contents of the overall mission. In view of the 
problem of countering MIED, the team first formulated the functional flow of a terrorist 
attack and identifies the key problem/issue that the US ports may face. Figure 11 




Figure 11 – Functional Flow Diagram of a Terrorist Attack of a US Port 
(Courtesy of Dr. Robert Harney, NPS) 
 
From the functional flow diagram shown in Figure 11, it is noted 
MIEDs being delivered, emplaced and detonated would be the main concern of any US 
ports (i.e. the function block highlighted in Figure 10). This also displayed the need for a 
system to prevent the delivery and emplacement of the MIED and a system to quickly 
locate and neutralize the MIED in order to minimize impact on the shipping operation to 
and out of the port.  
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b. Stakeholder Survey - A stakeholder survey was also 
conducted to gather feedback and view from the stakeholders on the needs to counter the 
MIED / mines problem (focusing mainly on mitigation of MIED attack). An electronic 
survey was sent to the following stakeholders to gather their view on the importance of 
each of the function identified in mitigating the impact of MIED attack. 
a. USCG Captains of the Port 
b. Port Security Representatives 
c. Associates of ORCA Maritime, Inc  
d. Maritime Union Members 
e. Mine Warfare Association Members 
f. Lloyd’s of London Joint War Committee 
g. US Northern Command Staff 
h. Law Enforcement Personnel 
i. Representative from PEO LMW 
j. Navy Mine and ASW Command Civilian and 
Military Staff  
k. Coast Guard Head Quarters Staff 
l. Engineers from Naval Surface Warfare Center  
Feedback from the stakeholders was compiled and analyzed using 
an AHP. The AHP carried out a pairwise comparison of the various functions and ranked 
the relative importance of each function according to the stakeholders input. From the 
input gathered, it was noted that the key objective is to clear the MIED in the shortest 
possible time without incurring damage to infrastructure and resume normal port 
operation as soon as possible.  
 
2.2.2 Constraints Analysis 
Constraints analysis is a methodology for identifying a critical path 
among all the actions potentially needed to create the design of a SoS for the stated 
problem.  It was carried out to examine and quantify the factors that limit the current 
available and possible future solutions in solving the problem. The steps in identifying 
the constraints and gaps in current systems were as follows. 
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1) Identify current situation, 
2) Identify the desired situation, 
3) List the gaps and constraints between desired and current 
situation, and  
4) Study the causes of the performance gaps and constraints. 
 
2.2.1.1 Current Situation 
         Based on the feedback obtained from the various MCM 
exercises attended by the members of the team, the team envisage the MCM process and 
worked out a typical function flows diagram of the MCM operation in a local port if there 
is a MIED threat. The detail function flow is shown in Figure 12. 
            Presently, the entire operation from report of threat to 
return to normal operation for the port would typically take a few days, up to a week or 
even a month, to complete. During this period of time, active shipping would be 
restricted resulting in potentially huge loses to commercial throughput and downrange 
through the supply chain management. 
 
2.2.2.2 Desired Situation  
The desired situation is to minimize the impact of the 
MIED threat by shortening the port closure duration such that commercial shipping can 
re-commence operation with minimum impact to the economy and reduce the threat the 





Figure 12 – Functional Flow for Counter MIED Threat 
 
 2.2.2.3. Gaps and Constraints 
From the above functional flow, the gaps and 
constraints identified are shown in Figure 13 and listed below.  
a. Constraints 
• Interagency co-operation required 
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• Limited resources / assets 
b. Gaps 
• Operation procedure for interagency 
cooperation 
• Limited non-destructive neutralization 
technology 
• Performance of search, detection and 
identification technology 
• Required highly trained personnel and large 
amount of time to carry out post mission 
analysis 
• Regular updated port survey needed  
 
2.2.3     Proposal Outline 
Based on the gap and constraint identified, the team reviewed 
and outlined the problem and direction toward solving the problem. Thus, the team 
objective was to proposal a System of Systems to counter MIED, focusing on searching, 












Figure 13 – Primary Gaps / Constraints Identified 
 
  
2.3. Input/Output Model  
  To better understand how to construct a SoS, the project team developed 
an Input/Output model. This model—derived from stakeholder needs—incorporates 
controllable and uncontrollable aspects and displays the intended and unintended outputs 
from the SoS. 
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Physical:  
Weight,  Dimensions, Speed,
Swath Width, & Resolution
Human:
Qualified  Operators &  
Operability (Interfaces)
Informational:
Tech Manuals, Techniques,  







Employ able & Deployability
Uncontrollable Aspects
Physical:
Bottom Type/Clutter Density,  
Water Depth,  Water Clarity,  
Burial Rate,  & Sea State
Human:












- Threat detected, classified, identified,
and countered
- Accurate transmission of positive or
negative detection, identification,
classification, or countering of threat
- Improved MDA
- Minimized impact to MTS and CI/KR
- Reduced risk of loss of life





- False detections, identifications, or
classifications
- Financial impact during system  operation
- Exportability to non-U.S. commercial
ports
- Use to mitigate effects of disasters
and/or other  disruptions to MTS
- Potential multiple useage (dredging,
clear fouled channel, terrain mapping,
ecological survey, etc.)
- Assist in Law Enforcement investigations
 
Figure 14 – Counter MIED System of Systems Input/Output Model 
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  2.3.1.  Controllable Aspects 
   Controllable aspects are those that can be measured, calculated, 
built, or compiled by the designers in the developmental and test and evaluation phases. 
These range from the physical characteristics such as size and speed to the human aspects 
such as the interface systems and the qualification of specific operators. Also considered 
controllable are the economic considerations—or how much it costs—and the 
informational aspects, which will dictate how the SoS will be employed. 
 
  2.3.2. Uncontrollable Aspects 
   Uncontrollable aspects are that that are beyond the control of the 
designers. These vary from the physical aspects (i.e. environmentals) to human error, 
interactivity issues, and doctrinal problems. 
 
  2.3.3. Intended Outputs 
   Intended outputs are those which are key to the SoS desired end 
state. Several key outputs were identified:  
a. Detection, Classification and Identification. 
b. Threat Countering. 
c. Ability to accurately transmit information (i.e. knowing 
when the threat has been detected, classified, identified, and countered). 
d. Improved Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). 
e. Minimization of the operational impact to the port’s key 
resources and critical infrastructure. 
f. Reduced risk of loss of life. 
g. Reduced capital lost due to the threat. 
  2.3.4. Unintended Results 
   Though the SoS is designed to counter MIEDs, several unintended 
outputs will inevitably result. Some potentially negative unintended outputs, or by-
products, were identified: 
a. Potential false sense of security provided should the data be 
wrong.  
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b. The financial impact having the SoS operating in a port. 
c. Other by-products may provide additional incentive to 
pursue development of the SoS. These include:  
• Exportability to non-U.S. ports,  
• Mitigate the effects of natural disasters and/or 
disruptions to the MTS  
• Assist in normal port operations (i.e. dredging) 
• Assist in law enforcement investigations 
 
3.  FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
  
 3.1 Functional Decomposition 
  In order to understand the purpose of the system, the project team 
conducted research on all the actions the system would need to do to accomplish the 
mission.  After conducting this research, the project team had a brainstorming session and 
developed a full spectrum of functions that must be accomplished to prevent, respond to, 




Figure 15 – Initial Functional Hierarchy 
 
  As the figure shows, this system would employ a full range of counter 
MIED functions, including preparing ports for threats, a full suite of sub-functions meant 
to prevent MIED emplacement, all actions required to detect and remove an MIED, and 
 35
the actions taken once a threat is removed to restore the port or waterway to normal 
operations. 
  A significant research opportunity was met through the project team 
attending the Mine Warfare Association 8th International Symposium on Technology and 
the Mine Problem hosted at the Naval Postgraduate School.  The general theme of this 
conference, which was collaborated by the individual interview of several stakeholders, 
was the organizational and political constraints associated with the problem that has 
slowed the allocation of funds and resources to combating this problem.  Further 
highlighting the difficulty is the notion that this problem has “high impact, but very low 
probability” of occurrence.  In short, funds and resources are short due to the lack of 
requirements for any service or agency to address the MIED problem systemically, and 
the predominant paradigm views an MIED threat as a low probability occurrence.   
 With this paradigm in mind, the project team decided to address the problem by 
developing a system that would respond to a threat once it occurs.  Although this system 
to a large extent does not address preventive and preparation concerns, the project team 
does acknowledge that the most successful way to mitigate the effects of an MIED attack 
is to prevent one from being placed and, barring that, ensure ports and waterways are 
fully prepared to deal with the threat in short order.  However, preventive and preparatory 
programs could require huge costs in training, manning, and technical development and 
acquisitions.  These costs, coupled with the political and organizational issues already 
addressed, led the team to focus on a response that could be fielded in the near term that 
would mitigate the effects of aggressive actions, either the placement of an MIED or the 
threat of one, until the full spectrum of counter-MIED operations could be addressed. 
 Having revised the functional hierarchy to reflect this change in the project team’s 
scope, the functions were further decomposed into sub-functions that must be completed 
in order to fulfill the higher order function.  The revised functional hierarchy including 
sub-functions is included in Figure 16.  A description of these functions and the metrics 
used to assess the system’s performance can be found in the following sections. 
 
3.2.  Search 




Figure 16 – Revised Functional Hierarchy 
 
complexity.  For instance, our problem includes non-conventional mines and a more 
restricted operating environment within the Maritime Domain (MD). To focus the 
problem, we have defined Search as all efforts to effectively achieve maximum coverage 
of a desired search area with a particular sensor/platform.  It is the first operational 
function of our system and is comprised of the following sub-functions:  Identify Search 
Method, Asset Deployment, Control Asset, and Execute Search.  Combined, these sub-
functions constitute the 1st tier, basic actions required to conduct a search. 
 
  3.2.1. Identify Search Method 
   Prior to conducting a search, mission requirements and 
environmental conditions are evaluated to determine the most effective search method.  
In this sub-function, plans are evaluated and decisions are made for which asset or 






































combination of assets will be used, search speed, track spacing and layout as well as 
priorities for search efforts.   
 
  3.2.2. Asset Deployment 
   Asset deployment includes all actions necessary to begin a search 
operation with the asset(s) identified in part A.  This sub-function allows us to account 
for the length of time required for an asset, its operators, support equipment and resources 
to arrive on station, but also accounts for additional processes or special considerations 
that are needed for the asset and its support structure to be employed.  The reasons for 
considering these factors are due to the limited use of conventional mine warfare assets 
that can be brought to bear in Maritime Homeland Defense (MHD) and the uncertainty of 
where an attack may occur within the 93,000 miles of U.S. coastline. 
 
  3.2.3. Control Asset 
   This involves the actions to direct a particular system in searching 
an area for MIEDs.  Asset control is influenced by time, space and the ability to 
communicate with the search asset.     
 
3.2.4. Execute Search Method 
   The execution of a search is the culmination of planning and 
identifying the search method, asset deployment and control efforts that are transpired 
into actively searching an area.  Figure 17 shows the completed tracks of REMUS UUV’s 
searching areas of Honolulu Harbor during the Honolulu Harbor Experiment, July 2008. 
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Figure 17 – Honolulu Harbor Search Areas, HHX 2008 
 
  3.2.5. Metrics 
   In order to evaluate the performance of a search, metrics have been 
established to quantify the effectiveness of minimizing the time to completion.  Our 
metrics for search will be inputs into determining the Overall Measure of Effectiveness 
(OMOE) which is the time required to restore commerce to an affected port after a MIED 
attack.   
 
3.2.5.1. Area Search Rate 
Area Search Rate is a measure of how quickly a search 
can be conducted and is a function of the search platform’s speed and effective swath 
width.  It is also dependent on the type of search being conducted, such as an exhaustive 





3.2.5.2    Time to Station 
Time to Station is the time required for a search asset to 
be deployed from a forward staging area to the area of intended search.  The unit for TOS 
is expressed in time (t). 
 
   3.2.5.3.   Deployability Rating 
Deployability Rating is a scaled metric that measures 
how well and easily a search asset can be positioned for readiness and put into use.  The 
dependant factors for scoring Deployability are:    
        a.   Integration.  How seamlessly a search asset can 
integrate with static assets already present at the affected site.  Static assets can be 
personnel, material or procedures. 
        b.   Operators.  How many operators are needed to 
conduct a search and the resource requirements they need such as facilities, training and 
footprint?   
         c.   Size and Weight.  Size and weight of the search asset 
affects how effectively it can be transported to the affected site quickly while minimizing 
the cost and special requirements to do so. 
Specifically, the deployability rating of a given system or 
alternative provides decision makers with a quick-look at how rapidly it can be prepared 
for operation. The deployability has several components for which the rating is derived 
including time, manpower, required operational tests, environmental limitations, etc. The 
time phase for the rating begins from the point that all required equipment is on station to 
when the system has completed all preparations and is ready for use.  Table 3 depicts an 
example chart used to document the Deployability Rating.  The following metrics derive 
the deployability rating: 
 
  a. Movement. The movement accounts for 
manpower and other system requirements to transfer the system to its area of operation. 
Movement does not account for the transit requirements from another location to the area 
of need. 
 40
        
 Scale  
    1 – Requires heavy equipment to move the system. 
    2 – Requires significant resources. 
    3 – Requires four personnel and light equipment.  
    4 – Requires minimal resources. 
    5 – Requires two or less personnel to move 
 
     b. Assembly. Upon arrival of the system to the 
scene, the ultimate time required for detection of an object is hampered by assembly 
and/or mounting requirements of the search vehicle. The ability to rapidly assemble a 
system from its transporting carrier will benefit the on scene commander by expediting 
the total timeline of the process. 
 
Scale  
    1 – Greater than 8 hours to assemble. 
    2 – Requires significant time. 
    3 – Requires 4 hours to assemble.  
    4 – Requires minimal time. 
    5 – Less than 1 hour to assemble 
 
     c.  Operational testing. The time required to warm 
up the system and perform all tests, including mechanical, program, network, etc. 
 
Scale  
    1 – Greater than 4 hours to test. 
    2 – Requires significant time. 
    3 – Requires 2 hours to test.  
    4 – Requires minimal time. 
    5 – Less than ½  hour to test. 
 
     d.  Fueling and Charging. The time required to 
either fill fuel tanks or charge onboard batteries in preparation for deployment. 
 
Scale  
    1 – Greater than 1 hour. 
    2 – Requires significant time. 
    3 – Requires ½  hour.  
    4 – Requires minimal time. 





Trait System A System B System C System D 
Movement     
Assembly     
OPTEST     
Fuel & Charge     
Rating     
 
Table 3 - Example Deployability Rating Chart 
 3.3.  Detect  
Detection is the phase of an operation where potential mine-like contacts 
are identified for further classification and identification16. Unlike traditional mine 
hunting taxonomies, all objects must be accounted for due to the inherent definition of an 
MIED.   
 
3.3.1. Locate   
The method of utilizing various unmanned systems within the 
threat area to locate objects floating on the surface of the water, within the water column 
or buried on the bottom.  
 
3.3.2. Mark 
Once an object has been located, a means of recording or 
designating the location must be made.  The location data must contain a degree of 
accuracy needed to reacquire the object for future comparison and analysis.   Figure 18 
shows various contacts of interest marked using MEDAL software. 
 
3.3.3. Metrics 
There are two primary metrics involved with the Detect function. 
These are the Probability of Detection (Pd) and Probability of False Detection (Pfd)  
    
 a. Probability of Detection: Probability of Detection is the 
probability that a system can make the proper determination that an object is present.  
Probability of Detection considers the performance of the sensor, the means by which 
                                                     
16 Naval Warfare Publication 27-2(Rev. B), Section 1.8.4.1(unclassified) 
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detection analysis is conducted, and the presence of human operators in the 
determination. 
 b. Probability of False Detection: Probability of False Detection is 
the probability that a system makes the wrong determination as to the presence of an 
object, which results overall performance degradation of the system. 
 
   
Figure 18 – Marked Contacts Using MEDAL Software 
 
 3.4. Classify 
  Traditional Surface Mine Countermeasure operations define Classify as 
the phase of a mine hunting operation where detected contacts within the MD are further 
investigated and classified as a mine-like or non-mine-like object17. 
  In the case of an MIED, Classification is the phase in which a contact, 
once detected, is further investigated, determined to be MIED-like and classified as a 
                                                     
17 Naval Warfare Publication 27-2, Section 1-9 
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contact of interest (COI) or determined to be non-MIED-like and classified as a contact 
of no-interest (CONI). For example, a refrigerator on the sea floor would quickly be 
designated a CONI using conventional MCM methodologies.  However, the same 
refrigerator filled with explosives could pose a threat as serious as a conventional mine 
and must be treated as such.   
The ability to classify is determined by the conduct of three sub-functions, 
obtaining characteristics, processing characteristics and assigning classification.  
 
3.4.1. Obtain Characteristics 
   In order to classify a contact it is necessary to obtain characteristics 
about the contact.  This process of collecting key and essential distinctive elements may 
include but is not limited to characteristics of size, shape, shadow length, proximity to 
other contacts, and if it correlates with any previous detection attempts within the MD. 
The characteristics obtained from each contact will be processed utilizing human and 
computer systems to determine classification.   
 
  3.4.2. Process Characteristics 
   The method of analyzing obtained contact characteristics, utilizing 
a combination human and computer system to determine the classification of the contact.  
Human systems may include various operators and technical experts within each 
detection and post mission analysis system. Other detection systems may have 
incorporated classification algorithms where a human interface is not required.   
 
  3.4.3. Assign Classification  
   After processing the contact’s unique characteristics a decision will 
be made to assign a specific classification. The classification designates the contact as 
either a COI or CONI. 
   This classification designation differs from the conventional mine 
countermeasure definition of classifying a contact as mine-like or non-mine-like in that 
the data necessary to correctly classify a mine is not sufficient to make the distinction of 
whether a contact is MIED-like or not.  Unlike traditional naval mine hunting, 
consideration must be taken to not only include naval mines but also various improvised 
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devices with an unlimited range of options for employment must be considered as a 
possible threat within the MD. 
 
3.4.4. Metrics 
a. Resolution:  Resolution describes the amount of detail an 
image used by a computer system or operator in making the determination of an object’s 
Classification.  Resolution is a function of the frequencies used by the sensor and the 
display resolution of the display system used by the operator.   
b. Search/PMA Time Ratio:  In most current systems collected 
search data can only be processed after the search is complete.  The current goal is a 1:1 
ratio; for every hour of search time, it takes a nominal hour of data processing, or post 
mission analysis (PMA).  In practice, this ratio is closer to 1:2 or even 1:3.  A desired 
goal is to reduce this ratio below 1:1 by allowing the search and data processing to 
proceed concurrently. 
 
 3.5. Identify 
Mine watching can be best described as the procedure of detecting, 
locating and identifying mines during the act of laying. The ease of locating a Maritime 
IEDs could be greatly enhanced if the objects were visually sighted during deployment, 
however, due to the clandestine nature of mine or IED laying, this will most likely not be 
the fact. 
  Identification of a Maritime IED is further hindered by the physical 
components of the actual explosive.  These objects can be constructed of fiberglass or 
plastic, making them extremely difficult to detect and therefore identify.  
  Traditional mine warfare doctrine is explicit on determining the existence 
or non-existence of a mine in the water column.   
 
  3.5.1. Determine Identification Method 
There are limited means of identifying an underwater contact, but 
there are options that must be determined.  An EOD diver trained and equipped to 
identify a contact may provide the most confident identification, but the presence of a 
diver adds risk to personnel.  Other options include electro-optical sensors or other 
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sensors with the required resolution may be safer, but may not be able to provide 
adequate data to confirm the identity of an improvised device.  These sensors may be 
complemented by chemical detectors, resonance sensors, or other emerging methods.  
These considerations must be taken by the decision maker to ensure the safety of the 
asset being used while developing a high enough confidence in the Identification to 
formulate follow-on actions as required. 
 
  3.5.2. Deploy Asset 
Just as assets required for other functions have different 
deployment considerations.  This sub-function incorporates all actions that need to be 
taken to move the Identify asset from forward staging to the location of the threat. 
 
  3.5.3. Control Asset 
All functions required to control, coordinate, and direct the asset 
throughout the process of Identification.  Asset control is influenced by time, space and 
the ability to communicate with the search asset.   
 
  3.5.4. Retrieve Asset and Information 
In some systems, the actual asset must be recovered from its 
operating environment before data supporting the Identification can be retrieved.  Even if 
data can be collected during the process, the asset must be retrieved and the data 
accumulated for processing. 
  
  3.5.5. Metrics 
3.5.5.1. Accuracy of Identification:  
 This metric determines the probability that the system 
can make an accurate determination to the Identity of the contact.  This metric is 
determined by resolution of the sensor, the presence of a trained person in the loop, the 
level of improvisation of the device, and its surrounding environment. 
 
 3.5.5.2.  Time to Identify:  
The time required to identify a single contact. 
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 3.5.5.3. Positional Accuracy (PA):  
  Positional Accuracy is the precision to which a contact 
is reported.  Poor accuracy leads to longer time required to reacquire a contact for further 
prosecution.  Positional Accuracy is a function of the plotting and reporting features and 
the reliability of the reported data. 
 
 3.6. Neutralization 
  Neutralization is defined as, “the action taken on an individual basis 
against a detected, classified, localized…[MIED] to eliminate it”18. The following are 
methods used in traditional mine warfare to neutralize a threat: 
a. Render-Safe Procedure (RSP): Renders the mine inoperative 
by interruption of operating functions or separation of essential components. This can be 
carried out on the mine in-situ or after removal or recovery19.  
b. Removal: Relocation of a mine to an area where it presents no 
hazard20.  
c. Recovery: Used to obtain mine for exploitation for intelligence 
purposes21.  
d. Countermining: The process of causing a high order detonation of 
the mine by placement of a charge. Countermining destroys the contact and removes it 
from the environment22.  
  In the case of countering an MIED, neutralization is carried out in the 
same manner as in traditional mine warfare, however, additional factors must be 
considered.  For instance, implantation of an MIED is regarded as a criminal act and the 
necessity for a criminal investigation—either before, during, or after neutralization—
must be considered. 
  Also, before neutralization takes place consideration must be paid to the 
location of the threat. Should the MIED be placed near some critical infrastructure or a 
key port resource (CI/KR), blow in place may cause more harm than good and mark and 
                                                     
18 Naval Warfare Publication 27-2, p 1-6 
19 Naval Warfare Publication 27-2, p 1-9 
20 Naval Warfare Publication 27-2, p 1-9 
21 Naval Warfare Publication 27-2, p 1-9 
22 Naval Warfare Publication 27-2, p 1-9 
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ignore may not be plausible if the MIED is planted such that if it is left in place, it will 
prevent normal port operations.  
  With those factors in mind, the project team performed a functional 
decomposition of Neutralization. The following were identified as its lower level 
functions: 
 
3.6.1 Assess Impact 
Assess Impact is the sub-function that incorporates the added level 
of consideration to the safety of surrounding infrastructure that must be taken in port 
environments.  Standard MCM neutralization methods that involve detonation of the 
MIED or devices used to render the MIED safe may not be suitable in an environment 
where critical infrastructure can be damaged by such neutralization means.  Assess 
Impact requires the decision maker to consider the risk the neutralization method poses to 
critical infrastructure, assets, and personnel involved in the process. 
 
  3.6.2.  Identify Neutralization Method 
Upon examining the threat, the on-scene decision-maker will 
confer with his subject matter experts and determine the best approach to remove it. 
Factors he will consider include: location in relation to CI/KR, composition of the 
explosive (if known), projected blast radius, and potential risk to the personnel carrying 
out the neutralization. With all this in mind, the decision-maker will select the method 
most likely to effectively neutralize the threat while producing the least collateral 
damage. 
 
3.6.3 Deploy Asset 
After the method is selected, the asset required to carry out the 
mission will be deployed. The process of deployment will vary depending on the method 
selected, but this key step cannot be overlooked during the selection of the neutralization 
method because the port must have the capability (i.e. electric power supply, crane, 
sufficient pier access, etc.) to support the deployment. Figure 19 shows the Mine Counter 
Measure Unmanned Surface Vehicle (MCM USV) being deployed from CG Station St. 
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Petersburg via port crane in St. Petersburg, Florida, during the Tampa Bay Homeland 




Figure 19 -  Deployment of MCMUSV Using Pier Services 
 
  3.6.4. Metrics 
 
3.6.4.1.   Neutralization Rating:  Neutralization Rating is  
a weighted score given to a neutralization method that considers the effectiveness of 
neutralization and the potential risk the method poses to CI/KR, personnel, and assets. 
 
3.6.4.2.   Time to Neutralize:  Time to Neutralize is the time 
required to neutralize a single contact. 
 
3.6.5.  Control Asset   
After the method has been selected and deployed, it must be 
controlled in order to receive useful data to relay to the decision-makers. Controlling the 
asset can vary from remotely maneuvering an unmanned vehicle to maintaining lines of 
communication with an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). Maintaining situational 
awareness is essential to this lower level function. 
 
  3.6.6.  Remove Threat 
Once the MIED has been located by the neutralization asset, the 
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threat must be removed in the manner identified by the decision-maker.   
 
4.  SUITABILITY OBJECTIVES HIERARCHY  
Using the revised problem statement discussed above as an effective needs 
statement, the project team used the functional hierarchy and the sub-functions listed 
therein as the basis for a series of objective statements pertaining to system performance.    
 These objectives were drafted from inputs provided by stakeholders, resources, 
and academic advisors.  These inputs also identified the need for suitability objectives 




Figure 20 – Objectives Hierarchy 
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 4.1. Performance Objectives 
  As Figure 20 shows, the overarching objective is to mitigate post-
aggression impact to the Maritime Transportation System.  This means that the success of 
the system will rely on its ability to reduce the time use of a waterway is restricted once 
an aggressive act is known or believed to have occurred and its ability to reduce the 
damage produced by the placement of an explosive device. 
 
  4.1.1 Search Objectives. 
Three performance objectives were developed for the Search 
function: Reduce Time to Search, Improve Search Rate, and Minimize Reliance on Port 
Infrastructure.  An explanation of these objectives is as follows: 
 a. Reduce Time to Station – By reducing the time it takes for 
search assets to arrive on station and commence searching, the overall search time is 
reduced.  This objective is measured by the Time to Station metric.  
 b. Improve Search Rate – A system capable of a higher search 
rate, given that there is a negligible affect on sensor performance, is better suited to 
reducing the time taken to search a given area.  This objective is measured by the Area 
Search Rate metric. 
c. Minimize Reliance on Port Infrastructure – Systems that are 
more easily transported to their operating environment and do not rely on port-maintained 
infrastructure such as storage, cranes, or ramps make asset deployment, mission planning, 
and manpower use simpler and more effective. This objective is measured by the 
Deployability Rating. 
 
 4.1.2. Detect Objectives. 
Three performance objectives were developed for the Detect 
function: Improve Probability of Detection (Pd), Reduce Probability of False Detection 
(Pfd), and Reduce Search Time.  An explanation of these objectives is as follows: 
 a. Improve Probability of Detection – The detection of an object 
by a sensor is the tripwire that leads to the classification and identification of a potential 
MIED.  By increasing the probability of object detection, the possibility of an MIED 
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going unnoticed and causing debilitating damage is inversely decreased.  Probability of 
Detection is a metric of this function. 
 b. Reduce Probability of False Detection – The false assessment 
that a contact is present when the opposite is true leads to wasted time and assets 
prosecuting ‘ghost contacts” and increases the time of the overall search.  Probability of 
False Detection is a metric of this function. 
c. Reduce Detection Time – Reducing the time it takes to 
search an area and note all detected objects directly affects the overall problem time.  
This objective is measured by the Probability of Detection, as a higher probability will 
lead to reduced overall detection time. 
 
 4.1.3. Classify Objectives.  
Two objectives were developed for the Classify function: Increase 
Confidence and Reduce Classification Time. Increase Confidence is the improvement in 
the probability that an object classified as MIED-like is actually an MIED.  Accurate 
Classification reduces the chance of an MIED going unnoticed and causing damage.  The 
metric of Resolution measures this objective.  Conversely, the metric Probability of False 
Classification (Pfc) measures the probability an object given the classification of MIED-
like will be further prosecuted, thereby wasting time and resources.  The second 
objective, Reduce Classification Time, is vital to reducing overall problem time and is 
measured by the Search Time/PMA time ratio. 
 
 4.1.4 Identify Objectives. 
Two objectives, Increase Confidence and Reduce Identification 
Time were developed for the Identify function.  Increase Confidence is the improvement 
in the probability that an object identified as an MIED is actually an MIED.  Accurate 
Identification reduces the chance of an MIED going unnoticed and causing damage.  The 
metrics of Probability of Identification (Pi) measures this objective.  Conversely, the 
metric Probability of False Identification (Pfi) measures the probability an object given 
the identification of MIED will be further prosecuted, thereby wasting time and 
resources.  The second objective, Reduce Identification Time, is vital to reducing overall 
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problem time and is measured by Positional Accuracy and Identification Time per 
Contact. 
 4.1.5 Neutralize Objectives. 
Four performance objectives were developed for the Neutralize 
function: Reduce Time to Neutralize Threat, Reduce Risk to Personnel, Reduce Risk to 
Assets, and Reduce Risk to Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources.  An explanation of 
these objectives is as follows: 
 a. Reduce Time to Neutralize Threat – Reducing the time it 
takes to neutralize each MIED reduces the overall problem time.  This objective is 
measured by the Time Required to Neutralize per Contact rate. 
b. Reduce Risk to Personnel – By reducing the risk to personnel 
engaged in counter MIED operations, the overall risk of the operation is reduced.  This 
objective is measured in the Neutralization Rating metric. 
c. Reduce Risk to Assets - By reducing the risk to assets used in 
counter MIED operations, the overall risk of the operation is reduced.  This objective is 
measured in the Neutralization Rating metric. 
d. Reduce Risk to Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources – By 
reducing the risk to critical infrastructure/key resources from MIEDs, the overall risk of 
the operation is reduced.  This objective is measured in the Neutralization Rating metric. 
 
 4.2. Suitability Objectives 
 In order to capture the desired but non-functional attributes of the system, 
several suitability objectives were derived from stakeholder input.  The collection of this 
data, particularly for emerging or developmental systems, proved to be more difficult 
than the timeline of the project would allow. Therefore, a comparison of suitability data 
for each alternative was decided to be taken out the scope of the project.  However, a 
detailed discussion of the objectives, implications of each alternative, and a general 
process for suitability requirements generation is included in Chapter V, Section 2. 
 
  4.2.1. Weighting 
   After developing the objectives previously discussed the project 
team then took the objectives back to the stakeholders and asked them to quantitatively 
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weigh each function, suitability trait, and objective in the form of a survey.  These 
weights were used to compare alternatives in order to properly assess the value of the 
various components in each alternative.  The Performance Design Value Diagram in 
Figure 21 shows the results of the survey and the flow from functions to objectives, 
metrics, and weight scores.  
 
Figure 21 – Performance Design Value Diagram 
 
4.2.2. Analysis of Stakeholder Survey 
 Having identified high-level functions and their sub-functions 
using stakeholder input, the project team then needed to determine the relative 
importance of each function.  This weighting would be crucial for performance 
analysis and the determination of which systems performed best overall, when taking 
into consideration these weights.  
 The survey was also conducted to gather priority data from the 
stakeholders on the needs to counter MIEDs.  An electronic survey was sent to the 
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following stakeholders to gather their view on the importance of each of the functions 
identified in mitigating the impact of an MIED attack. 
 
a. USCG Captains of the Port 
b. Port Security Representatives 
c. Associates of ORCA Maritime, Inc  
d. Maritime Union Members 
e. Mine Warfare Association Members 
f. Lloyd’s of London Joint War Committee 
g. US Northern Command Staff 
h. Law Enforcement Personnel 
i. Representative from PEO LMW 
j. Navy Mine and ASW Command Civilian and Military Staff  
k. Coast Guard Head Quarters Staff 
l. Engineers from Naval Surface Warfare Center 
 
4.2.2.1 Stakeholder Survey 
The survey questionnaire consisted of two sections.  The 
first section sought the stakeholder view on the relative importance of the main 
functions to counter MIED threat (i.e. search, detect, identify, classify and 
neutralize). The second section aimed at determining the relative importance of 
the objectives within the high level functions. Figure 22 is a sample question from 
the electronic survey. 
 
 
Figure 22 – Sample Electronic Survey Question 
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4.2.2.2 Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
 From the survey data, the team utilized the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) tool to evaluate the relative importance of the various 
objectives and functions.  The AHP carried out a pairwise comparison of the various 
objectives and ranked the relative importance of each function according to the 
stakeholders input.  
From the feedback obtained from the survey, it was noted 
that among the top level functions, stakeholders viewed Search, Detect and Neutralize as 
most important.  Table 4 illustrates the pairwise comparison of these main functions and 































Criteria   1 2 3 4 5 Weights 
Search 1 1 1 5 3 1 28.05% 
Detect 2 1 1 5 3 1 28.05% 
Classify 3  1/5  1/5 1 1/3  1/5 5.09% 
Identify 4  1/3  1/3 3 1  1/3 10.75% 
Neutralize 5 1 1 5 3 1 28.05% 
 








Table 4 – Pairwise Comparison of High Level Functions 
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The same AHP process was carried out to determine the relative weight of each 
objective within a given function.  The results of this AHP are summarized in Table 5. 
 
Function 
Weighting Function Objectives 
Objective 
Weighting 
Reduce time to station 26.05% 
Improve Area search rate 63.33% 28.05% Search 
Minimize reliance on port 
infrastructure 10.62% 
        
Improve probability of detection 63.30% 
Decrease false detection rate 10.62% 28.05% Detect 
Reduce time required to complete 
detection 26.05% 
        
Increase confidence in object 
classification 75.00% 5.09% Classify 
Reduce time to classify an object 25.00% 
        
Reduce time to identify an object 25.00% 
10.75% Identify Increase confidence of an object 
identification 75.00% 
        
Reduce time to neutralize 38.89% 
Reduce risk to personnel 15.35% 
Reduce risk to assets 6.87% 28.05% Neutralize 
Reduce risk to CI/KR 38.89% 
 
Table 5 – Relative Objective Weights 
 
 With the relative weights for each sub-functions criteria computed, the 
stakeholder survey sub-function criteria was mapped to the performance metric as listed 
in the functional hierarchy to get the weights for every performance criteria. Table 6 
shows the mapping of the stakeholder survey to the performance metric and the resultant 
weights of each performance criteria. 
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Table 6 – Mapping of Stakeholder Survey and Performance Metric 
  
































































































































































































































































































































Reducing Asset Time to Station 0.0731   1 1                     
Improving the rate of search 0.1777 1                         Search 
Minimizing reliance on port infrastructure for asset 
deployment, operation, and recovery 0.0298     1                     
Improve probability of detection 0.1777       1                   
Decrease false alarm rate 0.0298         1                 Detect 
Reduce the time required to complete detections 0.0731       1                   
Increase confidence in object classification 0.0382           1               Classify 
Reduce the time it takes to classify an object 0.0127             1             
Reduce the time it takes to identify an object 0.0269               1     1     Identify 
Increase the confidence of an objects identification 0.0807                 1 1       
Reduce time to neutralize 0.1091                       1   
Reduce risk to personnel 0.043                         1 
Reduce the risk to assets 0.0193                         1 
Neutralize 
Reduce the risk to critical infrastructure/key resources 0.1091                         1 
  Sub-total  0.18 0.07 0.10 0.25 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.11 0.17 
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III.  SYSTEM DESIGN 
 
1 SYSTEM DESIGN PROCESS 
 
1.1 Initial Methodology  
  Having established functions and objectives, the project team then went 
about the task of building and synthesizing physical architectures, the actual formulation 
of system alternatives based on physical components.  All alternatives would 
simultaneously address the objectives previously discussed and be uniquely different so 
that decision analysis could properly determine the strengths and weakness inherent in 
both and attempt to make the assertion of which system alternative would be best to 
accomplish overall mission goals. 
  First, the project team established a baseline system that would model 
current counter-MIED capabilities.  This baseline would serve as a basis for comparison 
to the other developed alternatives and provide the systems for inclusion in the wargame 
portion of the modeling and simulation plan.  Detailed explanations of the baseline and 
system alternatives will be discussed later in this section. 
In order to create distinct alternatives, the project team brainstormed 
possible themes that would be conducive for such distinction.  A sample of the themes 
discussed by the project team is listed in Table 7. 
 
Theme Variants Theme Variants 
Space Air Manning High Manning 
  Surface   Med Manning 
  Subsurface   Low Manning 
        
Employment Local Timeline Long Term 
  Regional   Mid Term 
  National   Near Term 
        
Technology High Tech End User DoD 
  Med Tech   DHS 
  Low Tech   Civil-Industry 
 
Table 7 – Initial Alternative Themes 
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  After debating the advantages and disadvantages of each, the theme of 
Space was chosen to categorize alternatives.  However, using this theme, it was 
determined that the function of Neutralize required a different set of physical components 
than the other functions.  Therefore, the project team split the system into two 
subsystems, A and B.  Subsystem A would entail the physical components necessary to 
Search, Detect, Classify, Identify and Assess Impact of an MIED, while Subsystem B 
would include the components necessary for its Neutralization.  The project team then 
sub-divided into two groups, A and B, and began developing alternatives. Each group 
would develop four alternatives; one alternative that would encompass mostly airborne 
components, one that operated primarily from the water surface, on primarily based on 
subsurface components, and a hybrid that was unbound by space limitations and 
incorporated assets from all space areas.  The understanding was that each alternative 
would not answer the question of “which operating space is best to mitigate MIEDs”.  
Instead, the analysis would utilize the separation to determine the advantages and 
limitations of each alternative and combine them into one solution. This final solution, 
deemed as “hybrid”, is unconstrained by space limitations and seeks to incorporate the 
best features of each space-based solution, and overcome any drawbacks. 





Figure 23 – Initial System of Systems Alternatives for System A 
 
 Subsystem A – Search, Detect, Classify, Identify, Assess Impact 
  1 – Air: Uses ALMDS and AQS-20 equipped helicopters 
  2 – Surface: Uses stabilized sonar and USV technologies 
 3 – Subsurface: Uses an integrated Synthetic Aperture Sonar and laser  
 linescan onboard an AUV 
  4 – Hybrid: Uses ALMDS and a stabilized sidescan sonar on a UUV  











Figure 24 – Initial System of Systems Alternatives for System B 
 
 Subsystem B – Neutralize *(refer to page xviii for acronym glossary) 
  1 – Air: Uses RAMICS, AMNS, and an assault breaching chemical dart- 
containing JDAM 
  2 – Surface: Uses conventional surface MCM ship capability 
3 – Subsurface: Uses expendable submersibles operated from air or  
surface craft 
  4 – Hybrid: Uses RAMICS, AMNS, and other expendable submersibles 
  To compare each alternative to the established baseline capability, the 
subsystem alternatives would be paired together into systems of systems that 
accomplished the full spectrum of functions and objectives.  A rendition of such pairings 




Figure 25 – Possible Systems of Systems Combinations 
 
  After reviewing the developed alternatives with mine warfare and systems 
engineering advisors and after briefing the alternatives at an in-process review, it was 
determined that this methodology was flawed in that it did not incorporate the near term 
technologies that are being developed and tested for this problem.  Therefore, the project 
team reassessed the process to develop a different alternative scheme.  The new process 
would utilize the previously established baseline and add capabilities that were on the 
horizon in a layered scheme.  Alternative 1 and 2 add the capabilities that will be present 
in the 2009-2015 timeframe.  Alternatives 3 and 4 do not incorporate the baseline, but 
rather represent a “blue sky” view of possible alternatives not bounded by baseline 
concepts using emerging technologies that would need to be developed before these 
systems can become a reality. 
  
1.2. Alternative Generation  
  During discussions on how to implement the new systems design 
methodology, it was discovered that the subsystem approach could not adequately 
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consider systems that could complete functions of Subsystem A and B.  Essentially, a 
system that could Neutralize as well as perform Search, Detect, Classification, and 
Identification functions may not adequately be considered in the performance of both 
roles.  Therefore, the project team decided to forego the subsystem method and focus on 
the overall Adaptive Force Package.  For purposes of this project, we adapted the 
working definition of US Atlantic Command’s concept of an adaptive joint force 
package.  In response to the need of a highly skilled force, rapidly deliverable, and fully 
capable of operating effectively on arrival, the Adaptive Force Package is a capabilities 
centered grouping of forces and control elements trained and organized to meet the 
specific crisis requirements of the Incident Commander. 
   
Table 8 shows a Morphological Box entailing the components and which 
functions they accomplish. 
 
 




Alt Type Components Quantity Search/Detect/Classify Identify Neutralize
Side Scan Sonar
Legacy PMA







ALMDS 1 Laser Scan
RAMICS 1 Advance PMA Remote Deflagration/Detonation
AQS-20 1 Side Scan/Volume Search Sonar/ EO-ID Electro-optical
AMNS 1 Electro-optical Remote Detonation
MH-60 2
Talisman M 1 Synthetic Aperature Sonar Laser Line Scan
Archerfish 2 Remote Detonation
SeaArcher 2 Chemical Neutralization
Improved REMUS 4 Synthetic Aperature Sonar
Talisman M 1 Volume Search
Archerfish 2 Electro-optical Remote Detonation
SeaArcher 2 Chemical Neutralization
Benthos Modem 
Network 1 In-situ PMA
Autonomous Asset 
























1.3. Adaptive Force Packages 
  A detailed account of each Adaptive Force Package is found in the 
following sections.  Each description includes an explanation of the components, a 
discussion on employment considerations, and a broad-brush assessment of capabilities 
and limitations viewed from the paradigm of function completion, performance against 
the various MIED types, and any objectives that are inadequately met. 
 
2 ALTERNATIVE 0 (SYSTEM BASELINE) 
Alternative 0 (Alt 0) is the baseline Adaptive Force Package. It is the United 
States’ most likely response today to a terrorist attack on the MTS using MIEDs in a 
HLS/HLD scenario.  The technology, manning, equipment, and procedures are being 
tested and evaluated to determine the best alternative to conduct operations against 
MIEDs in a US port.  
 
2.1 Components: 
Alt 0 includes system components strictly from US Navy EOD and the 
Naval Oceanographic Mine Warfare Center (NOMWC). 
 
EOD assets considered in Alt 0 are: 
a. a five man EOD team (and equipment) 
NOMWC assets considered in Alt 0 are: 
 a. a six man REMUS team 
 b. 12 man Post Mission Analysis (PMA) team 
 c. four REMUS vehicles 
 
MCM-1 class SMCM ships are not included due to the unlikely chance 
they will be a plausible solution. Currently, there are fourteen Avenger Class ships in the 
US Fleet. Of those fourteen, six to eight are forward deployed leaving only six to eight  
INCONUS, often in limited states of readiness.  Due to the limited stationing speed of 
these assets, unless the port that requires MCM operations is in proximity to the ships 
position, stationing time probably precludes SMCM from being a viable asset.  
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Similarly, no AMCM assets are used in this alternative due to the 
stationing times of AMCM assets to get to the area of operations and their probable lack 
of availability due to dedicated missions overseas.  Additionally, the time it takes to prep 
an aircraft once it arrives on station and becomes ready for operations is significant due 
to the maintenance required after it has self-deployed, the fitting of equipment, and 
logistics constraints. 
Additionally, both traditional AMCM and SMCM may have navigation 
and other problems conducting towing operations in many US ports due to narrow 
channels, shallow depths, and bridges or other infrastructure.  Influence sweeping, which 
makes these assets very effective and timely in open-ocean mine sweeping are not well 
suited for some port environments.  The remaining capabilities left in these systems offer 
no advantages over already included systems. 
 
2.2 Employment Considerations 
Alt 0 has the least footprint required of all the other alternatives, and the 
fastest deployability.  Commercial and military air can be used to move the assets in Alt 0 
(people and equipment) quickly into the area of operations from anywhere in the US.  
  Once on station the footprint of EOD teams are not intrusive. They 
advertise 72 hour deployability and are self-sufficient, needing only communications gear 
to allow them to communicate with local agencies in the area.   
 
  
         
Figure 26 – Typical EOD Dive                 Figure 27 – Technicians Deploy  




The REMUS (100)s are two-man portable, requiring no crane or other pier 
services. The support and PMA teams come with their own computers and equipment, 
and only require communications gear to allow them to communicate with local agencies 
in the area.  
 
 
Figure 28 – Alternative 0 Concept Image 
 
2.3  Capabilities and Limitations 
The NOMWC REMUS platoons are the main sensors that conduct the 
Search function, but with sidescan sonar it is limited to bottom search and cannot detect 
objects floating in the water column. After the REMUS completes the search in its 
designated area, the data from the mission is extracted and analyzed during the PMA, at 
which time the Detection and Classification functions are performed. 
The REMUS vehicles have the capability to rapidly search sea beds in the 
very shallow and shallow water regions (10-40 and 40-200+ feet).  The vehicles have a 
maximum eight-hour mission life and require either change of batteries or a six-hour 
recharge before resuming Search operations.  These vehicles can operate at night but are 
limited by currents above two knots, as the vehicles operate at 3-5 knots.  
After Classification as MIED-like, the EOD personnel will reacquire the 
target to Identify and Neutralize threats that require further prosecution.  While EOD has 
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the capability to conduct localized volume searches, they cannot adequately cover large 
volumes of water and their presence in a potential mine-field increases the risk of the 
operation. 
Limited methods of disposal are available with current technologies and 
practices. A target designated for prosecution is either detonated in place or must be 
disarmed manually, a very dangerous endeavor, and removed from the area. EOD divers 
prefer to operate in water depths less than 150 feet23, well within typical port 
environments, but are limited to operations in currents less than one knot.  
 
3 ALTERNATIVE 1 – LCS MISSION MODULE CONCEPT 
 Alternative 1 incorporates the baseline systems of EOD and REMUS and adds to 
it the LCS MIW Mission Module components of the WLD-1 Remote Mine Hunting 
Systems.  The WLD-1 adds an increased on-station time, speed, and a forward looking 
over-the-horizon video and radar capability.  WLD-1 also is the host platform for the 
AQS-20A which is designed to detect and identify moored and bottom IEDs.  This 
system increases situational awareness for the mission commander and adds layered 




The AN/WLD-1 Remote Mine Hunting System consists of 5 subsystems 
a. Remote Multi Mission Vehicle (RMMV): Fueled for long 
endurance (200 gallon capacity), the RMMV’s 370 hp Cummins diesel marine engine 
and high-efficiency propulsor can drive the 7 meter-long vehicle at speeds exceeding 16 
knots.  A streamlined snorkel/mast is the vehicle’s only visible feature above the 
waterline.  The snorkel draws air into the engine, and provides a platform for RF 
antennas and an obstacle avoidance video camera. The nose module features a forward-
looking sonar for detection and avoidance of underwater objects. 
Recent configuration changes to the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) 
class guided-missile destroyers, DDG 91 through DDG 96 to handle the AN/WLD-1A 
remotely-operated mine countermeasures system, marks the return to a practice instituted 
                                                     
23 Capt. Matthew Lesnowicz, USMC, interviewed by LT Tim Smith, USNR. Monterey, CA, June 13 2008. 
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at the end of the 1930s.  The need for a rapid-response, reliable and autonomous platform 
designed primarily for Mine Warfare has not seen full production since the end of World 
War I.  The Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV) is entering the Navy inventory as 
part of the AN/WLD-1 Remote Minehunting System (RMS).  RMS is currently installed 
onboard USS Bainbridge (DDG 96), and systems will transition to Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS) as part of the Mine Warfare and ASW Mission Packages.  The RMMV provides 
all-weather, low observable operations, high endurance, interchangeable mission systems 
with electronics and real-time data transfer capability beyond line-of-sight.  Designed for 
deployment from surface combatants, as well as shore-based or ships of opportunity, the 
RMMV can provide a significant off-board capability for Combatant Commanders. 
  On August 28, 2004, the USS Momsen (DDG 92) became the first 
US Navy's surface ship to be equipped with organic mine reconnaissance capability using 
an unmanned, remotely operated vehicle. Shipboard testing was scheduled to begin in 
early September 200424.  The RMMV was also tested from August of 2007 through 
February 2008 onboard the USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) another U.S. guided missile 
destroyer, while operating in the Mediterranean Sea.  In this deployment, as part of a 
NATO Naval Task Force exercise, the RMMV had many successes including 
successfully conducting mine reconnaissance operations off the coast of Spain.  
 
b.  Launch and Recovery System:The RMMV is launched and 
recovered as safely and simply as a ship’s boat. A single capture/release device provides 
a 15-ft. reach from the host ship.  Figure 29 shows an RMMV launch from an Arleigh 
Burke Class Flight IIA destroyer.  This integrated launch and recovery system assists the 
host ship in rapidly and efficiently securing the RMMV.  The ability to use existing 
infrastructure on the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) destroyer to recover the RMMV is 
essential to the mission flexibility. 
 
c. Data Link System (DLS): The DLS integrates communication and 
voyage information from the RMMV to the host platform.  This enables the RMS to 
operate not only within the line of sight (LOS) of the host platform but also over the 
                                                     
24 http://www.deagel.com/Underwater-Vehicles/ANWLD-1_a001521001.aspx 
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horizon (OTH).  Real-time command and control of the RMMV—including operational 
status— are relayed to the 
 
 
Figure 29 – Launching the RMMV 
 
host ship via one of two encrypted data communications modes.  For close-in operations, 
a high data rate RF link will send back continuous Variable Depth Sonar (VDS): sonar 
data and camera video.   When over the horizon, a lower RF bandwidth will send snippets 
of sonar data and video imagery.  Developing systems will incorporate satellite 
communications links. 
 
d. Variable Depth Sonar (VDS): During its mine reconnaissance 
mission, the RMMV deploys and tows a version of the AN/AQS-20 mine hunting 
variable depth sensor.  The VDS is designed to detect, classify, localize and identify 
bottom and moored mines. The AN/AQS-20 carries port and starboard Side-Looking 
Sonars, a Forward-Look Sonar, a Gap-Filler Sonar, a Volume-Search Sonar or an 
Electro-Optical Laser.  Despite its important military applications, VDS has multiple 
civilian applications such as search and salvage missions.  This technology can also be 
useful for harbor surveys and other maritime reconnaissance operations. 
3.2 Employment Considerations 
 The WLD-1 RMMV is just one system included in U.S. Navy Unmanned 
Surface Vessel (USV) Master Plan, the first edition of which was published in July of 
2007.  The Master Plan incorporates many developing USVs for use in not only force 
protection applications but also as host platforms for mine hunting and sweeping.   As 
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mentioned previously, employment of the RMV is designed primarily from surface 
combatants, and the Littoral Combat Ship(LCS).  However, operational testing as recent 
as August of 2008, have shown that a RMMV can be used as a stand alone system; 
provided that the shore installation is equipped with at least a 10 ton crane.  
 
 
Figure 30 – Alternative 1 Concept Image 
 
3.3 Capabilities and Limitations 
 The RMMV is designed to enhance the mine countermeasures capabilities 
of the DDG-51 class and the Littoral Combat Ship.  The OTH data collection, long on 
station time, and diversity of missions enable this vehicle to provide the multi-mission 
capabilities that is desired by the U.S. military.  The system, with organic handling, 
control and logistic support, is designed to be air transportable to forces anywhere in the 
world. The RMS will provide a rapidly deployable mine countermeasures system to 
surface combatant forces in the absence of deployable mine countermeasures forces.   
 
 a. Deployability:  The RMMV can only be deployed by a host ship or a 
heavy lift crane.  At a weight of 14,000 lbs, WLD-1 is unable to be deployed by a 
standard small boat lift.  As part of RMMVs total systems of systems, a command and 
control module is required for mission planning and post mission analysis.  The Tampa 
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Bay limited objective experiment in August of 2008 showcased the ability of a system 
designed for the LCS to be operated autonomously.  Due to cost over-runs and the limited 
amount of LCS platforms available for the US Fleet, the modularity of the MIW Mission 
package is essential for success of WLD-1.   
 
b. Navigation:  Navigating in and around a potential mine or IED field 
is a challenge in initial positioning with regard to the terrain and avoid collisions with 
other vessels.  A 2006 Navy Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) solicitation 
proposed using navigation radar for collision avoidance — UUVs would passively listen 
for surface ships’ radars, including Automated Identification System beacons mandated 
for larger, oceangoing vessels. 
 
c. Propulsion:  RMS is propelled by a 370 hp Cumming Diesel engine 
fueled by a 200 gallon tank.  The vehicle can maneuver at speeds up to 16 knots with a 
loiter capability enabling for longer on station time.  In sea trials RMMV has sustained 
over 15 hours of independent operations, however, there is currently no capability to 
refuel the vehicle en-mission.  Advances in fuel cell technologies will increase the on 
station time which will enable RMMV advanced capabilities with clandestine operations. 
 
4  ALTERNATIVE 2 – IMPROVED AMCM CONCEPT 
This alternative utilizes the baseline system and includes several air-borne assets.  
All assets are designed to be employed from the MH-60S helicopter.  This group of assets 
was chosen because both the ALMDS and RAMICS, and the AQS-20 and AMNS, are 
designed to work together, from the air, to provide rapid response to a mine threat.  We 




The additional components in this alternative include the Airborne Laser 
Mine Detection System (ALMDS), the RApid MIne Clearance System (RAMICS), the 
AQS-20 sonar, and the Airborne Mine Neutralization System; and the aforementioned 
MH-60 helicopter platform from which the components will be employed. 
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a. Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS): The ALMDS 
utilizes a Laser Imaging Detection And Ranging (LIDAR) sensor in the blue-green field 
to visually detect mines and mine-like objects in the near-surface water volume.  The 
system essentially mounts to the side of the helicopter and scans the water as the 
helicopter moves through an area of interest.  This provides for a very fast search time. 
 
b. Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS):  The RAMICS 
is designed to mount onto the same airframe as the ALMDS and utilizes data inputs from 
the ALMDS.  The system then uses its own LIDAR to reacquire mines in the water 
column.  After mines have been reacquired, the system neutralizes the mine with a 30mm 
MK 44 Bushmaster II gun.  A critical component is the MK 258 Mod 1 armor-piercing, 
fin-stabilized round.  This round is stable in air and upon entering the water, 
supercavitates to reduce drag and increase accuracy until the round strikes and destroys 
the mine or MIED in the near surface water volume.  This method is not effective against 
bottom mines or MIEDs.  These systems are depicted in Figure 31. 
 
c. AQS-20:  This is the same device mentioned in Alternative One.  
However, in this Alternative the AQS-20 is towed from the MH-60 helicopter platform, 




Figure 31 – Artist Renditions of ALMDS and RAMICS 
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d. Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS): The AMNS (see 
Figure 32) provides another method of mine neutralization from the MH-60S.  After a 
mine has been located, AMNS employs the Navy’s Common Neutralizer Vehicle to 
detonate the mine.  This method is effective against near surface, moored, or bottom 
mines or MIEDs.  The entire system is comprised of the Carriage, Stream, Tow and 
Recovery System (CSTRS); a Launch Handling System (LHS); the Common Neutralizer 
Vehicle; and the control console.  After the MH-60S is on station above the mine, the 
LHS is deployed.  The LHS houses four of the neutralizer vehicles that “swim” away 
from the LHS and reacquire the mine utilizing their onboard sonar.  The neutralizers also 
have onboard cameras and feed imagery of the mine, or mine-like object, back to the 
console operator via fiber-optic cable.  The operator can then decide to neutralize the 
mine by detonating the armor-piercing warhead on the neutralizer.  AMNS is included in 
this alternative because it is effective against deep mines that are potentially out of the 
range of the RAMICS.  There have been delays in the CSTRS system that will be 




Figure 32 – Artist Rendition of AMNS 
 
4.2 Employment Considerations 
Because this alternative includes baseline systems in addition to those 
described above, the employment considerations of the baseline alternative apply here as 
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well.  Additionally, this alternative requires two MH-60S helicopters, one for the 




Figure 33 – Alternative 2 Concept Image 
  
4.3 Capabilities and Limitations 
This alternative provides two very attractive capabilities – it keeps 
personnel at a safe standoff distance from the threat, and it is extremely fast.  Because the 
systems are employed from a helicopter, there is no “man in the minefield,” which is an 
obvious benefit.  In terms of speed, this alternative may have an advantage in two 
aspects.  If the threatened port is within helicopter range of the assets, they would arrive 
on-station faster than any other non-organic alternatives.  Once on-station, the ALMDS 
can search, detect, and classify near-surface threats faster than other alternatives, as it is 
airborne.  The RAMICS or AMNS systems can also be employed for identification and 
neutralization much faster than other alternatives. 
This alternative has its limitations as well. The systems and the helicopters 
that they operate from are expensive; prohibitively so for local and possibly regional use. 
A helicopter also offers limited time on station before refueling and/or maintenance is 
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required. Another major limitation for the ALMDS and RAMICS systems are the depth 
of water in which they are effective.   
 
 
5 ALTERNATIVE 3 - SILVER BULLET CONCEPT 2015+ 
Alternatives one and two incorporate existing or emerging technologies being 
developed for traditional navy mine countermeasures. Alternatives three and four attempt 
to step out of that paradigm and to fill gaps left in those systems using technologies and 
equipment not currently under development. The issues created by using non-
conventional systems would tend to make the targeted service date beyond the timeframe 
scope of 2015, but bring advances to the MIED problem that would make early 
investment in the technology, integration, and R&D worth the cost.  Realization of these 
systems in the given timeframe can only be made if investment into the composite 
systems begins in the near term. 
 Alternative three consists of a single body capable of performing all required 
functions.  By packaging capabilities into a single body, capable of in-situ PMA, mission 
time is greatly reduced as the time lost to planning for and employing additional assets is 
mitigated, as is the time required to conduct conventional PMA.  This body would need 
to contain: sensors for Search, Detect, and Classify: higher resolution sensors for 
Identification; and an organic means of Neutralization. Although there are several 
options, the following outlines a possible means of obtaining this all-in-one body. 
 
5.1 Components 
Although using an underwater platform brings inherent difficulties 
(communications, deploy and recovery, etc) and risks (platform is in the MIED danger 
area) the benefits of simplifying sensor equations, reducing cooling and other support 
equipment, and the ease of having the platform in close proximity still make it a desired 
option. To illustrate this alternative, the project team modeled the use of the Talisman M 
as representative of a similar system that could be modified to fill this role.  Talisman M, 
depicted in Figure 34, is an advanced UUV produced by BAE Systems. This UUV is a 
modular, multi role vehicle capable of carrying search sensors, communication 
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equipment, and four Archerfish single shot mine neutralizers, which are the neutralizing 
component of the EMNS and AMNS systems.   
A nominal search sensor suite would include synthetic aperture array 
sonar which would provide resolutions of up to ten times higher than conventional side 
 
 
Figure 34 – Talisman M 
 
scan sonar.  An additional sensor would be required for Identification purposes.  This 
could be accomplished with a laser line scanning capability or electro-optical cameras.  A 
laser line scan(LLS) could potentially provide a higher resolution at longer distances with 
higher swath width than the camera and is therefore included here. 
  For Neutralization, the Talisman M already comes equipped with four 
Archerfish mine neutralizers.  To fill the gap of non-explosive neutralization, the 
integration of these Archerfish and a single-shot deployed chemical neutralization dart 
could fill that gap.  This solution can be realized by incorporating darts from the Assault 
Breaching System (ABS) Countermine System (CMS).  This program, under contract by 
Boeing, is developing a dart-equipped Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) capable of 
delivering thousands of darts to chemically neutralize mines.  Although this concept is 
being developed to support the rapid clearing of mine-laden areas in support of 
amphibious operations, the project team envisions a body capable of accurately launching 
a single dart that would penetrate the casing of a mine or MIED, disperse a reactive 
chemical agent, and chemically neutralize the explosive without detonation.  The body 
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and optics of the Archerfish could potentially be fitted with a launcher that will 
accurately deliver a single dart with enough kinetic energy to penetrate a mine or MIED.  
This “SeaArcher” variant of the Archerfish could provide non-explosive neutralization 




Figure 35 – Archerfish Single Shot Mine Neutralizer 
 
5.2 Employment Considerations 
  Due to the added capability, the Talisman M is large compared to other 
UUVs such as the REMUS variants.  Therefore, the Talisman would need pier support 
for launching and recovery.  The launching and recovery equipment would need to 
provide adequate lift for its 2200 lbs and up to 1100 lbs of payload, but the advanced 
battery and recharging system, which allows for 24 hours of operation before recharging 
and an organic surface recharging generator, require few uses of pier services.  
Although the chemical neutralization variant of the Archerfish would 
provide non-explosive neutralization in many cases, testing of this method and the effects 
on more improvised explosives have yet to be carried out.  Therefore, EOD may still be 
required to safely remove explosives from a CIKR dense area. 
 
5.3 Capabilities and Limitations 
  This system is capable of performing all functional requirements in 
a single body.  Integration of the SAS adds the capability of detecting buried objects, a 
useful feature due to the rapidly changing environments found in port conditions.  The 
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SAS and LLS integration also allow for redundant searching should water conditions not 
be optimal for either sensor.  Additionally, the use of the optics on the Archerfish allow 
for the search of piers, quay walls, and other infrastructure and its maneuverability makes 
 
 
Figure 36 – Alternative 3 Concept Image 
  
it well suited for operating close to such infrastructure, a feature not found elsewhere, 
particularly where a helicopter is the launch and control platform. 
  An all inclusive system does, however, inherit an increased risk of total 
system failure in the event of single component loss.  In other systems, the loss of a 
single component only degrades overall system performance, but the loss of this system 
could result in overall mission failure.  Additionally, one body with a slow search speed 
(5kts) could increase search time significantly. 
 
6 ALTERNATIVE 4 – VEHICLE SENTRY CONCEPT 2015+ 
Alternative four adds advanced processing and underwater communications in 
order to connect UUV and static network modems into a semi-autonomous network of 
assets capable of conducting all high-level functions while minimizing human interface.  
This type of networking is being developed for unmanned vehicles, particularly UAV’s, 
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under the name of Unmanned Vehicle Sentry and has been championed in the NPS-led 
program called Seaweb. 
 
6.1 Components 
  Alternative four requires UUV’s equipped with sensors and auxiliary 
equipment used to conduct all high-level functions and communications and computer 
technologies allowing the passing of information to other underwater assets and shore 
nodes.  For this alternative, we’ve built the network around advanced REMUS vehicles 
similar to the baseline, but equipped with forward looking sonar for volume search and 
synthetic aperture sonar for improved imaging and buried object detection. 
  For reacquisition and Neutralization, the project team has included the 
Talisman M, as already designed and marketed, equipped as in Alternative 3 with 
Archerfish EMNS and yet-to-be-developed SeaArcher CMNS. 
  In order to facilitate communications, the use of Benthos Underwater 
Modems (see Figure 37) is most logical choice due Benthos being the leader in 
underwater communications.  To facilitate searching the areas modeled in the wargame 
discussed in Section IV, a network of approximately 14 acoustic modems would be used 
to pass data from the UUVs along the network to either a gateway buoy or to other 
UUVs.  This gateway buoy would require both an acoustic modem for sending and 
receiving data in the network and means of wireless communications to send and receive 
data from a command and control station ashore.  Such buoys have been used in Seaweb 
experiments using cellular, Iridium satellite communications, or military FreeWave.   
Although the acoustic network technology is already reportedly capable of 
reliable data transmissions of 10-15 Kbps at ranges of 1-8 km, Professor Joe Rice at NPS 
reports that environmental constraints impose a more realistic performance of 140 bps at 
ranges of 300-3000 meters25.   
Modifications would need to be made to REMUS and Talisman M 
vehicles to enable them to participate in the network.  Benthos has already been approved 
                                                     
25 Professor Joe Rice, interviewed by Bobby Rowden, Naval Postgraduate School, November 21, 2008. 
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for a SPAWAR contract to develop a REMUS capable modem 26 but Talisman would 




Figure 37 – Benthos Underwater Communication Equipment 
 
6.2 Employment Considerations 
  Although the same considerations apply for previous alternatives for 
transportation, deployment, and retrieval of these components, the operational aspects are 
streamlined due to the autonomous nature of this system architecture.   
The network is very mobile and could be on station within two days of 
notice, and deployed and operational within hours27.  Although past experiments have 
used boats to emplace sensors, in order to avoid placing manned assets in the danger area 
the ideal delivery would be by helicopter.  Although this has not yet been accomplished 
in trials, there is no reason an air deployment is ill-suited.   
Once in place, all components begin Search, Detect, and Classification 
functions using onboard sensors and advanced CAD/CAC algorithms.  Since the current 
bandwidth would not allow the streaming of sensor imagery, CAD/CAC would be 
necessary to capture important data and transmit in bursts back to human operators 
ashore that can make a classification determination.  As with many autonomous systems, 
the sensors are much more mature than the algorithms used for change or anomaly 
                                                     
26 Dale Green, telephone interview by author, November 24, 2008. 
27 Joe Rice, 2 "Underwater Networks”, (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, November 20, 2008). 
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detection, but efforts are underway to improve existing algorithms that will enable this 
employment scheme. 
Once an object is determined to require further prosecution, the Neutralize 
vehicle (Talisman M) is automatically routed to the object to begin prosecution.  Video or 
other data is streamed to the shore node where human interface makes the final 





Figure 38 – Alternative 4 Concept Image 
 
  However, in addition to the search bodies, this architecture would require 
relays to collect and pass information.  These bodies would also need to be placed in the 
environment in a matter conducive to data transfer.  Depending on the area of the search, 
this could require extensive planning and placement of relay nodes. 
 
6.3 Capabilities and Limitations 
  Although using mostly modified equipment already in use, the addition of 
the underwater networking allows a synergy that reduces the timeline of overall mine and 
MIED clearance operations.  By allowing information to be passed from between nodes, 
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processing, asset deployment and recovery, and decision making times are greatly 
reduced. 
  This alternative is based on two important assumptions: the development 
of a REMUS vehicle capable of using volume search and SAS sonars, and the 
development of a CAD/CAC algorithm that will enable specific imagery to be sent via 
the acoustic network.  The use of UUVs operating within an acoustic network has had 
sufficient testing to prove its capability and the individual components have likewise 
been proven.   
  Before deployment, effort must be made to the battlefield in which the 
network will operate.  The environmental factors affecting each port differently will have 
various effects on network performance.  These factors must be understood in order to 


















































IV.  MODELING AND ANALYSIS 
 
1. WARGAME 
As part of the SEDP this wargame was designed to perform the following tasks:  
1) conduct an analysis of system of systems solution alternatives, 2) provide an 
infrastructure to validate the project problem statement, operational concept and scenario,  
and 3) serve as a knowledge-generating tool giving insight toward the main task and the 
additional complexities and issues that would encompass a Maritime Homeland Defense 
(MHD) MIED scenario.  Using a simulation in this study offered a unique opportunity 
that would allow unlimited freedom to explore several options and ideas, change input 
parameters easily without extensive calculations and provide a venue to test virtually all 
the group’s hypotheses prior to taking on this problem.   The advantages of modeling and 
simulation (M&S) in a Systems Engineering project seemed to be a mutually beneficial 
venture, taking two very distinct processes and using them toward a common goal.   
 
1.1 M&S Approach Development 
 The development of the wargame was carefully evaluated to ensure that it 
would be feasible and would meet its intended objectives.  The objectives of the game 
listed in the introduction were considered on the basis of using the SEDP to address the 
problem statement.  Once the requirements were established the focus shifted toward 
translating those requirements into a conceptual design that would be a hybrid of war-
gaming to establish baseline metrics followed by closed form simulations of the solution 
alternatives.  Within the conceptual design, the scenario planning, environment, player 
cell objectives, constraints, and design of experiments were considered.  Following the 
conceptual design was the model implementation phase which involved constructing the 
wargame database for the baseline systems, asset allocation to the player cells, force 
layout, and data collection scheme for alternative system specifications to input into the 
database.  The final step was the execution and revision for the purpose of understanding 
the behavior of systems and collecting desired information from the model’s execution.  
The steps that were focused on for the wargame were one, objectives/requirements, two, 
conceptual design, three, model implementation, and four, experimentation and revision.  
Given the team’s limited experience with modeling and simulation, the M&S process 
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required two war games to meet the objectives.  An illustration of the M&S process is 





























Figure 39 - Modeling and Simulation Process 
 
 The modeling tool selected is the Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation 
(JCATS) program.  The JCATS program is an interactive simulation tool sponsored by 
the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and has been used by Center for Asymmetric 
Warfare (CAW), a Department of the Navy operation associated with Naval Postgraduate 
School, for planning and executing Maritime Based Homeland Security/Homeland 
Defense exercises in the Northwest Region, specifically in the Puget Sound area. 
 
1.2 Operational Concept 
 
1.2.1 Scenario Development 
 A fishing vessel has inconspicuously planted MIEDs in the Elliot 
Bay.  The attack is directed at a passenger ferry that makes routine transits to a nearby 
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island.  The terrorist attack is successful against the ferry with several civilian casualties.  
Chaos ensues in the bay.  A Coast Guard first response unit becomes victim to terrorist 
mining as it attempts to render aid to the ferry.  Simultaneously, the C.V. Columbia is 
enroute to the loading docks located in the Port of Tacoma (POT).  A terrorist group 
towing a submerged kayak laden with explosives places the improvised bomb in the 
traffic separation lane directly in the path of cargo vessel C.V. Columbia.  The C.Vs 
mobility is instantly degraded and the ship begins to flood.  The ship experiences minor 
civilian casualties but the major concerns in this attack are the suspicion of additional 
mines and the loss of cargo containers in the channel which will require an extensive ship 
salvage operation.  This portion of the wargame was not amendable and introduced the 
scenario to the player cells in a coherent sequence with the purpose of prompting the 
operational commander to shut down port operations forcing crisis mitigation actions.  





                                     
1.2.2 Environment 
The scenario takes place in Puget Sound primarily in Elliot Bay 
and in Commencement Bay near POT.  The reason for selecting this area is that Puget 
Sound offers a vast area, numerous choke points and large volume of commercial traffic.  
However; before creating a virtual map of this area in JCATS, field research was 
conducted in order to gather sufficient data about the terrain, port infrastructure, vessel 
traffic, military and civil authority locations and the possible effects that an MIED attack 
would incur on the Port of Seattle area.  Key features obtained from the field study were 
noted such as ferry routes, transit times to and from nearby islands as well as the average 
number of passengers per transit.  One important feature considered was that the average 
water depth in Puget Sound is approximately 200ft.  For practical purposes, we modified 
the water depth to 70ft in JCATS to make the environment more vulnerable to a MIED 
attack.  An assumption about the environment was that a baseline underwater survey was 
completed within the last 6 months and any contacts detected during a search would be 
considered new contacts that were not detected in the underwater survey. 
Ferries 
 






1.2.3 Supporting Elements 
The exercise is designed to generate mitigation actions from the 
response cell, in this case, the BLUE cell.  The exercise controller was responsible for 
coordinating the actions of the opposition force and all neutral forces in the simulation.  
Since the statement of our problem dealt with post attack, there was no need to have a 
dedicated RED cell because the only remaining RED cell assets were the MIEDs.  The 
actions of the BLUE cell were not scripted but their responses needed to be able to 
accomplish key tasks in order to achieve the overall objective of re-opening the port.  The 
following is a list of the supporting elements of the BLUE cell as well as the key 
operational tasks that each supporting element was required to complete: 
   
a. Joint Harbor Operations Center (JHOC):  Operational 
commander/decision maker responsible for the actions of all supporting elements and 
assets. 
    Key Tasks:  
• Maintain C2 of the operation and coordinate the 
actions of supporting elements.  
• Make the determination to implement MARSEC 
Levels. 
 
b. Coast Guard:  Lead element responsible for search and rescue 
(SAR) operations as well as area first responders to a crisis in and around the harbor. 
    Key Tasks: 
• Emergency evacuation of ferry passengers to triage 
collection stations. 
• Establish 2000 (yd) secure zone around the ferry, 
first response unit, and cargo vessel. 
• Enforce MARSEC Level and report to JHOC. 
 
c. Navy Region Northwest (NRNW):  NRNW is responsible for 
mine hunting and mine clearance operations in the Puget Sound AO. 
Key Tasks: 
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• Conduct area sweep of designated search areas. 
• Ordnance disposal of localized MIEDs. 
• Provide assistance during SAR operations. 
 
d. Local Agencies:  Local agencies cell is comprised of law 
enforcement, fire department, Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and Seattle Port 
Assets.  This element provides support to the JHOC through law enforcement, 
firefighting capability, medical services and other crisis and consequence management 
resources. 
    Key Task: 
• Setup Triage Collection Stations. 
• Account for all personnel casualties. 
• Assist with enforcement of secure zone. 
• Provide firefighting capability. 
• Conduct Ship Salvage Operations. 
  
e. The WHITE/RED cell was responsible for controlling all 
neutral assets in the exercise as well as provide injects into the game.  Injects were built 
into the script, however if the response cell was not taking the appropriate actions, the 
controller could initiate a detonation of additional mines, escalating the scenario and 
prompting additional unscripted responses. 
 
   1.2.4 Exercise Constraints 
 In order to accurately mimic a response to the scripted attack, we 
added constraints for the response cell to follow.  The first of these constraints was that 
once the attack took place, none of the BLUE cell supporting elements would risk 
transiting the bay until the areas where cleared.  Therefore, SAR operations could only be 
accomplished using helicopters that would operate during daylight hours and load only 
two passengers at a time.  The constraints to the Navy where that once notified they could 
not begin to mobilize until after two hours.  Minehunting operations using air assets 
could not take place at night, however; UUVs could operate at any time.  Neutralization 
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operations also had to be accomplished only during daylight hours and all 
searches/neutralization actions had to coincide with Naval Mine Warfare doctrine.  The 
vehicle endurances of all BLUE force assets had to be considered and downtime for 
refueling was necessary.  Finally, asset placement had to be accomplished with 
movement orders to prevent unrealistic repositioning of assets during game play.  
 
1.2.5 Design of Experiments  
 As described above, the M&S plan for our project was to combine 
an interactive wargame with closed form simulation to assist in performing an analysis of 
system alternatives.  The interactive wargame was conducted with the intent of collecting 
the metrics of the baseline which is composed of current systems.  The closed form 
simulation would be conducted in order to gather data on the proposed system 
alternatives.  The design of experiments for the wargame and the closed form simulations 
centered around obtaining measurements of the metrics established in the functional 
hierarchy.  Combining the functionality of wargaming with that of closed form 
simulation improved the overall results by filling in the shortfalls of each with the 
advantages of the other.  Data collection was accomplished through the recording of 
Microsoft Netmeeting© Chat postings and the JCATS data logger.  This allowed for the 
review of an already played scenario where all actions from the game can be viewed in 
their entirety.  The data collected was ultimately used for the performance analysis of 
each of the proposed systems.   
 
1.3 Model Implementation 
 The model implementation phase entailed the translation of the conceptual 
model into an executable simulation.  This involved building dynamic models of moving 
objects (vessels, helicopters, submersibles, etc.) into the JCATS database known as the 
Vista.  In addition the Vista allowed the database operator to develop the force plan 
which assigns assets to different cells.  The performance parameters of the various 
vehicles were collected from their manufacturers and/or operators but not all of the 
pertinent data could be attained due to either their classification level or the system’s 
developmental phase.  The performance parameters from open sources of legacy systems 
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were used to fill the missing data.  This data was then entered into the Vista to construct 
the new platforms used in the system alternatives.   
 
1.3.1 Building the Database 
 Each of the modeled vehicles was constructed in the Systems 
Editor of the Vista.  The systems editor is used to specify basic attributes of a system, 
specifically the mobility type and the symbols used for classification and identification 
during the game.  In addition to physical dimensions and passenger capacities, the 
systems general editor allowed us to characterize the detectability, vulnerability and 
station characteristics of the asset.  The detectability, vulnerability and station tabs of the 
general editor are the features that allowed us to establish relationships between all of the 
vehicles.  Detectability allowed us to enter data about the sensor each asset carried and 
depending on inherent algorithms built into JCATS, it would provide a signature that 
another asset could see.  Pairing the detectability of two assets allows them to be able to 
detect each other during game play.  Similarly, the vulnerability of an asset allowed for 
each of the assets to be affected by the MIEDS used by the RED cell.  Vulnerability also 
contains a series of inherent PHPK tables built into JCATS for each asset against each 
weapon system in its archive.  The Station tab is used to assign sensor and weapons to a 
platform.  The sensors used by our vehicles were configured in the Sensor Editor of the 
Vista and the weapons in the Munitions Editor.   
 
  In order to give similar characteristics to similar assets, the assets 
were grouped by mobility class.  Starting with surface vessels, each was given their own 
specific physical characteristics and a unique identifier symbol.  However, as a class they 
were given a common vulnerability to mines/MIEDs and were dependent on the physical 
dimensions of the vessel and the PHPK tables, which would dictate the various degrees 
of damage.  The sensor for each surface vessel was standard sight, called Direct View 
Optics (DVO) in the VISTA.  The range was from 0 to 2000 (m), with a 2 second scan 
interval and a horizontal field of view of 20 degrees.  Helicopters were also given a 
generic DVO sensor with a range from 0 to 4000 (m) with a 2 second scan interval and a 
135 degree horizontal view.  REMUS (100) UUVs were given a range from 0 to 50 
meters and a 90 degree horizontal field of view, with a continuous scan active sonar as 
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the primary sensor.  The active sonar detection is a pairing algorithm that allows the 
database manager to enter the types of platforms that the sonar can detect and then uses 
the built in probability tables based on user inputs.  Dismounted persons used “unaided 
eye” as the primary sensor ranging from 0 to 1000 (m), a 20 horizontal field of view and 
continuous scan.  Assigning attribute was done mainly for all generic vehicles, while 
some of the vehicles that contain special sensors such as the ALMDS was given a 
different sensor mounted to it in the station tab.   
 
1.3.2 Asset Allocation 
 Table 9 shows the list of assets available to each cell.  The exact 
number of units was unknown, so we determined the numbers based on our best 
estimates from the field study.   
 
 Placement of the assets was also determined from research 
conducted in Seattle, WA.  The neutral forces were randomly placed throughout the 
Puget Sound.  The goal was to re-enact a typical day in the Port of Seattle prior to the 
attack.  Figure 42 shows the initial force lay-out.  Asset placement also served as a venue 
for conducting functional tests for each vehicle.  The operational testing was conducted at 
three levels:  individual, force and game.  At the individual level each asset was tested for 
functionality of characteristics developed in the Vista.  The force level testing allowed us 
to view the collaboration of the assets and determine whether enough assets were 
available to accomplish the mission of objectives for the cell and the BLUE force as a 
whole.  The final test was simply done to show movement of all elements and so that 
each asset could be seen and operated.  This test was conducted independent of doctrinal 
procedures. 
 
1.4 M&S Execution and Revision 
 In order to ascertain the effectiveness of the pre-exercise planning, we 
proceeded with conducting a scaled-down version of the wargame in the form of a 
feasibility experiment.  The feasibility exercise was conducted over the course of a single 
day in which the scenario was run for six hours.  The experimental wargame proved to be 
a very meaningful exercise and served as proof of concept for our overall approach to the 
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MIED problem.  The validity of the scenario was supported by representatives from 
JFCOM as they were invited to participate in the game as JCATS operators for the cells.  
The simulated and free play portions of the game were executed as planned as each asset 
was able to move and detect contacts using their sensors.  Although the scenario was  
 
Table 9 - Asset Allocation List 
 
validated and each of the systems functioned properly, there were uncertainties in 
conducting the prototype wargame such as the amount of time necessary for the response 
cell to meet all of the objectives, game speed, and player experience level for reacting 
and employing assets.  Although some of these elements could be taken directly from the 
prototype game, other factors, such as the interagency relationships, SOPs, and mitigation 
CG Asset Number Location 
  HH-65 Dolphin 2 Everett 
  EOD TM 1 Pier 36 
  25ft Boat 3 Pier 36-North Pier 
  25ft Boat 3 Pier 36-Central Pier 
  CG Cutter Mellon 1 Pier 36-South Pier 
  Utility Boat 2 Pier 36-Slip 
Local Agencies 18ft RHIB 1 IVO Bainbridge Island 
  17ft RHIB 1 Entering Elliot Bay 
  Fire Boat 1 Pier 36 
  Tug 2 
Eastern Pier of West 
Seattle 
  EOD TM 1 
Eastern West Seattle 
Island 
  Air Ambulance 2 City of Seattle 
Navy MH-53 4 NE Everett 
  MH-60 2 NE Everett 
  MH-60 w/RAMICS 1 SW Everett 
  MH-53T 3 SW Everett 
  MH-60T 2 SW Everett 
  Skimmer 3 Central Everett 
  Patrol Boat 2 Central Everett 
  REMUS 100 3 SE Everett 
  AQS-20A 1 SE Everett 
  AQS-24 1 SE Everett 
  EOD TM 2 SE Everett 
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efforts that each agency would undertake given the scenario could not.  During the game, 
the JHOC was unable to identify priority search areas, sequence of actions, information 
flow, and areas of responsibility. Since these considerations ultimately affect the overall 
timeline, they needed to be researched and implemented into the free play.  The wargame 
experiment also identified the need for a more formalized data collection scheme.  
Reviewing chat files that had been saved from Netmeeting proved time consuming and 
ineffective.  It identified the need to record the specific data that was necessary to 
conduct the analysis which could then be used in tandem with the JCATS logger.  
Overall, the prototype model proved that it was not only feasible, but it would provide a 
great opportunity to acquire realistic data for the analysis.  
 
 




1.4.1 Prototype Improvements 
 Taking the lessons learned from the experiment, the first step was 
to present our scenario to the experts and get their responses.  For this we consulted with 
Tom Coyle of Pacific Northwest National Laboratories (PNNL), who has coordinated 
numerous exercises with (CAW) dealing with disaster emergency response actions.  Mr. 
Coyle was able to coordinate for us a table top exercise (TTX) with members of the 
USCG Sector Seattle, Contingency Plans and Force Readiness (CPFR) office .  The 
CPFR is the key office of the DHS in Seattle responsible for policy and procedures for 
emergency responses.  Those present at the TTX were Stephen J. Harvey, Supervisor 
Security Specialist USCG Seattle, LT Jim Erickson, USCG, Capt. Gerry Fiola, Seattle 
Police Department and Capt. Paul S. Foerster, Seattle Fire Department.  Some of the 
topics of that discussion were: 
• Unified Command Center (UCC) and Incident 
Command Element (ICE) structure communications 
and information flow that would be implement in our 
scenario. 
• Priority Search Areas 
• Actions required to resume port activities 
• Integration with NRNW  
• Sequence of actions 
• Real-life timeline of our scenario 
  The conclusion from meeting with members of CPFR was 
an understanding of each agency’s goals and UCC relationships.  The game lab was 
reconfigured to emulate a UCC so that online chat would no longer be required. The 
purpose for doing so was to provide the players the opportunity to act as contingency 
planners within their respective cells, provide them better situational awareness and 
allowing them to provide more useful analysis at the conclusion of the game.  As an 
added bonus to our visit back to Seattle we also witnessed a live, full-scale exercise of a 
MRO, which involved twelve federal, state and local agencies.  We learned that a MRO 
of the magnitude in the JCATS scenario may take several days vice several hours and 
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would require an enormous amount of resources.  These were all considerations that we 
hope to capture in our game. 
 
1.4.2 Conducting the Final Wargame 
 The baseline wargame was executed over a period of two eight 
hour days.  On day one, the first six hours were devoted to crisis management in which 
the BLUE cell was prompted to take actions in controlling the scenario, conduct maritime 
rescue operations and execute planning for the area searches. The first six hours of the 
wargame tested the ability of the command and control (C2) to deal with the complexity 
of the scenario.  The JCATS program was ideal for supporting a “commander-in-the 
loop” simulation such as this through the use of Command and Control (CAC) files that 
allow graphics to be displayed as overlays onto the JCATS maps and situation awareness 
functionalities that focus on the human user.  The second day was devoted to conducting 
area searches of the designated priority areas displayed by the CAC files.  Figure 43 





Figure 43 - JHOC Designated Search Areas 
 
 The searches were conducted using a speed ratio of 15 to 1 in order 
to complete search paths in the allotted time for the game.  The mine classification and 
identification of each contact, which was characterized by a JCATS serial number, also 
had a picture associated with it.  The Navy cell had to determine whether the pictures 
were either “mine-like” or “non mine-like” objects.  The individuals that were tasked 
with making those determinations were mine warfare qualified individuals who have had 
experience with Naval Mine Warfare.  This allowed for a sense of realism into the 
scenario and allowed for human error.  The time required to extract the REMUS 100 and 
conduct the PMA was simulated.  This process, which normally requires three hours for 
every hour of search conducted, was not incorporated into the wargame, but was included 
into the overall timeline on the data collection sheet.  The contacts that were considered 
“mine-like” objects were further investigated using EOD teams in JCATS.  Once the 
EOD teams were on station, we then determined that the mines were neutralized with the 
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assumption that it would require a minimum of one hour per contact and three hours if 
that contact was identified as an MIED.  This data was also recorded in data collection 
sheet.   
   The data collection strategy was carefully revised in order to 
maximize the tools available and to get the data that were required.  From the 
experimental game it was understood that not all of the metrics could be measured.  Area 
search rate and probability of detection for the baseline systems could be collected but 
inferences had to be made about some of the other metrics such as asset time to station, 
detection rate, and rate of neutralization per contact.  The data collection sheets were 
condensed to record only the significant activities in the detect-to-engage (DTE) 
sequence of the game.  The data collection sheets were an adaptation of an Incident 
Status Summary template taken from the National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
that was converted into a real-time report for the JHOC commander.  The JCATS logger 





1.4.3 Expected vs. Actual Results 
 The scenario was designed for the BLUE cell to accomplish three 
main objectives before the port could be re-opened.  These objectives included a 
maritime rescue operation, mine clearance and ship salvage operations in Elliot Bay and 
Commencement Bay.  It was anticipated that the game timeline for completion of the 
scenario would be much shorter than the timeline discussed in the TTX.  According to 
interviews with USCG Sector Seattle, the maritime rescue operation alone would take 
several days vice several hours.  This is due to the limited capacity of the triage centers 
which could not handle the volume of victims evacuated, the extreme difficulty of SAR 
using a helicopter and the likelihood of having to search for drowned victims. 
Concurrently the designated area searches which were conducted on a 15:1 ratio would 
have taken a combined 443 hours to complete in real time which was close to the 
predicted number and the time to completion that we calculated.  The time for the Navy 
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Cell to deploy its assets from Everett Naval Station to Elliot Bay and Tacoma took 30 
minutes when in reality it would take at least two hours for them to arrive.  This does not 
include the 3 hours for set-up that is normally required for a UUV platoon and EOD team 
to set up a command center.  These times did not play out in the wargame but were part 
of the expectations discussed in the TTX. 
The six mines in the scenario were randomly distributed 
throughout Elliot Bay along with seventy non-minelike objects.  During the area 
searches, the REMUS 100 UUVs were able to detect approximately .85 of the total 
number of objects which included all of MIEDs.  The PMA team however identified 4 
additional objects as mine-like.  This prosecution of the additional contacts would have 
added significantly to the real-life timeline since those objects would be treated as mines.  
Although the TTX expected timeline varied from the simulation, we did record accurate 
data on the search times and detection rates in which the search time of all designated 
areas by the three vehicles was approximately 147.98 hours of per vehicle for a total of 
six days of area search at 460-550 m2/s which we were able to accomplish on a 15:1 




1.4.4 Closed Form Simulation 
   The next step in the wargaming process was to conduct the 
performance analysis of the alternatives in a closed form simulation.  The goal was to 
replicate the operating capabilities of the individual systems.  Simulated test runs were 
conducted using only the individual platforms in order to obtain the detection rate and 
area search rates for each element in the alternatives.  The individual systems were then 
grouped into their respective alternative systems and then were tested in a closed form 
miniature wargame that would encompass all of the free play actions specific to mine 
clearance operations.  Other portions were not re-enacted.  It was important for us to 
conduct both a simulated run of each asset individually and then the entire alternative 
made up of multiple assets operation as a system to get a side-by-side comparison of 
competing equipment and systems.  The data that we collected on each of the alternatives 
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from the simulation was verified by our team by employing theoretical formulas for area 
search rate and detection rate using an exhaustive search model.  The resulting data is 
explained in the performance analysis section of the report.   
 
1.5 Modeling and Simulation Conclusions 
 The wargame and closed form simulations conducted supported the SEDP 
as tools for comparing system solution alternatives.  The process of developing a model 
is in itself an excellent tool from which to perform Systems Engineering by incorporating 
all of the steps of SE process.  JCATS is an excellent modeling tool to support 
“commander-in-the-loop” interactive wargaming and is also capable of being used to 
perform closed form simulations.  The JCATS program was ideal for meeting the 
objectives of the wargame and, ultimately, the project.  SEDP geared strictly for M&S 
had to be adopted to meet the requirements of the project.  The term “simulation systems 
engineering” encompasses what method of building the M&S model.  It is highly 
recommended that the Systems Engineering Analysis curriculum incorporate some form 
of M&S using an interactive simulation model in future capstone projects and adopt 
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V. DECISION ANALYSIS 
 
1. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
Performance analysis was conducted to evaluate the performance and 
effectiveness of system alternatives in countering a MIED threat through the function 
decomposition and the metrics created for each function (refer to Chapter II Section 3).  
The various alternatives were evaluated and analyzed with reference to the current MCM 
system as the baseline model and threshold for the other alternatives.  Similarly each 
metric was weighted according to the feedback gathered from stakeholder surveys and 
used in an Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) tool to rank the relative importance of the 
metrics.  
 
1.1 Alternative 0 - Baseline 
Alternative 0 is the current MCM system and is set as the baseline system.  
It consists of a REMUS UUV platoon performing the functions of search and detection, 
and EOD divers carrying out identification and neutralization functions. Classification is 
performed off-site through PMA. Based on this configuration, the team conducted 
extensive research to obtain the technical specifications of this system.  This information 
was subsequently translated into the metric or MOP for each function as discussed in 
Chapter II.  
These MOPs were set as the threshold values for the subsequent 
alternatives, which constitute the minimum requirements to be met for other alternatives 
proposed.  At the same time, the desired performance for each MOP was set as the goal 
or upper limit for that MOP. Tables 10, 11 and 12 illustrate the threshold and goal for the 
MOP for alternative 0. 
Threshold values for the MOPs were obtained from the manufacturers,  
system operators, data obtained from modeling and simulation, subject matter experts and 
feedback gathered from various Navy sponsored exercises. Data was also collected from 
the 8th International Symposium on Technology and the Mine Problem hosted by the 
Naval Postgraduate School on May of 2008. The goals for the MOPs in general were set 
at 20% higher than the threshold value. However, a range of performance figures was 
given, so that information was used in lieu of the 20% increase. 
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Alternative 0 - Baseline Threshold Goal Units
Search Area search rate 460 550 m2/s
Time to station 1 0.5 hr
Deployability rating 4 5 -
Detect Probability of Detection 85 95 %
Probability of False Detection 5 1 %
Identification Probability of Identification 95 99 %
Probability of False Identification 5 1 %
Identification time per contact 1.5 1 hr
Positional accuracy 15 3 m
Classification Resolution 4 3 cm
Search time / PMA time ratio 3 1 -
Neutralization Time required to neutralize 3 2 hr
Neutralization rating 3.26 4 -
 
 
Table 10 - Alternative 0 Performance Data 
 
Wt Data Value
Deployability Movement 0.25 5 1.25
Assembly 0.25 5 1.25
Operational testing 0.25 5 1.25
Fueling & Charging 0.25 1 0.25
TOTAL 1.00 4 4.00  
 
Table 11 - Deployability Rating for Alternative 0 
 
Wt Data Value
Neutralization Effectiveness in neutralizing 0.2 5 1.00
Rating Damage to facilities 0.33 4 1.32
Damage to personnel 0.14 2 0.28
Damage to assets 0.33 2 0.66
TOTAL 1.00 3.26  
 
Table 12 - Neutralization Rating for Alternative 0 
 
Deployability rating was computed based on the metric discussed in 
Chapter II.  The deployability rating for the baseline alternative had an excellent rating 
for movement, assembly and operational testing. It required only 2 personnel to move, 
less than 1 hour to assemble and less than ½ hour to conduct operational testing.  The 
deployability rating of the baseline system was only slightly hindered due to REMUS 100 
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requiring approximately six hours to fully charge from about 20% power.  The rating for 
deployability was assigned as per Table 11.  
A similar process was conducted to derive the standardized neutralization 
rating for all of the systems.  Since the baseline system used EOD divers as the primary 
neutralization method, it had an excellent neutralization effectiveness given that it is a 
man-in-loop operation. Having a man-in-loop minimized the damage to the facilities and 
infrastructure, but also carried a high risk to personnel because of close contact with the 
MIED. Rating for neutralization was assigned as per Table 12.  
 
1.2 Alternative 1 
Alternative 1 was an augment to alternative 0 but also included the LCS 
MIW Mission Module which consisting of the WLD-1 with the AQS-20 sonar suite. 
Based on this configuration, the team gathered the necessary technical specification for 
the system and translated them into the MOP tabulated in Tables 13, 14 and 15, 
respectively. These technical specifications and MOPs were then compared to the 
threshold and goal values of the baseline (alternative 0) to generate a fraction for the 
MOP (where 0 is equal or worst than threshold and 1 is equal or better than goal).  
 
Alternative 1 Data Units
Search Area search rate 630 m2/s
Time to station 2 hr
Deployability rating 4.5 -
Detect Probability of Detection 88 %
Probability of False Detection 5 %
Identification Probability of Identification 95 %
Probability of false identification 5 %
Identification time per contact 1 hr
Positional accuracy 10 m
Classification Resolution 1 mm
Search time / PMA time ratio 2 -
Neutralization Time required to neutralize 3 hr
Neutralization rating 3.26 -
 




Deployability Movement 0.25 3 0.75
Assembly 0.25 5 1.25
Operational testing 0.25 5 1.25
Fueling & Charging 0.25 5 1.25
TOTAL 1.00 4.50  
 
Table 14 - Deployability Rating for Alternative 1 
 
Wt Data Value
Neutralization Effectiveness in neutralizing 0.2 5 1
Rating Damage to facilities 0.33 4 1.32
Damage to personnel 0.14 2 0.28
Damage to assets 0.33 2 0.66
TOTAL 1.00 3.26  
 
Table 15 - Neutralization Rating for Alternative 1 
 
The key performance differences in this alternative were an enhanced 
search rate, probability of detection, resolution and improved ratio of search time/PMA 
time. Similar to the baseline system, Alternative one utilized EOD divers as the 
neutralization method and therefore had the same neutralization rating.  Alternative one 
had a better deployability rating as it did not require re-charging and could be easily 
assembled. On the other hand the WLD-1 would require more personnel and some light 
equipment in order to deploy.  
 
1.3 Alternative 2 
Alternative 2 consisted of the baseline system and the AQS-20, ALMDS, 
RAMICS and AMNS. Tables 16, 17 and 18 show the technical specifications for 
Alternative 2. As with Alternative 1, the technical specification and MOPs were 
compared to the threshold and goal values of the baseline (Alternative 0) to generate a 




Alternative 2 Data Units
Search Area search rate 6650 m2/s
Time to station 2 hr
Deployability rating 4.5 -
Detect Probability of Detection 95 %
Probability of False Detection 1 %
Identification Probability of Identification 95 %
Probability of false identification 5 %
Identification time per contact 1 hr
Positional accuracy 10 m
Classification Resolution 0.01 mm
Search time / PMA time ratio 2 %
Neutralization Time required to neutralize 0.5 hr
Neutralization rating 3.48 -
 
 
Table 16 - Alternative 2 Performance Data 
 
Wt Data Value
Deployability Movement 0.25 3 0.75
Assembly 0.25 5 1.25
Operational testing 0.25 5 1.25
Fueling & Charging 0.25 5 1.25
TOTAL 1.00 4.50  
 
Table 17 - Deployability for Alternative 2 
 
Wt Data Value
Neutralization Effectiveness in neutralizing 0.2 4 0.8
Rating Damage to facilities 0.33 1 0.33
Damage to personnel 0.14 5 0.7
Damage to assets 0.33 5 1.65
TOTAL 1.00 3.48  
 
Table 18 - Neutralization rating for Alternative 2 
 
The main additions to this alternative were the AQS-20, ALMDS, AMNS 
and RAMICS. With the laser sensor mounted to a MH-60, the ALMDS was able to 
achieve a high probability of detection and a significantly faster search rate.  The laser 
provided a higher resolution, which also improved the search time/PMA time ratio.  In 
terms of deployability, this alternative would require light equipment and a few personnel 
to deploy it.  It would also require less than one hour to refuel as compare to alternative 0, 
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but would have to refuel more frequently due to the on-station limitations of the MH-60.  
Table 16 illustrates the deployability rating assigned for this alternative. 
The neutralization function in this alternative is accomplished by the 
AMNS and RAMICS neutralization systems.  These systems use remote control 
operation which minimized the risk to asset and personnel.  Equipped with an optical 
camera the AMNS could provide the operator with a verifiable battle damage assessment 
(BDA). This alternative also was extremely effective at neutralizing threats on or near the 
surface as well as submerged threats.  However; a drawback was that both neutralization 
systems had an increased potential for damage to existing infrastructure. Neutralization 
rating was assigned as per Table 18.  
 
1.4 Alternative 3 
Alternative 3 consisted of the Talisman M and an advanced UUV 
produced by BAE Systems. This UUV is a modular, multi role vehicle capable of 
carrying search sensors, communication equipment, and four Archerfish single shot mine 
neutralizers, which are the neutralizing component of the EMNS and AMNS systems.  
The nominal search sensor suite includes synthetic aperture array sonar which would 
provide resolutions of up to 10 times higher than conventional side scan sonar.  An 
additional sensor would be required for Identification purposes. This would be 
accomplished with a bathymetric laser line scanning sensor or electro-optical camera.  A 
laser line scan could potentially provide a higher resolution at longer distances and have a 
wider swath width than a camera. 
For neutralization, the Talisman M is equipped with four Archerfish mine 
neutralizers.  To fill the gap of non-explosive neutralization, the integration of the 
Archerfish and a single-shot chemical neutralization dart would be used.  This solution 
can be realized by integrating: a dart from the Assault Breaching System (ABS) 
Countermine System (CMS), a program under contract by Boeing to provide dart-
equipped JDAMs capable of delivering thousands of darts to chemically neutralize 
mines; the body and optics of the Archerfish, and a launcher that will accurately deliver a 
single dart with enough kinetic energy to penetrate a mine or MIED.  This “SeaArcher” 
variant of the Archerfish could provide non-explosive neutralization when the proximity 
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to port infrastructure makes conventional neutralization impractical.  The potential MOPs 
for this alternative are listed in Tables 19, 20 and 21.  
 
Alternative 3 Data Units
Search Area search rate 184 m2/s
Time to station 2 hr
Deployability rating 5 -
Detect Probability of Detection 95 %
Probability of False Detection 1 %
Identification Probability of Identification 95 %
Probability of false identification 5 %
Identification time per contact 1 hr
Positional accuracy 10 m
Classification Resolution 0.01 mm
Search time / PMA time ratio 1 -
Neutralization Time required to neutralize 0.5 hr
Neutralization rating 4.47 -
 
 
Table 19 - Alternative 3 performance data 
 
Wt Data Value
Deployability Movement 0.25 5 1.25
Assembly 0.25 5 1.25
Operational testing 0.25 5 1.25
Fueling & Charging 0.25 5 1.25
TOTAL 1.00 5.00  
 
Table 20 - Deployability rating for Alternative 3 
 
Wt Data Value
Neutralization Effectiveness in neutralizing 0.2 4 0.8
Rating Damage to facilities 0.33 4 1.32
Damage to personnel 0.14 5 0.7
Damage to assets 0.33 5 1.65
TOTAL 1.00 4.47  
 
Table 21 - Neutralization rating for Alternative 3 
 
The synthetic aperture array sonar and laser line scan give the system 
search, detect and identification performance equivalent or better than the ALMDS. 
Additionally, the real-time data processing capability would enhance the search 
time/PMA time ratio and ultimately lessen the overall clearance time.  The main 
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disadvantage of this system was the slow speed of the Talisman in which the area search 
rate was worse than the other alternatives.  
Simultaneously, the non-explosive neutralization method employed by the 
Archerfish would minimize the potential risk of damage to facilities, personnel and 
assets, and provide visual control of the neutralization efforts through use of optical 
cameras built into the system. 
The deployability rating of the Talisman and Archerfish was rated high 
since both are relatively small and could be easily moved with a minimum of two persons 
without the need of heavy equipment.  This system could be easily assembled at the 
test/operation site and incorporates a built-in generator which eliminates the charging 
time required. 
 
1.5 Alternative 4 
Alternative 4 consists of the Talisman M with Archerfish mine 
neutralizers similar to that of the Alternative 3. The search and detection functions will be 
carryout by an improved REMUS UUV with synthetic aperture array sonar offering a 
better resolution as compare to present REMUS vehicle. Alternative 4 also features the 
use of Joint Architecture for Unmanned Systems (JAUS) that inter-links the components 
through a Benthos Underwater LAN system that enhances the communication among the 
various sub-systems and provides real-time PMA.  Potential MOPs for this alternative are 
listed in Tables 22, 23 and 24.  
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Alternative 4 Data Units
Search Area search rate 644 m2/s
Time to station 1 hr
Deployability rating 4 -
Detect Probability of Detection 95 %
Probability of False Detection 1 %
Identification Probability of Identification 95 %
Probability of false identification 5 %
Identification time per contact 1 hr
Positional accuracy 10 m
Classification Resolution 0.01 cm
Search time / PMA time ratio 1 -
Neutralization Time required to neutralize 0.5 hr
Neutralization rating 4.47 -
 
 
Table 22 - Alternative 4 Performance Data 
 
Wt Data Value
Deployability Movement 0.25 5 1.25
Assembly 0.25 5 1.25
Operational testing 0.25 5 1.25
Fueling & Charging 0.25 1 0.25
TOTAL 1.00 4.00  
 
Table 23 - Deployability Rating for Alternative 4 
 
Wt Data Value
Neutralization Effectiveness in neutralizing 0.2 4 0.8
Rating Damage to facilities 0.33 4 1.32
Damage to personnel 0.14 5 0.7
Damage to assets 0.33 5 1.65
TOTAL 1.00 4.47  
 
Table 24 - Neutralization Rating for Alternative 4 
 
The synthetic aperture array sonar gives the system search and detection 
characteristics that were equivalent to that of the Alternative 3. Additionally, wireless 
communication among the sub-systems gave the system the real-time processing 
capabilities for PMA.  
Simultaneously, the non-explosive neutralization method employ by the 
Archerfish would minimize the potential risk of damage to facilities, personnel and 
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assets, yet provide visual control in the neutralization through the optical camera attach to 
the system. 
As for the deployability rating, the Talisman and Archerfish, which are 
relatively small can be easily move with two men without the need of heavy equipment. 
Another advantage of this system is that it can be easily assembled at the test/operation 
site. But the time required to charge the REMUS is the only disadvantage in term of 
deployability requirement, because the REMUS would required a charging time of six 
hours. 
 
1.6 Comparison of All Alternatives 
With the data and MOPs obtained for all the alternatives, the MOE 
(measure of effectiveness) of each alternative was computed. The MOP for each function 
was multiplied by the weights gathered from the stakeholder survey and then summed up 
to form the MOE of the alternative. Refer to the Table 25 for the summary of the overall 
comparison of all the alternatives. The comparison shows that for presently available 
technologies and systems, Alternative 2 is the most effective SoS to counter an MIED 
threat. With its high resolution, probability of detection and speed of the MH-60 as the 
employment platform, Alternative 2 gives a much higher MOE compare to Alternative 1.  
However, in comparison Alternative 4 had an even better MOE in 
countering MIEDs. The synthetic aperture sonar gives an almost equivalent search and 
detection performance as the ALMDS. Conversely, the non-explosive neutralization 
method coupled with the optical camera provides an enhanced effectiveness in 
neutralization without risks to infrastructure, assets and personnel. 
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Baseline AFP 1 AFP 2 AFP 3 AFP 4 
Evaluation Criteria Weights Threshold Goal units Data units Value Data units Value Data units Value Data units Value
Search Area search rate 0.15 460 550 m2/s 630 m2/s 1.00 6650 m2/s 1.00 184 m2/s 0.00 644 m2/s 1.00 
  Time to station 0.06 1 0.5 hr 2 hr 0.00 2 hr 0.00 2 hr 0.00 1 hr 0.00 
  Deployability rating 0.09 4 5 - 4.5 - 0.50 4.5 - 0.50 5 - 1.00 4 - 0.00 
                                    
Detect Probability of Detection 0.21 85 90 % 88 % 0.60 95 % 1.00 95 % 1.00 95 % 1.00 
  Probability of False Detection 0.03 5 1 % 5 % 0.00 1 % 1.00 1 % 1.00 1 % 1.00 
                                    
Identification Probability of Identification 0.07 95 99 % 95 % 0.00 95 % 0.00 95 % 0.00 95 % 0.00 
  Probability of false identification 0.07 5 1 % 5 % 0.00 5 % 0.00 5 % 0.00 5 % 0.00 
  Identification time per contact 0.02 1.5 1 hr 1 hr 1.00 1 hr 1.00 1 hr 1.00 1 hr 1.00 
  Positional accuracy 0.02 15 3 m 10 m 0.42 10 m 0.42 10 m 0.42 10 m 0.42 
                                    
Classification Resolution 0.03 4 3 cm 1 cm 1.00 0.01 cm 1.00 0.01 cm 1.00 0.01 cm 1.00 
  Search time / PMA time ratio 0.01 3 1 - 2 - 0.50 2 - 0.50 1 - 1.00 1 - 1.00 
                                    
Neutralization Time required to neutralize 0.09 3 2 hr 3 hr 0.00 0.5 hr 1.00 0.5 hr 1.00 0.5 hr 1.00 
  Neutralization rating 0.15 3.26 4 - 3.26 - 0.00 3.48 - 0.30 4.47 - 1.00 4.47 - 1.00 
                                    
 Total 1.00     MOE 0.39  MOE 0.64  MOE 0.64  MOE 0.70 
 
Table 25 - Comparison of All Alternatives 
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2. SUITABILITY ANALYSIS 
 In addition to the performance and capability of the proposed system, the 
availability and dependability of the proposed system would also affect the system 
effectiveness. Reference to Figure 44 (extracted from Benjamin S. Blanchard and Wolter 
J. Fabrycky), the system availability and dependability depend on it ability to minimize 
the downtime and enhance the uptime. Based on this approach, the team analyzes and 
compares the maintainability and reliability of the various alternatives to gauge the 
suitability of the proposed alternative. 
 
 
Figure 44 - Relationship Between Maintenance Downtime and Logistics Factors 
(extracted from Benjamin S. Blanchard and Wolter J. Fabrycky) 
 
However, as most of the proposed systems are still in it development or research 
stage, the reliability and maintainability data are not easily obtainable. Thus, the team 
conducted a prediction of the reliability and maintainability for the various alternatives 
based on combination of the following prediction techniques. 
a. Analysis of similar equipment 
b. Estimate of active element groups 
c. Equipment parts count 
d. Mechanical parts 
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e. Electrical parts 
f. Software complexity 
g. Spare parts availability (supply responsive) 
h. Test and support equipment effectiveness 
i. Maintenance facility availability 
j. Maintenance organization (personnel and training availability) 
k. Data and information process capability 
 
2.1 Reliability Prediction 
Basing on the prediction techniques highlighted above, the team 
conducted research and sought expert advice with regard to the various proposed system 
and its components. Among these techniques, the prediction based on similar equipment, 
active element group, equipment parts count, mechanical parts, electrical parts and 
software complexity were used for analysis of the reliability of the alternatives.  
a. The prediction, based on similar equipment, looked at equipment 
available or currently in use as a reference to guide the team when comparing the relative 
reliability of the proposed system to the baseline system.  
b. The active element group-based prediction referred to the active 
element of various components within the alternative system as a guide. This was 
required to compare the relative reliability of the proposed system to the baseline system. 
c. The equipment-parts-count is a factor of the prediction for the 
system reliability. Systems with more parts or components would more likely have a 
higher failure rate than those with fewer components. 
d. The mechanical parts prediction compares the components 
mechanical parts to determine the relative reliability of the proposed alternative. 
Mechanical parts that are subject to more movement, friction, wear and tear, etc, tend to 
have a likelihood of higher failure.  
e. Predictions based on electrical parts compare the extensiveness and 
complexity with respect to the individual electrical components used in the system. The  
more complex the electrical design of a system is, preludes to a higher failure rate (as 
compared to those using proven technology and simpler designs). 
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f. Systems that have a more complex software suite and require 
extensive interface would be more likely to have a higher failure rate than those having 
less interface.  
Referencing these prediction techniques, the team compiled the necessary 
information to compare the relative reliability of the various alternatives. The relative 
scale is from one to nine. One demonstrates the lowest reliability, five representing the 
baseline, and nine being the highest possible reliability. The team then performed a 
prediction analysis of the relative reliability utilizing the baseline system. Table 26 
tabulated the data regarding the various components of the alternatives.   
From the comparison in Table 26, it is noted that the reference to the 
baseline system, alternative 1 would be the most reliable system followed by alternative 
3. Alternative 2 and 4 were the least reliable systems. The main contribution to the low 
reliability for alternatives 2 and 4 were parts count and software complexity.  
 
2.2 Maintainability Prediction 
Similar to reliability, the prediction technique was used to predict the 
maintainability since the data and information on maintainability for the various 
alternatives were not easily obtainable. The criteria used to predict the maintainability 
included required spare parts, test and support equipment, maintenance facilities and 
organizations, and system capability to record and process maintenance data and 
information. Only corrective maintenance is used to determine maintainability. This is 
because the team assessed that the preventive maintenance for all the alternatives would 
be conducted at the unit level, thus the maintainability would be similar for all 
alternatives. 
The predictions based on spare parts looked at the availability of the spare 
parts for the proposed system. A commercially available part would enhance the system 
maintainability. On the other hand, parts that were only available through the Navy (such 
as explosives, etc) would constrain the availability of parts, making the system less 
maintainable. Similarly, the availability of test and support equipment for the proposed 






REMUS Proven and reliable
Battery, gps system, 
propulsion system, sonar 
sensor
Few equipment and 
parts
Propulsion system, 
control system Gps system, sensors
EOD Divers
Allowable diving time is 2 
hrs Human, diver equipment
Few equipment and 
parts N.A N.A
REMUS Proven and reliable
Battery, gps system, 
propulsion system, sonar 
sensor
Few equipment and 
parts
Propulsion system, 
control system Gps system, sensors
EOD Divers
Allowable diving time is 2 
hrs Human, diver equipment
Few equipment and 
parts N.A N.A
AQS-20 Similarity to REMUS
Sonar sensor, optical 
camera Relatively more parts
Assembly and 
connection
Sonar sensor, optical 
camera, RF link
WLD-1
Similarity to diesel 
engine
Propulsion system, gps 
system Relatively more parts
Propulsion system, 
control system
Electrical circuit and 
components
Support Module
Similarity to main frame 
computer
Software, electronic 
components Relatively more parts N.A
Electrical circuit and 
components, computer 
system
REMUS Proven and reliable
Battery, gps system, 
propulsion system, sonar 
sensor
Few equipment and 
parts
Propulsion system, 
control system Gps system, sensors
EOD Divers
Allowable diving time is 2 
hrs Human, diver equipment
Few equipment and 
parts N.A N.A
ALMDS
Similarity to AQS-20 
(laser)
Pulse laser, receiver, 
computer system Relatively more parts assembly laser, computer sys
AQS-20 Similarity to REMUS
Sonar sensor, optical 
camera Relatively more parts
Assembly and 
connection
Sonar sensor, optical 
camera, RF link
RAMICS
Similarity to gun and 
AQS-20
Laser guidance, firing 
system, gps system Relatively more parts
Firing system, train and 
elevation system Laser, computer system
AMNS Similarity to REMUS
Battery, gps, sonar, 
propolusion, firing 
system Relatively more parts
Propulsion system, firing 
system, gear system




Similarity to any 
helicopter
Rotor, engine, gps, 
control system, etc Relatively more parts
Rotor, engine, control 
system, etc Navigation system, etc
3 Talisman M (c/w Archerfish, 
SeaArcher)
Similar to AQS-20 + 
AMNS + WLD-1
5
Laser, sonar, firing 
system, propolusion 
system, gps system (all 
in 1 vehicle)
2
More equipment and 
parts than alternative 1 
but less than alternative 
2
4 Propulsion system, gear 
system
5 Firing ssytem, sonar, laser, gps, control 
system




Similarity to present 
REMUS
Battery, gps system, 
propulsion system, sonar 
sensor
Few equipment and 
parts
Propulsion system, 
control system Gps system, sensors
Talisman M (c/w 
Archerfish, 
SeaArcher)
Similar to AQS-20 + 
AMNS + WLD-1
Laser, sonar, firing 
system, propolusion 
system, gps system (all 
in 1 vehicle)
More equipment and 
parts than alternative 1 
but less than alternative 
2
Propulsion system, gear 
system
Firing ssytem, sonar, 
laser, gps, control 
system
Benthos Modem 
Network REMUS reference Bouy WIFI




Reliability prediction based 
on electrical parts
Reliability prediction based 
on software complexity
5 5 5
Reliability prediction based 
on similar equipment
Reliability prediction based 
on active element group
Reliability prediction based 
on equipment parts count




Simple and least 
interface required
Slightly more complex 
software and interface 
required
0










More complex software 






Table 26 - Reliability Prediction and Comparison 
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For maintenance-facility-required prediction, there are three levels of 
maintenance facilities: unit, base and depot. Systems requiring only unit level 
maintenance facility would have a better maintainability compared to systems that 
require depot level maintenance. 
Maintenance-organization-required prediction looks at the training of 
personnel that carry out the necessary corrective maintenance. There are three levels of 
maintenance organization: operator crew, maintenance team and manufacturer 
engineering team. Systems that require operator crew level maintenance would have a 
better maintainability compared to systems that require the manufacturer’s engineering 
team.  
Prediction based on the system’s ability to record and process maintenance 
data/information, compares the system’s ability to keep a record of usage data which 
would provide maintenance personnel with the system’s information and usage pattern, 
thus facilitating corrective maintenance. 
 Using the above prediction techniques, the team compiled the necessary 
information and compared the relative maintainability of the various alternatives with 
reference to the baseline system. The relative scale is from one to nine. One demonstrates 
the lowest maintainability, five representing the baseline, and nine demonstrate the 
highest maintainability (shown in Table 27). 
From the results obtained, it is noted that alternative 1 rated high in 
maintainability, followed by alternative 2, while alternative 3 and 4 had a poor rating. 
Depot level maintenance and the need for manufacturer engineering team were the main 






REMUS Commercially available Unit level Maintenance team Available
EOD Diver N.A N.A N.A N.A
REMUS Commercially available Unit level Maintenance team Available
EOD Diver N.A N.A N.A N.A
AQS-20
LCS module - available 
only through Navy Intermediate level
Maintenace team / 
manufacturer Available
WLD-1
LCS module - available 
only through Navy Intermediate level
Maintenace team / 
manufacturer Available
Support Module
LCS module - available 
only through Navy Intermediate level
Maintenace team / 
manufacturer Available
REMUS Commercially available Unit level Maintenance team Available
EOD Diver N.A N.A N.A N.A
ALMDS
Widely available through 
Navy and some 
commercial Intermediate level Maintenace team Available
AQS-20
LCS module - available 
only through Navy Intermediate level
Maintenace team / 
manufacturer Available
RAMICS
Widely available through 
Navy and some 
commercial Intermediate level
Crew / maintenance 
team Available
AMNS
Widely available through 
Navy and some 
commercial Depot level Manufacturer Available
MH-60
Widely available through 
Navy and some 
commercial Unit level Crew Not available
3 Talisman M (c/w Archerfish, SeaArcher) Available through Navy 4 Depot level 2 Manufacturer 2 Available 5 13
Improved REMUS Commercially available Unit level Maintenance team Available
Talisman M (c/w 
Archerfish, SeaArcher) Available through Navy Depot level Manufacturer Available
Benthos Modem 
Network Commercially available Intermediate level Manufacturer Available 13
4 3 1 5
20
15
4 3 3 4 14
3 4 3 5





based on spare parts and 
test & support equipment
Maintainability prediction 
based on maintenance 
facility required
Maintainability prediction 




based on system capability 
to record and process 
maintenace data / 
information 
 
Table 27 - Maintainability Prediction and Comparison 
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2.3 System Suitability  
From the analysis of the various alternatives relative reliability and 
maintainability as compare to the baseline system, the team mapped the two factors 
together to determine the system availability and dependability. Table 28 illustrates the 
summary of the various alternatives’ reliability and maintainability. The summary shows 
that alternative 1 had high reliability and maintainability and alternative 4 had low 
reliability and maintainability.  
 
Reliability Maintainability
Alternative 1 High High
Alternative 2 Low Medium
Alternative 3 Medium Low
Alternative 4 Low Low  
 
Table 28 - Summary of Various Alternatives Reliability and Maintainability 
 
3. COST ANALYSIS 
  
The life cycle cost (LCC) of each Alternative used to perform the identified 
system functions of search, detect, classify, identify and neutralize is analyzed to study 
the life cycle cost behavior from the perspective of a buyer.  
Developing cost analysis tools allows for the evaluation of different alternatives 
based upon constant dollar amounts, assumption and best guesses while investigating the 
costs and benefits of each alternative.  Each alternative was reviewed systematically to 
aid in the decision making process of which alternative is best for a given CONOPs. The 
following are elements in which this cost analysis was based:   
a. Establishing and defining the objective desired 
b. Searching out hypothetical alternatives for accomplishing the 
objective (describer in Chapter III) 
   c. Formulating appropriate assumptions 
d. Determine the cost and benefits of each alternative 
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e. Comparing costs and benefits of all alternatives and ranking the 
alternatives28 
Developing the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) was done to identify each element of the 
alternative’s system components cost. Research Development & Test Evaluation 
(RD&TE), Acquisition, Operation & Support (O&S), Overhaul/Major Upgrades and 
Retirement & Disposal were the overarching categories used to develop the LCC. Each 
category was broken down further as listed in figure 45.  Assumptions had to be made in 
order to generate cost dollars to perform this analysis.  
For Alternatives 0, 1, 2 the estimated costs were determined using actual costs 
supplied from various sources based on current programs of record and budgets. By 
extrapolating the current program cost we were able to break down the cost of each 
system to develop an overall cost of the alternative.  Alternative 3 and 4 include systems 
in which are still in the Research and Development phase and costs were estimated by 
analogy. Taking a single cost value form a single data point within a current system 
allowed us to estimate the cost of the system in the future.  
 
3.1 Formulating Assumptions 
  Assumptions were made in order to scope the analysis down to the larger 
overall components of each alternative.  
  RD & TE for Alternative 0-2 were not included in the LCC because these 
systems are already developed and available for use.  Alternative 3 has components in 
which are still in the RD & TE phase and educational/professional estimations were 
conducted to develop a cost range for each.  
  O & S takes into consideration attrition cost and operating personal costs. 
The attrition is defined as the reduction of the effectiveness of a system caused by loss of 
materiel and system degradation.  Attrition was measured using an attrition rate, which is 
defined as “a factor, normally expressed as a percentage, reflecting the degree of losses of 
materiel and system degradations due to various causes with a specified period of time. “ 
                                                     
28 Defense Economic Analysis Council ,Economic Analysis Handbook(Defense Resources Management 
Institute)Chapter 4.b 
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29Attrition rates were derived from data developed by a CNA study discussing the 
“Attrition of Future MCM Systems: Peacetime Attrition.” 
  Number or personnel for each system component was extracted from 
professional knowledge and various personal conversations with subject matter experts 
and used as a means to calculate operating personnel costs. Individual personnel costs 
used only base pay, BAH and BAS to determine annual cost. Annual cost used average 
CONUS rates, no dependants and nominal year-in-rate30. 
Without any data on system overhaul and major upgrade, it was 
determined for cost estimation purposes that every five (5) years of service a major 
overhaul/ system upgrade was conducted. The cost was determined by using fifty percent 
of the initial acquisition cost of the system.  
The economic life was determined to be ten (10) calendar years starting in 
2009 for alternatives 0, 1, and 2. During this economic life, it is also assumed that ten 
years will also be the life expectancy of each alternative. It is expected that each 
alternative will perform its required mission for 10 calendar years while at the same time 
development of Alternatives 3 and 4 will require additional funding.  
                                                     
29 Attrition of Future MCM Systems: Peacetime Attrition, Barry Reed, Kai Wang, The CNA Corporation, 
2007 







Cost Per Year EOD REMUS WLD-1 RMS AQS-20 ALMDS RAMICS AMNS SH-60 Talisman M Intgrated SAS Archerfish EMNS SeaArcher CMNS Benthos 
Underwater LAN
Research and Development $300,456,750 $172,456,750 $50,456,750 $50,456,750
System life cycle management
Tactic, Usages, Mission Planning $456,750 $456,750 $456,750 $456,750
Aqusition
 - Compnent Cost $2,700,000 $300,000 $9,000,000 $7,400,000 $7,000,000 $5,000,000 $3,500,000 $28,378,781 $3,500,000 $3,500,000 $200,000 $200,000 $1,492,000
* Assumtion that RD&TE has been 
completed and componet cost is 
based as close as possible 
legitimate Per Unit Cost
Operation & Support $3,084,257 $644,774 $173,335 $219,639 $79,457 $88,335 $119,335 $1,379,462 $153,335 $141,457 $75,457 $75,457 $208,934
 - Maintance $2,700,000 $30,000 $90,000 $148,182 $8,000 $5,000 $36,000 $1,200,000 $70,000 $70,000 $4,000 $4,000 $29,840
 - Operating personnel $384,257 $614,774 $83,335 $71,457 $71,457 $83,335 $83,335 $179,462 $83,335 $71,457 $71,457 $71,457 $179,094
* Assumtion of rates used for 
operators/technitians. EOD & 
REMUS Plt are per EDVR rqmts
(1) OIC, (1) 
CPO, (3) E4, 
(2) E5, (2) E6
(1) OIC, (1) 
CPO, (5) 
E4, (4) E5, 
(3) E6 (2) E5 (2) E4 (2) E4 (2) E5 (2) E5
(1) O2, (1) 
O2, (1) E5 (2) E5 (2) E4 (2) E4 (2) E4 (1) E4,  (3) E4-E6
Overhaul/ Major Upgrades $2,892,128 $472,387 $4,586,667 $3,809,819 $3,539,729 $2,544,167 $1,809,667 $14,879,121 $1,826,668 $1,820,729 $137,729 $137,729 $115,691,940
* Assumtion, cost determined by 




Retirement & Disposal $54,000 $6,000 $180,000 $148,000 $140,000 $100,000 $70,000 $567,576 $70,000 $70,000 $4,000 $4,000 $29,840  
 









3.2 Cost Analysis 
 
3.2.1 Alternative 0 
System cost estimates are based on FY08 dollars, initial costs to 
purchase one unit of the system and the operation/support costs for the first year. Figure 
46 illustrates the estimated ten-year life cycle cost, which focused on the following: 
a. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit 
 (1) OIC – O3 
 (1) CPO – E7 
 (7) Enlisted E3-E6 
 Support Equipment 
 Training 
 Travel 
b. NOMWC UUV Platoon 
 (1) OIC –O3 
 (1) CPO – E7 
 (12) Enlisted E3-E6 
 (3) REMUS 100 












CASH VALUE 10 Year Life Cycle Alt 0 
2009 $6,729,031 $3,729,031 10,458,061 $10,458,061 Initial cost (in $millions) $6,729,031
2010 $3,729,031 3,729,031 $3,655,912 Annual cost $3,729,031
2011 $3,729,031 3,729,031 $3,584,228 One time overhaul 
2012 $3,729,031 3,729,031 $3,513,949 (at 5 yr mark) $3,364,515.36
2013 $3,729,031 3,729,031 $3,445,048 Scrap value $54,000
2014 $3,729,031 $3,364,515.36 7,093,546 $6,424,843 Ten Year Life Cycle Cost (FY09$) $43,996,638
2015 $3,729,031 3,729,031 $3,311,273
2016 $3,729,031 3,729,031 $3,246,346
2017 $3,729,031 3,729,031 $3,120,286
2018 $3,729,031 $54,000 3,729,031 $3,182,692
NPV $43,942,638
DISCOUNTED 2.00% CYCLE PERIOD 10  
 
Figure 46 - Alternative 0 System Cost Estimate 
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3.2.2 Alternative 1 
The Alternative 1 System cost estimates are built upon the baseline 
provided in Alternative 0 with the addition of the WLD-1 Remote Mine hunting System 








CASH VALUE 10 Year Life Cycle Alt 1 
2009 $23,522,004 $4,122,004 27,644,009 $27,644,009 Initial cost (in $millions) $23,522,004
2010 $4,122,004 4,122,004 $4,041,181 Annual cost $4,122,004
2011 $4,122,004 4,122,004 $3,961,942 One time overhaul 
2012 $4,122,004 4,122,004 $3,884,257 (at 5 yr mark) $11,761,002.19
2013 $4,122,004 4,122,004 $3,808,095 Scrap value $208,000
2014 $4,122,004 $11,761,002.19 15,883,007 $14,385,728 Ten Year Life Cycle Cost (FY09$) $72,821,982
2015 $4,122,004 4,122,004 $3,660,222
2016 $4,122,004 4,122,004 $3,588,453
2017 $4,122,004 4,122,004 $4,122,004
2018 $4,122,004 $208,000 4,122,004 $3,518,091
NPV $72,613,982
DISCOUNTED 2.00% CYCLE PERIOD 10  
  
Figure 47 - Alternative 1 Cost Estimate 
 
3.2.3 Alternative 2 
The Alternative 2 System cost estimates are built upon the baseline 
provided in Alternative 0. Added to the baseline is the Airborne Laser Mine 
Detection System (ALMDS), Rapid Airborne, Mine Clearance System 
(RAMICS), AQS-20 and two SH-60. The system cost is calculated over a ten-
year life cycle to include a onetime fifty percent overhaul/major upgrade cost at 
the five-year mark.  
a. Alternative 2 includes: 
EOD Mobile Unit 













CASH VALUE 10 Year Life Cycle Alt 2 
2009 $89,563,947 $5,615,258 $95,179,205 $95,179,205 Initial cost (in $millions) $89,563,947
2010 $5,615,258 $5,615,258 $5,505,155 Annual cost $5,615,258
2011 $5,615,258 $5,615,258 $5,397,211 One time overhaul 
2012 $5,615,258 $5,615,258 $5,291,383 (at 5 yr mark) $44,781,973.67
2013 $5,615,258 $5,615,258 $5,187,631 Scrap value $1,833,151
2014 $5,615,258 $44,781,973.67 $50,397,232 $45,646,326 Ten Year Life Cycle Cost (FY09$) $184,322,497
2015 $5,615,258 $5,615,258 $4,986,189
2016 $5,615,258 $5,615,258 $4,888,420
2017 $5,615,258 $5,615,258 $5,615,258
2018 $5,615,258 $1,833,151 $5,615,258 $4,792,569
NPV $182,489,346
DISCOUNTED 2.00% CYCLE PERIOD 10  
 
Figure 48 - Alternative 2 System Cost Estimate 
 
3.2.4 Alternative 3 
The Alternative 3 System costs estimates are not built upon from 
the baseline Alternative 0. This alternative includes new system technologies in 
which many of the components are still in the RD&TE phase. Cost data was not 
directly available and estimations were conducted using similar current year 2008 
system cost data. Specifically, the Archerfish cost data was derived from using the 
cost data for the Expendable Mine neutralization System (EMNS).  
 The SeaArcher  cost data was derived from using the cost data for 
the for the EMNS in combination to the ABS Countermine System.  
a. Alternative 3 includes:  
(1) Talisman with Integrated SAS 
(2) SeaArcher EMNS 











VALUE 10 Year Life Cycle Alt 3
0 $7,845,706 $445,706 $8,291,412 $8,291,412 Initial cost (in $millions) $7,845,706
1 $445,706 $445,706 $436,967 Annual cost $445,706
2 $445,706 $445,706 $428,399 One time overhaul 
3 $445,706 $445,706 $419,999 (at 5 yr mark) $3,922,853.00
4 $445,706 $445,706 $411,763 Scrap value $156,000
5 $445,706 $3,922,853.00 $4,368,559 $3,956,738 Ten Year Life Cycle Cost (FY09$) $15,638,419
6 $445,706 $445,706 $395,774
7 $445,706 $445,706 $388,014
8 $445,706 $445,706 $380,406
9 $445,706 $156,000 $445,706 $372,947
NPV $15,482,419
DISCOUNTED 2.00% CYCLE PERIOD 10  
 
Figure 49 - Alternative 3 System Cost Estimate 
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3.2.5 Alternative 4 
The Alternative 4 System Cost estimates build from Alternative 3 
and add the Benthos Underwater LAN systems, which utilizes the JAUS system.  
Like Alternative 3, this system has not been tested nor funding requirements 
established.  The cost was estimated by analogy with current proven systems.   
a. Alternative 4 includes: 
(4) Advanced REMUS UUV 
(1) Talisman M 
Benthos Underwater LAN 
(1) Gateway Buoy 
(14) Network Nodes 
(2) Archerfish EMNS 
(2) SeaArcher CMNS 
(1) Shore Station 
YEAR INITIAL COST
ANNUAL 





CASH VALUE 10 Year Life Cycle Alt 4 
2009 $10,097,554 $805,554 $10,903,108 $10,903,108 Initial cost (in $millions) $10,097,554
2010 $805,554 $805,554 $789,759 Annual cost $805,554
2011 $805,554 $805,554 $774,274 One time overhaul 
2012 $805,554 $805,554 $759,092 (at 5 yr mark) $62,894,747.12
2013 $805,554 $805,554 $744,208 Scrap value $185,840
2014 $805,554 $62,894,747.12 $63,700,301 $57,695,326 Ten Year Life Cycle Cost (FY09$) $74,761,286
2015 $805,554 $805,554 $715,309
2016 $805,554 $805,554 $701,283
2017 $805,554 $805,554 $805,554
2018 $805,554 $185,840 $805,554 $687,533
NPV 74,575,445.60    
DISCOUNTED 2.00% CYCLE PERIOD 10  




10 Year Life Cycle Alt - 0 Alt - 1 Alt - 2 Alt - 3 Alt - 4 
Initial cost  6,729,031 23,522,004 89,563,947 7,845,706 10,097,554 
Annual cost  3,729,031 4,122,004 5,615,258 445,706 805,554 
One time overhaul  3,364,515 11,761,002 44,781,974 3,922,853 62,894,747 
Scrap value  54,000 208,000 1,833,151 156,000 185,840 
Total 43,996,638 72,821,982 184,322,497 15,638,419 74,761,286 
 





Over a ten-year life cycle Alternative 2 is nearly double the cost of 
Alternatives 1 and 4. Major consideration for this is that Alternative 2 requires the use of 
two SH-60 helicopters to perform its mission.  If the cost of the helicopters were removed 
and assumed that if a credible threat was made a request for services would be issued and 
the navy would provide then the cost is reduced to $85 million. This figure is more in line 
with the other Alternatives and will require performance and risk based analysis to 
determine which of the Alternatives lends itself to being the most cost effective.  
 
4. RISK ANALYSIS 
A risk is defined as the measure of the inability to achieve program objectives 
within cost and schedule constraints.   Risk management is as an organized, systematic 
decision making process that effectively identifies, assesses, monitors, controls and 
documents risks that are associated with a program.  Risk Management is a cyclic process 
that is executed continuously throughout a program’s lifecycle.  The risk management 
process used by the MIED Program is an established risk management process.    
Risks that impact either the MIED program or successful completion of the MSSE  
Capstone Project were identified.  Risks were identified using such techniques as: best 
judgment, lessons learned, negative trends, forecasting etc.  
Every risk event has both a likelihood of occurring and a potential adverse 
consequence.  These attributes were assessed and analyzed in order to quantify each risk 
identified.  The likelihood that the risk event would occur is rated on a scale from ‘A’ to 
‘E’.  A level ‘A’ rating indicates a remote possibility that the event will occur.  A level 
‘E’ rating indicates a near certainty that the event will occur.  The consequence of the 
event occurring is rated on a scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’.  A level ‘1’ rating indicates a minimal 
or no impact to the program.  A level ‘5’ rating indicates a catastrophic impact to the 
program.    
Risks were then plotted on a risk matrix.  A risk matrix is a pictorial 
representation of risk that clearly displays risk priority based on the likelihood and 
consequence of each risk.  The green, yellow and red sections of the risk matrix denote 
low, medium and high priority risks, respectively.  A sample risk matrix is provided in 
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Figure 52.   
Low priority risks may cause minimal program impact.  Minimal oversight is 
needed to ensure risk remains low.  Medium priority risks may cause some program 
disruption.  Mitigation plans are required and may need to be executed.  High priority 
risks may cause major program disruption.  Mitigation plans are required and must be 
executed.  Mitigation plans were constructed for all risks and were implemented based on 
risk priority.    
 Program risks are dependent on the implementation of a specific alternative.  
Program risks will be evaluated to compare system alternatives regarding risk.   Note 
that, since the Baseline System will be used in each system alternative the Baseline Risks 
apply to all system alternatives although they are only displayed once under ‘Baseline 
System’.  
 
Figure 52 - Representative Risk Matrix 
 
Four risk categories were considered for each system alternative: Development 
Based Risks, Cost Based Risks, Schedule Based Risks, and Organizational Based Risks.  
Program risks are provided by category in the following figures and described in the 
respective tables.   
Developmental risk is the possibility that any combination of the individual 
components in an adaptive force package has integration, technology, or budgeting 
conflicts that could lead to a degradation of the capability or development of the system. 
Cost risk is the possibility that the specified allocated budget will be exceeded, to 
include, cost over-runs and budgeted cost for the entire system life cycle. 
Schedule risk is the possibility that the program will fail to meet the scheduled 
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milestones and be delivered in time to be integrated into the Adaptive Force Package.  
Schedule failures can be influenced by delays in dependent technology, parts, decision, 
and hardware or by estimation errors. 
Organizational risk is the possibility of competing or conflicting interests among 
customers, users, and stakeholders that could adversely affect the budgeting, acquisition, 
operation, or maintenance of the adaptive force package.   
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Identification Analysis Mitigation Plan 
Baseline System Risk 1 Low or no risk associated. The 
system has already gone through 
a number of years of satisfactory 
testing and operational use. This 
is assessed at A1. 
 
Adaptive Force Package 1 
Alternative Risk 1 
Risk that a MPCE production 
delayed may cause system 
degradation. This is assessed at 
D3. Currently, the LCS mission 
modules are tied to production of 
LCS ships, meaning ship delays 
are module delays. 
Use baseline systems.  Allocate 
more resources to R&D and 
production.  
Adaptive Force Package 1 
Alternative Risk 2 
Risk of supportability issues with 
WLD-1. This is assessed at C4. 
Use baseline systems; investigate 
other UUV alternatives. 
Adaptive Force Package 2 
Alternative Risk 1 
Risk of integration 
incompatibility between hardware 
commonality systems ALMDS 
and RAMICS. This is assessed at 
B3. Currently, there is a 20% 
incompatibility issue between the 
two components. 
Continue with current OPEVAL; 
allocate resources to development 
 
Adaptive Force Package 2 
Alternative Risk 2 
Risk that there may be a delay in 
resolution of CSTR interface 
issues. This is assessed at B4. 
Use baseline systems; continue 
with current OPEVAL, and 
allocate more resources to 
production and development. 
Adaptive Force Package 3 
Alternative Risk 1 
Risk of difficulties with 
development and integration of 
the system. This is assessed at E5. 
There are currently no system 
requirements for the program. If 
requirements are established the 
risk will be substantially reduced. 
 
Use baseline systems; Transition 
to partial capabilities that may be 
ready.  Create system 
requirement. 
Adaptive Force Package 4 
Alternative Risk 1 
Risk of difficulties with 
development and integration of 
the system. This is assessed at 
D3. The technology necessary for 
the inter-communication 
component of the system may 
cause degradation in mission 
capability. 
 
Use baseline systems; Transition 
to partial capabilities that may be 
ready. Create system 
requirement. 
Adaptive Force Package 4 
Alternative Risk 2 
Risk that Advanced REMUS 
productions delay may cause 
system degradation. This is 
assessed at D2.  
Use baseline systems.  Allocate 
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Figure 54 - Cost Based Program Risks 
 













Identification Analysis Mitigation Plan 
Baseline System Risk 1 Risk that a continuous funding 
stream is not available to support 
maintenance and training. This is 
assessed at C4  
Assign roles and responsibilities 
to the appropriate agencies to be 
determined by higher level 
officials. 
Adaptive Force Package 1 
Alternative  Risk 1 
Risk that AFP 1 will not be 
funded adequately to achieve the 
required performance when it is 
needed. This is assessed at D4. 
Assign financial roles and 
responsibilities to the appropriate 
agency to be determined by 
higher level officials 
Adaptive Force Package 2 
Alternative Risk 1 
Risk of increased H-60 helicopter 
parts failure due to increased use. 
This is assessed at B3. 
Account for additional 
maintenance requirements. 
Adaptive Force Package 3 
Alternative Risk 1 
Risk of manufacturing and 
design problems that could cause 
some tasks for production 
labor to be rescheduled and not 
accomplished within scope of 
project timeline. This is assessed 
at E5. There are currently no 
system requirements for the 
program. If requirements are 
established the risk will be 
substantially reduced. 
 
Use baseline systems. Allocate 
resources towards R&D. Create 
system requirement. 
Adaptive Force Package 4 
Alternative Risk 1 
Risk of manufacturing and 
design problems that could cause 
some tasks for production 
labor to be rescheduled and not 
accomplished within scope of 
project timeline. This is assessed 
at E5. There are currently no 
system requirements for the 
program. If requirements are 




Use baseline systems. Allocate 
resources towards R&D. Create 
system requirement 
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  Identification Analysis Mitigation Plan 
Baseline System Risk 1 Low or no risk associated. The 
system is already an established 
program of record. This is 
assessed at A1. 
 
Adaptive Force Package 1 
Alternative Risk 1 
Risk of MPCE acquisition delay. 
This is assessed at D3. 
Use baseline systems 
Adaptive Force Package 1 
Alternative Risk 2 
Risk of MPCE schedule delay. 
This is assessed at C2. 
Ensure that MPCE development 
is managed effectively to 
minimize schedule impact. 
Adaptive Force Package 2 
Alternative Risk 1 
Risk of RAMICS schedule 
delays. This is assessed at B3. 
Use baseline system; continue 
with OPEVAL and allocate 
resources towards R&D 
Adaptive Force Package 2 
Alternative Risk 2 
Risk that there may be a delay in 
resolution of CSTR interface 
issues. This is assessed at B4. 
Use baseline system; continue 
with OPEVAL and allocate 
resources towards R&D 
Adaptive Force Package 3 
Alternative Risk 1 
Risk of manufacturing and 
design problems that could cause 
some tasks for production 
labor to be rescheduled and not 
accomplished within scope of 
project timeline. This is assessed 
at E5. 
 
Use baseline system. 
Adaptive Force Package 4 
Alternative Risk 1 
Risk of manufacturing and 
design problems that could cause 
some tasks for production 
labor to be rescheduled and not 
accomplished within scope of 
project timeline. This is assessed 
at D4. The technology necessary 
for the inter-communication 
component of the system may 
cause degradation in mission 
capability. 
 
Use baseline systems. Allocate 
resources towards R&D. 
Adaptive Force Package 4 
Alternative Risk 2 
Risk of Advanced REMUS 
acquisition delay. This is assessed 
at D3. 
Use baseline systems. Allocate 
resources towards R&D. 
Adaptive Force Package 4 
Alternative Risk 3 
Risk of Advanced REMUS 
schedule delay. This is assessed 
at C2. 
Ensure that Advanced REMUS 
development is managed 
effectively to minimize schedule 
impact. 
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Identification Analysis Mitigation Plan 
Baseline System Risk 1 Risk of insufficient or ineffective 
command and control structure.  
This is assessed at C4. 
Assign roles and responsibilities 
to the appropriate agencies to be 
determined by higher level 
officials 
Baseline System Risk 2 Risk of failing to determine 
which of the agencies will fund 
the program. This is assessed at 
D4. 
Assign roles and responsibilities 
to the appropriate agencies to be 
determined by higher level 
officials 
Adaptive Force Package 1 
Alternative Risk 1 
Risk of conflicting asset 
availability. This is assessed at 
E5. 
Allocate sufficient assets to the 
appropriate agencies. 
Adaptive Force Package 2 
Alternative Risk 1 
Risk of conflicting asset 
availability. This is assessed at 
E5. 
Allocate sufficient assets to the 
appropriate agencies. 
Adaptive Force Package 3 
Alternative Risk 1 
Risk of conflicting asset 
availability. This is assessed at 
B4. This is assessed at a lower 
risk due to the minimal use of 
interagency assets. 
Allocate sufficient assets to the 
appropriate agencies. 
Adaptive Force Package 4 
Alternative Risk 1 
Risk of conflicting asset 
availability. This is assessed at 
B4. This is assessed at a lower 
risk due to the minimal use of 
interagency assets. 
Allocate sufficient assets to the 
appropriate agencies. 
 
Table 32 – Organizational Based Risks 
 
5. CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
 
In order to properly assess the viability of each Adaptive Force Package, it is 
necessary to critically address each of the decision variables in order to make a final 
determination. 
 The most widely used decision analysis involves the comparison of performance 
data to expected costs, termed Cost-Benefit Analysis.  Figure 57 shows a plot of the 
performance scores for each AFP compared to the expected lifecycle cost. 
Compared to the Baseline, all alternatives show significant increases in overall 
performance, as the baseline is standardized to the 0 for the performance score.  AFPs 2-4 
have nearly indistinguishable performance scores, but have a broad range of cost 
associated with that performance.  Notably, AFP 3 shows a significant improvement in 






























Figure 57 – Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
 When risk is incorporated into the analysis, insights into the potential for cost 
overruns and performance degradation can be considered.  Figure 58 shows the above 
plot modified to illustrate the level of overall risk associated with it. 
Although AFP 3 and 4 attain high performance, the risk associated with their 
development is equally high due to the unproven concepts or technologies.  A risk 
adverse decision maker may then decide to choose AFP 1 as it offers return on 
performance, is less costly than AFP 2, and involves less risk than AFP 3 or 4.  However, 
a remarkably high increase in expected performance can be obtained by mitigating those 
risks early in the developmental stage and reduce the probability of cost overruns or 
performance degradation. 
 Despite AFP 3 containing a single body and therefore a search rate less that 
threshold, its performance score is still competitive with other AFPs that incorporate 
several bodies.  Its relatively low cost would allow for the purchase and sustainment of 
three bodies that would make its cost and search rate comparable to the baseline and 
increase the overall performance score to 0.78, even higher than AFP 4. 
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 Suitability of the alternatives should be considered in this critical analysis.  As 
discussed previously, Figure 58 restates the overall maintainability and reliability 
































Alternative 1 High High
Alternative 2 Low Medium
Alternative 3 Medium Low
Alternative 4 Low Low  
 
Figure 59 – Reliability and Maintainability Summary 
 
 To make the later AFPs viable, investments into suitability aspects would need to 
be made in order to improve their reliability and maintainability.  The speculation with 
AFP 3 and 4 is largely due to the uncertainty of these as-yet undeveloped systems and 
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employment.  Operational testing at the component and system level may reveal more 
optimistic assessments of these suitability scores. 
 Overall, the layered approach of these AFPs, allowing for the implementation of 
certain components as they come online, is a suitable approach to build capability over 
the near to mid-term.  AFP 3 and 4, while having the potential for high performance 
returns in the long run, must be supplemented with adequate resources in the near-term in 
order to reduce the risk and increase suitability scores to make them considerable for 
















VI. NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT 
 
The selection of a definitive employment concept for the MIED problem could be 
the subject of its own study.  Therefore this report will refrain from attempting to make a 
conclusive recommendation.  However, over the course of this project much information 
regarding an appropriate employment concept has been brought to light, and as such the 
project team found it necessary to discuss those findings here.  Below is our suggestion 
for the process of developing a national employment, followed by an example 
employment concept we have developed with supporting information. 
 Of note, the members of SEA-14 traveled around the country visiting many of our 
major ports for research, and observed many exercises relevant to our study.  A major 
lesson learned from our observations is that there are many entities; government, DoD, 
and private, that are working on domestic port security and the MIED problem.  
However, there is a significant lack of continuity and cohesion at the national level, and 
high-level requirements for addressing the MIED problem have not been established.   
For the purposes of employment development, some realities must be 
acknowledged.  First and foremost, there is not an unlimited budget available to combat 
the MIED problem.  As with any addressable threat, enough money could make the 
problem easier; but this just is not the case.  A second reality is that the Navy does not 
currently have the assets to provide the proper coverage of ports necessary to fulfill this 
mission.  Furthermore, the Navy is charged with defending the nation against threats 
abroad, while the subject of this study is the threat to domestic ports.  Third, all ports are 
different, as will be discussed in detail below.  Each port provides its own unique 
challenges to countering the MIED problem.   
1  EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT 
 The following is a suggested method for developing an established national 
employment concept.  As mentioned above, the responsibility for defense against an 
MIED attack has not been established.  The tasking of this responsibility is the first step 




 1.1 Prioritize Ports  
  Due to the fact that the nation’s ports vary largely in terms of capacity and 
capability, it is obvious an attack will have varying impact depending on the port.  
Therefore, an intermodal transportation body should be tasked to determine what ports in 
the Maritime Transportation System (MTS) are critical and to what degree each port 
requires preparation and protection from MIED attacks.  A government body acting as a 
“Maritime Transportation System Security Council” should be established to take inputs 
from necessary stakeholders to determine where critical nodes are in the U.S. MTS.  With 
the mindset of, “Where can terrorist attacks most likely achieve the economic impacts 
they desire?” the council should consider conducting network analysis, supply chain 
resiliency, tabletop discussions, input/output models, linear programming, etc.  While the 
analysis should focus on the MTS, the counsel should take into account all intermodal 
aspects of the port.  Furthermore, inland waterways such as the St. Lawrence Seaway and 
the Mississippi River should be considered as well. 
 Many factors should be taken into account when criticality is being determined, 
and numerous stakeholders should be involved.  Example factors that should be taken 
into consideration include; port capacity, port unique facilities and capabilities (such as 
Liquefied Natural Gas or heavy salvage capability, etc.), military or ammunition 
facilities, and how vital a port and its’ cargo is to downstream users and industries.  In 
order to accurately determine these factors, input should be taken from the Departments 
of Energy, Commerce, Transportation, Defense, and Homeland Security, as well as the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Office of Naval Research, Center for Naval Analysis, 
and possibly even civilian think-tanks such as RAND or The Heritage Foundation. 
 
1.2 Prepare for MCM Operations  
The second step for national employment is to prepare ports for Mine 
Countermeasures (MCM) operations.  After responsibility has been assigned and ports 
have been prioritized, the ports should prepare for MCM –type operations in accordance 
with their level of priority.   
  To conduct MCM operations, extensive knowledge of the environment is 
of paramount importance.  The sensors involved in searching for MIEDs are all very 
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sensitive and are easily affected by environmental conditions such as bottom type, clutter 
density, turbidity, tides, winds, and currents.  All of these conditions are unique to each 
port.  However, they can all also be determined well in advance of an attack.  With this 
knowledge on hand in the event of an attack, the time required for personnel to prepare 
for and conduct a search is greatly improved.   
  Preparation should not only include the determination of environmental 
factors; the relationships of local agencies that will likely be called upon to assist in 
response and recovery operations after an attack are equally important.  The standing 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for use of services and assets to include Requests 
for Information (RFI) of sensitive information should be well established before an event 
in order to provide for efficient and effective crisis management.  Organizations that 
should be included are; the Department of Defense (U.S. Navy and NORTHCOM under 
Defense Support of Civil Operations), Department of Justice (FBI), Department of 
Homeland Security (to include Customs and Border Patrol); local fire, police, and public 
works departments, utilities companies, and emergency medical response personnel.  The 
establishment of a Joint Harbor Operations Center (JHOC) can be very effective in 
establishing the working relationships of entities involved, and is also useful in day-to-
day operations. 
 
 1.3 Port Information 
  After responsibility is assigned, priority is established, and local 
environment conditions and personnel are identified, those personnel should work to 
“fingerprint” the port.  As mentioned, every port is different, and may require different 
preparations.  With the above relationships established, personnel can then work 
determine primary and secondary triage stations; prioritize berths, anchorages, and q-
routes, and identify Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR).  Examples of 
CI/KR could include underwater fiber optic cables, gas lines, seawater suction chests; 
bridges, geographic choke points, and locks and dams.   
 A suggestion that is being implemented in some ports across the country is 
the establishment of “port folders” in which the factors from this section were developed.   
Port folders should be standardized nationwide, and established via the above process.    
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 1.4 Develop Response Timelines 
  Just as each port in the country has its standard and unique characteristics, 
they also have their own impacts to the country.  The same council that prioritizes the 
ports should also delineate acceptable timelines for port opening, and at what capacity, to 
avoid catastrophic impacts.  Only after these timelines are established will personnel then 
be able to determine the numbers and types of assets required to meet the timelines.  
 
2 EMPLOYMENT EXAMPLE  
 Using the method outlined above, we have developed an example employment 
method that would significantly increase the national level of readiness against a 
terrorists attack.  The basis for our example employment would involve the layered 
employment of Regional Pre-Crisis Data Collection (PCDC) teams feeding information 
to a National Post Mission Analysis (PMA) Center, which can then provide data to a 
National Neutralization Team. 
 After establishing a National Maritime Transportation System Security Council in 
order to delineate responsibility as mentioned above, priority is given to the ports.  In our 
case, the project team decided on using the economic throughput of the ports to establish 
priority.  The top twelve ports in the United States are responsible for over 64% of U.S. 
waterborne foreign commerce.  The project team felt that prioritizing these twelve ports 
would notionally provide good coverage of economic throughput while still allowing for 
an acceptable number of prioritized ports.   
 After the selection of these twelve ports; Los Angeles, New York, Long Beach, 
Houston, Charleston, Hampton Roads (which consists of three ports), Baltimore, Seattle, 
Tacoma, and Savannah, it was noticed they fit discretely into five regions.  Seattle and 
Tacoma would comprise the Northwest Region.  Los Angeles and Long Beach would 
comprise the Southwest Region.  Houston, TX would comprise the Gulf Coast Region.  
The Southeast Region would consist of Charleston and Savannah, with New York, 
Baltimore, and Hampton Roads comprising the Northeast Region. 
 The inclusion of U.S. Fleet and Forces Command’s top twelve priority ports again 
fit nicely into these five regions.  Bangor, Bremerton, and Everett would be included in 
the Northwest Region.  San Diego would be included in the Southwest Region.  Ingleside 
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and Corpus Christi would be included in the Gulf Coast Region.  Kingsbay and Mayport 
would join the Southwest Region.  Finally, Norfolk, Little Creek, Newport News, and 
Groton would join the Northeast Region.   
 The primary purpose of the regions is Pre-Crisis Data Collection.  As discussed 
above, the collection of data prior to an event is of paramount importance.  The regions 
would maintain the assets required for this collection of data. The personnel and assets 
required for data collection would rotate through the ports in their region, enabling the 
near-continuous flow of data for significantly increased readiness.  The nature of regional 
teams ensures a level of standardization and reduced cost over individual, port-specific 
teams, and increases survey frequency, asset availability, and organic knowledge over a 
national team.   
 After this raw data has been collected regionally, it will be submitted to a 
National Post-Mission Analysis Center.  This center would be established by the MTSSC, 
possibly at NORTHCOM or a DHS facility.  Staffed by dedicated, full-time PMA subject 
matter experts, this centralized PMA will again increase standardization, and significantly 
reduce the cost and complexity associated with PMA.  After analysis, the results of the 
surveys would be returned to the port for inclusion into an ever-evolving port folder.    
 Finally, a national neutralization team consisting of Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
(EOD) personnel and a host of neutralization equipment would be established.  This team 
would be capable of deploying anywhere in the country very quickly, and be capable of 
MIED neutralization via any known technique.  This, again, allows for robust, thorough 
coverage while providing a cost-effective solution. 
 In the event of an MIED threat or attack, the regional search teams will deploy to 
the port under attack and begin the search, detect, classify, and identify functions of 
response.  They will be able to do so quickly, with port familiarity, and be able to rely on 
the well-established port folders.  The National PMA center will shift to dedicated 
support of the incident, able to provide rapid PMA for the effort.  The national 
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VII. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1 FINDINGS 
 The findings of this project offer insight into the technical issues encountered 
when dealing with the threat of MIEDs, but also highlighted observations about the tools 
of the SEDP and applications of this project to more general usages.  This section 
discusses the general observations about these topics that were discovered during the 
course of this project. 
 
 1.1 System Components 
  This study demonstrates the need for the development of technical 
advances in unmanned systems, computer aided decision-making, underwater data 
networks, and non-explosive neutralization techniques.  The use of unmanned systems, 
particularly in underwater environments, reduces the inherent risk to personnel while 
reducing the cost of personnel normally incurred in manned systems.  This savings 
increases the likelihood of a system being employed in mass. 
  An improvement in operational timelines is noted when systems integrate 
CAD/CAC programs and underwater acoustic networks.  By enabling search systems to 
capture selective data of interest to decision makers and equipping them to transmit that 
data without stopping the search process, the time it takes to clear a given search area is 
reduced by 50-75%.  This savings is realized by not having to process search data after 
the sensor has completed its search, which recent exercises suggest takes up to three 
times as long. 
  Novel, non-explosive neutralization is key in domestic ports to protect 
infrastructure, prevent public distress, ensure safety of personnel, and provide more 
useable data for forensics collection and criminal prosecution.  Systems modeled with 
this capability had a high performance score, largely due to the relatively high weight the 
neutralization MOP had on the score.  This area is emerging as a concept that could 
provide huge benefits to defeating domestic MIEDs and warrants further research and 
development. 
 
 1.2 Wargame Use in HLD/HLS Scenarios  
  SEA 14’s use of wargaming demonstrated the benefit of simulations such 
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as JCATS to model HLD/HLS exercises in general, and MIED scenarios in particular.  
These programs are particularly useful in modeling a mixture of technical concepts, 
probabilistic models, and human factors.  The scenarios, databases, and lessons learned 
offer a spring board to further studies that may develop and improve these tools to 
provide an even better representation of an MIED incident.  Further developing 
conditional stochastic models to represent component-level performance and “soft” areas 
such as human factors and stationing times would improve the validation of this 
modeling tool. 
  However, the use of this complex tool requires trained users, supported by 
subject matter experts, and dedicated for a considerable amount of time to building 
scenarios, validating databases, and executing the program.  SEA 14 was fortunate to 
have sponsorship by US JFCOM and JIEDDO, and supported by those organizations in 
addition to NPS faculty and staff, CAW, and the Port of Seattle.  However the dedication 
of two people for the propensity of the project schedule was a significant strain on the 
work load of the project team.  It is recommended that the use of wargaming be used by 
SEA and similar projects when there is sufficient time, manpower, and resources to 
ensure personnel are trained, support and funding is available, and will not cause a 
significant increase in work load. 
 
 1.3 Performance Modeling 
  The methodologies used to model performance may lead to potential 
variation in the results and need to be further studied in order to validate the performance 
claims of the project.  AHP, used to determine the weighting scale of functions and 
measures of performance based on formal stakeholder input gathered from a survey, has 
been criticized as having flaws that may lead to assumed order where no order exists, 
rank reversals, or biased results depending on flaws in the verbal scale used in the survey.  
Alternate methods of multi-criteria decision analysis are available, but not practiced in 
this study due to time and resource constraints.  These alternate means should be 
explored to validate or repudiate the project findings. 
  Similarly, a sensitivity analysis of the measures of performance weights 
and their effects on overall performance scores should be conducted, but was again 
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omitted from  this project due to time and resource constraints.  The effects of varying 
MOP weights on system performance is not known, but given the range of raw 
performance data and the often complementary performance of one AFP over another, its 
probable that as particular MOPs are weighted more heavily, overall performance marks 
could shift dramatically.  This study acknowledges this shortfall and recommends a 
sensitivity analysis of the MOPs as a follow-on project. 
  Lastly, the threshold and goal limits placed in the performance analysis 
introduce the possibility of systems with an extremely high or extremely low MOP score 
being unfairly judged, as extreme outliers with an improvement over 20% of threshold do 
not receive a higher score.  Therefore, it is recommended that a series of utility curves for 
each MOP be developed to ensure outlier data does not unfairly affect overall 
performance scores. 
 
 1.4 Expeditionary Applications 
  Although not addressed specifically in this study, the use of these systems 
in expeditionary operations shows potential.  However, the organizational problems 
coupled with a lack of reliable infrastructure compounds the problem, more so than in a 
domestic setting. 
  In an MIED threat in a foreign port that threatens U.S. commercial and 
military interests, there is likely a lack of command and control structure and multiagency 
plan that will assist in mitigation efforts.  There are also concerns about what capabilities 
the host nation has available to resume port activities.  The need for strategically 
significant commercial ports around the world to develop an incident response plan that 
addresses maritime homeland security, similar to the NIMS, needs to be implemented.  
Contingency planning and security measures need to be regulated and standardized in the 
largest commercial ports.  One means of doing so includes the involvement of non-
government organizations, such as the IMO or insurance companies, to pressure ports to 
train personnel, properly equip them, and exercise them in MIED scenarios. 
  Unlike in a U.S. port, information about the environment of a foreign port 
may not be accessed or obtained.  However; it is critical that the U.S. Navy in 
conjunction with the port authorities and indigenous naval forces conduct port surveys in 
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several of the strategic foreign ports that are routinely accessed by U.S. Naval ships.  
Senior Navy leadership needs to dictate the prioritization of ports that the Navy is willing 
to assist in conducting baseline level surveys on foreign shores, using a similar process 
used to designate priority domestic ports as outlined in Section V. 
  Many of the assets presented in this study can be applied toward clearing a 
foreign port.  The use of unmanned submersibles, EOD personnel, small vessels and 
towed equipment would constitute the first line of defense against an MIED threat inside 
commercial waterways.  One concern is that if the Navy were to take a significant role in 
addressing security in foreign ports, additional resources would be required.  Several 
more EOD teams would be needed as well as submersibles and their support equipment.  
Also these teams would have to be ready to deploy at a moment’s notice to ports around 
the world in the event of a crisis. 
  The sustainment and funding requirements in taking the MIED problem 
beyond the scope of domestic ports will be similar.  The Navy does not have the funding 
or resources to conduct all of the surveys it needs to in domestic ports simultaneously 
with surveys done abroad.  The Navy must seek partnerships with host nations, global 
maritime organizations, and the IMO to help fund the surveys and to ensure that the 
information in port folders is kept current. 
  The need for an international legal framework is essential to a rapid 
response.  An agreement between the Navy, host nation port authorities, and maritime 
security partners is required in order to allow forces to be employed quickly without 
political and administrative pitfalls in the event of a crisis.  The goal is to establish a 
memorandum of understanding so that the U.S. Navy can conduct or support counter-
MIED operations in a host country during peace time. 
  Considering lessons learned during this project, there are measures that 
need to be addressed without delay on the domestic front as well as abroad regarding the 
MIED problem.  The safety of equipment, economic interests, and personnel on foreign 
shores is of great importance, and an MIED attack is more likely to occur in a foreign 
country than in the U.S.  International agreements need to be developed and contingency 
plans made allowing the use of naval assets in a foreign port.  The Navy must 
acknowledge the significance of the vulnerability of ships from MIEDs when entering a 
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foreign harbor.   When it occurs, all eyes will be on the U.S. Navy for answers and it 
must be ready to meet the challenge and lead others in combating MIED terrorist attacks. 
 
2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The lessons learned in this study are beyond the initial scope of the project and 
the SEDP, but offer insight into issues at the highest levels of the MIED problem.  These 
recommendations are the product of the technical research that was conducted in support 
of this project, and the organizational issues that were highlighted along the way.  This 
project makes four overarching recommendations, each with supporting points and 
enabling mechanisms. 
 
2.1 Set Timelines for the Clearing of a Port 
  The first and arguably most important recommendation is the setting of 
timelines for the clearing of a port and how long it must take to restore to normal 
operations.  This timeline must account for the importance of that port to the national 
economy and other effects that are more port specific.  Such effects to consider include 
any specific commodities the port deals with, including natural gas, of which there are 
only five ports nationwide capable of receiving this import. 
Only after the baseline timelines are established can the determination of 
mission requirements at the operational and tactical level occur.  A designated 
coordinating agency can then develop the roles and responsibilities of first and second 
responders deployed to the scene of an MIED attack or threat. 
These requirements must also justify adequate funding for sustained 
manning, training, and equipment.  Although grants are useful for the rapid procurement 
of capability, the need for adequate funding for sustainment cannot be over-emphasized.  
Many ports have excellent security gear, purchased with grant money, sitting unused in 
storage due to the lack of funds to man and maintain the gear properly. 
 
2.2 Set National and Local Priorities 
Priorities must be set at the national and local level.  The threat of an MIED 
attack, although a “low probability” event, must be acknowledged as having the potential 
for extremely high impact to commerce and industry.  Therefore, it must become a 
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national priority to establish defense against these attacks.  Once that establishment has 
been made, it must be decided which US ports require coverage of the counter-MIED 
system, and as stated before, to what timetable is desired to mitigate long-term impact to 
the MTS. 
At a local level, port leadership must decide which areas are of most importance 
to their port industry so that focused recovery operations can begin almost immediately 
after an attack.  These decisions must be documented, trained to, and developed by all 
stakeholders that would be influenced by an underwater attack. 
Figure 60 shows a map of the approaches to LA/Long Beach.  This map shows 
two means of approach, the Queen’s Gate and Angel’s Gate.  After a baseline survey was 
conducted in support of LEAD SHIELD III, it was discovered that the Queen’s Gate 
approach offered a much better underwater picture with a third of the contacts.  This fact 
could make this approach better suited for a rapid survey and clearance route.  These 




Figure 60 – Approaches to LA/Long Beach 
 
2.3 Make Early Investments 
Additionally, in order to enable the system concepts discussed to be brought to 
fruition, investments must be made in the near-term to develop these technologies and 
improve system performance.  The need for safe, non-explosive neutralization techniques 
due to the unique environment of domestic ports must be emphasized.  The use of 
underwater communications and CAD/CAC algorithms has the potential to greatly 
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reduce the time it takes for operation completion and has potential for use in other 
warfare areas, highlighted by programs such as SeaWeb and UV Sentry, ongoing projects 
from ONR, NPS, NSWC, NUWC, and SPAWAR for applications in force protection and 
port surveillance. 
The Navy is a leader in the usage of underwater sensors.  However, these systems 
were often developed for deep, blue water purposes.  The effects of port environments, 
geography, and hydrography have not been well studied.  These effects must be better 
understood in order to develop sensing platforms optimized for near-shore employment.  
Exercises must be developed that flex the true capability of systems and 
responsible players.  Although MIED exercises have improved in quality and quantity 
since 9/11, true multiplayer exercises involving all required players flexing interagency 
coordination have not yet occurred.  Often exercises have been conducted to test a 
particular concept or technology.  A series of holistic exercises flexing the interagency 
coordination as a means of counter MIEDs in various ports is required to fully understand 
the complexities this threat poses and the capabilities that must be built and maintained to 
offer a credible, reliable counter-MIED capability. 
 
2.4 Develop Force Multipliers 
Finally, the development and implementation of force multipliers is vital 
to reducing operation timelines and improving efficiency. 
For example, the use of port folders is a concept that could be utilized 
today by Captains of the Port and area maritime security councils.  By cataloguing 
priority data, the location of CIKR, and MCM applicable environmental data, first 
responders have a wealth of timely data in which to begin operations. 
These folders are tantamount to building a common underwater picture 
that can be used to reduce the timeline. Experiments have shown that by cataloguing 
underwater contacts before a crisis occurs, the number of contacts that require 
prosecution can be reduced by 50-90%.  By simply comparing recorded imagery to 
surveys conducted after an incident has occurred, time that would normally have been 
spent investigating historical contacts can be reduced or even eliminated, allowing for 
assets to only engage newly discovered contacts.  Only by conducting baseline surveys 
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before a crisis and recording that data in a useable form can these time savings be 
realized. 
  In order for the data to be shared, this data must be standardized to allow 
for barrier-less data sharing.  If the data collection and maintenance is standardized, data 
can be collected by several entities, ranging from national data collection teams to port 
authorities that want to lean forward in collecting underwater data. 
The Limited Objective Experiment in Tampa Bay included a team from 
the Florida State University Underwater Crime Scene Investigation Team.  The tools and 
procedures they use could provide early intelligence into the nature of underwater threats 
and their chemical composition and enable the collection and prosecution of forensics 
data for use in criminal investigation.  The full potential of this capability has not been 
fully realized and requires exercises enabling the integration of UWCSI and MCM 
methods.  Early coordination of forensic analysis is crucial.  Surveying for data could 
potentially delay clearance operations, and therefore must be coordinated with the 
Incident Commander through the MCMC in order to ensure the IC’s priorities are met. 
All players involved in Maritime HLS/HLD should be familiar with the 
Incident Command System.  ICS is a standardized, on-scene, all-hazard incident 
management concept that coordinates interagency response teams.  This structure is used 
in all incidents ranging from wildfires to hurricane recovery and is the means by which 
multiple agencies communicate and coordinate response.  The Navy in particular, that has 
had limited exposure to this structure, should train responding personnel to ICS standards 
in order to ensure a smooth integration of Navy capability into the command structure. 
Since the potential for disaster was first realized in the wake of 9/11, the 
nation has made limited headway in taking preparations to protect our ports and seaways.  
Despite this, there is still much work to be done, starting with the acknowledgement of 
high-ranking government officials that a solution to this threat warrants development and 
employment.  As Dr. Scott Truver, proponent of countermine and MIED programs stated 
in his Naval War College Review article, “…as we address America’s “threat-rich” 
maritime security problems we must become mine and [MIED] conscious, if not “last 
















MEMORANDUM FOR SEA-14 STUDENTS 
 
Subj:  SEA-14 CAPSTONE PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
 
Enclosures: Tab A:  Background for Capstone Project Development 
 Tab B: Preliminary objectives for the Maritime IEDs, Mines, and Port 
Security Portion of the Project 
 Tab C: Preliminary objectives Interdependency in Organic Mine Warfare 
Programs Portion of the Project 
 
 
1. The objective of this memorandum is to provide guidance for the conduct of the 
integrated project which is required as partial fulfillment for your degree. You will 
deliver your completed and approved project report and final briefing on or before 10 
December 2008, in accordance with the following plan and milestones. 
 
(a) Develop a project proposal and a project management plan during the 
Spring Quarter 2008 for each project tasking.  These proposals and plans 
will serve to focus your initial research and analysis.  You should plan to 
review and update the plans frequently as you progress with your research. 
(b) Conduct project reviews approximately every six weeks, finishing with a 
final brief to be scheduled for the first week of December 2008. 
(c) Begin outlining and preparing your Project Reports as early as you can.  
Work with your faculty advisors, about every week, to prepare your Project 
Reports for their approval and signature.  The edited final report is due on 
15 December 2008. 
 
2. Background information on the character and the project objectives is outlined in Tab 
A.  The preliminary objectives statements for the two portions of the project are 
contained in Tab B and Tab C.  It is suggested that your initial efforts be aimed 
refining these objectives statements, based on research of current guidance documents 
and subject to the approval of your faculty advisors.  You should plan, at an 
appropriate time, with the concurrence of your advisors, to divide yourselves into two 
sub-teams, based on the Tabs B and C objectives.  Your final report should address 
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the relationship of the two portions; the Tab C objectives study may be included as a 
portion of the overall report – it is not necessary for there to be two separate reports.  
You are expected to work as a team on the full scope of the problems outlined, with 
strong interaction between the two sub-teams.   
 
3.   You will be expected to identify and integrate students and faculty from across 
the campus -- and other resources from outside the school -- to participate directly in 
your project or to provide source documents, technical knowledge and insights, and 
knowledge of evolving requirements, capabilities, and systems.  This participation 
could include students who would join your groups, students doing related individual 
thesis topics, faculty inside or outside NPS who have expertise related to your project, 
and appropriately engaged government agencies and industry developers.  Current 
NPS research projects that have relevance to your project include OR thesis work 
related to side scan effectiveness and Port Security War Gaming by the Chair of Mine 
Warfare.  It will be your responsibility to integrate the efforts of outside participants 
into your projects and your final report.  Your faculty advisors will, of course, assist 
in these efforts. 
 
3. You should employ the systems engineering and analytical methodology you have 
been learning in your class work and from your advisors.  Your role in the campus-
wide integrated project is that of the lead project systems engineering team.  In this 
role you will complete the Project Concepts Exploration phase.  This will require you 
to do a Stakeholder Analysis and Needs Analysis to determine operational 
requirements for the systems which will solve the problem the stakeholders have 
defined.  You will have to define the functions and performances of your system.  In 
executing these tasks you will be defining and understanding the overall project 
requirements (recognizing that this definition process is iterative and will evolve as 
the project progresses). 
 
4. You will have to define the selected concepts for supporting systems (the components 
in your systems) and partition the overall system requirements to be addressed by 
supporting teams of students and faculty.  Your role will include providing central 
guidance and requirements clarification and resolution, working with supporting 
teams, and completing your tasks according to your schedule. Ultimately, you will be 
responsible for integrating the work of supporting teams with your own to form a 
coherent, cohesive, finished report of the overall project. 
 
5. Background research of the references listed in Tab A are only a beginning.  You 
should also become familiar with related past SEA projects such as Maritime Security 
and other analytical studies concerning port security from RAND, IDA, CNA and 
other institutions and civilian industry.  
 
6.  The grades assigned to the participants in these projects will be pass/fail, and will be 
assigned by the lead faculty advisor.  Although you will work as part of a team, your 
individual performance will be the basis for this evaluation. Successful completion and 





Charles N. Calvano  
Systems Engineering and Analysis Curriculum Committee 





Profs Hughes, Papoulias, Paulo, Smith, Stevens, Solitario, Kline, Hoivik, Olwell, Eagle, 
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Background for Capstone Project Development 
 
Objective 
• Provide educational content appropriate to future professional careers as senior 
leaders. 
• Apply course content to execution of projects. 
 
Character of Capstone Projects 
• Address future security environments. 
• Relate strategic objectives, systems concepts, operational concepts, and 
technologies. 
• Tailor topics to group size and composition. 
 
Guidelines for SEA-14 Capstone Project Development 
• Establish homeland specific needs to counter a domestic mining threat in naval 
and civilian ports. 
• Working together, the SEA-14 students will derive threat types and levels. 
• Consider your Maritime Mine Port Security system to be capable of employing 
and supporting interagency forces. 
• Develop other faculty and student roles for the cross campus integrated projects 
 
Sources of guidance on current national maritime objectives 
• NSPD-41/HSPD-11 “Maritime Security Policy” 
• National Strategy for Maritime Security 
• National Plans for Maritime Security 
• Maritime Operational Response Plan 
 
Related CNO guidance 
• Maritime Strategy 
• Navy Strategic Plan  
• CNO Guidance for 2010 POM 




















































Port Security Systems to counter mine Objectives 
 
Design a system of systems to employ a regional or port specific port security system 
to counter the threat of mines or MIEDs.  The system should be capable of collecting 
and responding to maritime intelligence, surveying, and conducting timely response 
to open ports for maritime traffic.  The system must operate in an interagency and 
joint environment.  Consider current fleet structure and funded programs as the 
baseline system of systems to execute port security operations in developing these 
concept of operations, then develop alternative architectures for platforms, 
manning, command and control, communication, and operational procedures to 


























































Defining program interdependencies in the Organic Mine Countermeasure System 
 
Describe the requirements and current system programs to employ the Organic 
Mine Countermeasure concept.  Measure the level of inter-dependencies between 
component programs and identify critical key technologies in the current 
programmed system.   Use this programmed system as a base case and design 
system enhancements to lessen technical and operational risk of achieving the 
Organic Mine Countermeasure concept, or identify areas of potential investment 
savings.  Relate this project with the ability to respond to homeland defense 

























































EXERCISE ANALYSES & POST-TRIP REPORTING NOTES 
 
A.2.1.  
PORT OF CHARLESTON (01 April – 04 April 2008) 
 
Objectives:  Visit Project SeaHawk in Charleston, SC to see how one of the nation’s best 
Joint Harbor Operations Centers is preparing to the MIED threat. 
 
Conclusions:  Project SeaHawk is a congressionally funded pilot program that was 
developed in 2002, in large part by Senator Ernest F. Hollings, to create an interagency 
and joint operations control center to coordinate and integrate the efforts of multiple 
assets. SeaHawk was officially established by Congress in 2003. “Project SeaHawk is 
designed to demonstrate the value of interagency cooperation, joint operations, unity of 
command, and the sharing of intelligence and information to drive the risk-based 
allocation of homeland security/law enforcement resources across federal, state, and local 
jurisdictions. Project SeaHawk brings together the maritime and intermodal law 
enforcement operations, intelligence, and investigations of about 30 different federal, 
state, and local agencies with jurisdiction over one or more elements of the intermodal 
transportation system in South Carolina. Project SeaHawk is funded by DOJ and operates 
under the National Incident Management System/Incident Command System.” (CAPT 
Beeson, USCG). 
 
Although there is a high degree of interagency communication and a heightened 
Common Operational Picture (COP) there is no Common Underwater Picture (CUP). The 
port has a acquired a Klein 4000 Side Scan Sonar (SSS) for law enforcement personnel to 
use, there can be huge improvements in the capability to counter MIEDs.  
 
A.2.2.  
PORT OF SEATTLE (28 April – 01 May 2008) 
Objective.  Discuss Emergency Response Procedures (ERPs), research process of port 
security and relationships with CG and Local Authorities. Discuss authorities, 
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equipments and capabilities and limitations of all entities during a casualty or threat. 
 
Conclusion. The Port of Seattle, Sector Commander, CAPT Metruck will support SEA-
14 to the fullest of their availability. They are interested in what we develop and will 
serve as a sounding board for ideas, concepts and future SEA-14 capstone developments.  
Ports are ill-equipped to prevent the emplacement of an MIED. They must wait until 
attacked, and then respond.  From and equipment standpoint, ports have ample money 
through grants that may be used to purchase new equipment, but are not afforded any 
grant money to continue required maintenance and operation of such equipment. 
 
A.2.3.  
FRONTIER SENTINAL PORTSMOUTH EXERCISE (11 – 14 June 2008) 
Objective. The purpose of the Frontier Sentinel series was to exercise a 
coordinated planning and response plan to maritime threats to North America. The 
scenario for this exercise involves an underwater mine explosion located near 
Portsmouth, N.H. It involves the coordinated detection, assessment and response to a 
maritime security threat to Canada and the U.S. Frontier Sentinel exercise's objective was 
to practice, evaluate, and recommend improvements for multi-agency responses to 




Conclusion. Intelligence is the primary factor that most-effects the ability of 
personnel to deter and respond to an MIED or threat of an MIED.  The DOD is not 
capable of handling the MIEDs in commercial ports and must defer to DOHS/USCG. 




HONOLULU HARBOR EXPERIMENT (19 July – 25 July 2008) 
 167
Objective: Honolulu Harbor Experiment was developed to complete baseline 
sonar surveys of Pearl Harbor and Honolulu Harbor, to exercise interoperability between 
USCG COPT and USN MCM forces, and exercise the CNMOC change detection 
methodology. Additional objectives are to discuss mine warfare threat indicators and 
response escalation, discuss the command and control structure, and discuss measures to 
secure harbor facilities and vessels in a mine threat situation and, what required 
preparations required for the arrival of an MCM force.  
 
Conclusion: The baseline sonar survey was conducted in both Pearl Harbor and 
Honolulu Harbor. Priority search areas were identified by the COTP and additional 
searches were ordered. Change detection was made difficult that due to a large amount of 
clutter on ocean bottom. It was also determined that survey data may become obsolete 
after 12 months, requiring a new complete sonar survey. UUV operations witnessed 
which allowed for a deeper understanding of their capabilities and limitations.  
 
A.2.5.  
TAMPA BAY EXERCISE ( 21 August – 28 August 2008) 
Objective: The Tampa Bay Experiment was conducted to determine the 
applicability and feasibility of deploying an Adaptive Force Package in support of civil 
authorities and in response to a MIED threat. Maritime operations were closely 
coordinated with the USCG Captain of the Port and include some operations initiated 
from the Coast Guard station. The essential elements of the experiment are detailed 
surveys of selected locations within Tampa Bay and tactical employment of sensors, 
following simulated terrorist actions, using exercise mine shapes and MIED.  The 
primary experiment objective is the platform-independent employment of MIW Mission 
Modules, heretofore envisioned as deployed only from the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).  
Conclusion:  SEA-14 witnessed the successful use and implementation of the 
LCS MIW Mission Module to search and detect exercise mines and mine-like objects, 
calling this applicability and feasibility an Adaptive Force Package.” This was the first 
time the LCS MIW Module was used separate an actual LCS hull. Additionally, the 
Incident Command Structure (ICS) was used and a C2 structure was implemented in way 
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that has not been performed in previous harbor security exercises. In addition, a first, 
Florida State University’s College of Criminology’s underwater crime scene 
investigation dive team gathered forensic evidence, which was analyzed, on location by 
the National Forensic Science Technology Center’s mobile crime lab.  
 
A.2.6 
NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER (9 September – 11 September 2008) 
 
Objective. Establish a detailed knowledge of tactics, processes, legacy 
systems and systems under development. Discuss SEA-14 ideas with system and warfare 
experts. 
 
Conclusion. Met with current project managers and engineers to discuss various 
project and observed demonstrations. Gathered detailed data, regarding capabilities and 
limitations, for various systems to be utilized during follow on JFCOM hosted war 
games.  Further, other potential uses or modifications to currents systems were discussed 
as it relates to feasibility.  Discussed TACMEMOs under development within the Tactics 
and Analysis Department, and lessons learned to be implemented. Compared notes with 
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